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Editorial correspondence should be addressed to John W. Langdale, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.  
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# Marx vs. Man

NICHOLAS A. BERDYAEV

Translated by Donald A. Lowrie

**M**ARXISM aspires to becoming the predominant faith of the world's population: what does Marxism really mean for man, for human personality? Answering this question is not so simple as it may at first appear. That Marxism is anti-personal is easily demonstrated. Every purely sociological doctrine of man is anti-personal, every theory which considers man simply as a social entity, formed by the milieu in which he lives, limited to one plane of being, the social. For human personality has depth as well as mere extension.

Just what is personality? Before examining the attitude of Marxism, we must define our philosophical concept of personality. Such a concept is possible only if we recognize that the problem of man precedes the problem of society. First, personality must not be confused with the individual, as thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have often done. The individual is a natural category, biological and sociological. The individual belongs to the world of nature. From the biological point of view he is a part of the race; from the sociological, he is a part of society, an indivisible atom, anonymous, without internal living content. Apart from the race, from society, the individual has no independent existence. He is an element, a part determined by its relations with the whole.

Personality is something quite different. This is a spiritual, a religious, category. Personality says that man belongs, not only to the sociological and natural order, but to another plane of being, the spiritual. Personality is an image of a higher form of being than either the social or the natural. It cannot be a part of anything else. Society has a tendency to consider personality as its creation, the individual as dependent upon society. From the sociological viewpoint, personality is a minute part of society, a small circle within the large one which is society itself. On the basis of sociology, personality cannot stand and defend itself against society.

But from the viewpoint of existence-philosophy, the reverse is true: society is a small part of personality, merely its social element. The world is only a part of personality. Personality is the existential center, rather than

nature or society. The subject is existential, not the object. Personality realizes itself in social and in cosmic life, but it can do so only because within it is an element independent of both. Personality is not definable as a part of something else. It is totalitarian, integral, central; it is essentially universal and cannot be a part of the world or society, of universal being or of divinity.

Personality in general does not belong to the realm of natural law: it cannot be ranked in the hierarchy of the natural. It is rooted in the realm of the spirit. Its existence presupposes the dualism of spirit and nature, freedom and determinism, the individual and the social, the kingdom of God and that of Caesar. The existence of human personality in the world means that the world is not self-sufficient, that the transcendent is inevitable, that the end of the world is not in itself, but in God, in supernal being. The freedom of human personality, freedom not only *in* society and the State, but freedom *from* them as well, is possible because, beside the world, beside nature and society, beside the kingdom of Caesar, there is a super-mundane being, there is a world of the spirit, there is God. Personality breaks into the natural world and is inexplicable without it.

Personality is above all unity in diversity and changelessness in the changing. It is not a co-ordination of parts: it is an original unity. It has been ordained that personality must change itself, must create something new, must increase and enrich itself. But it must also remain itself, be the unchanging subject of all these changes. Upon meeting an old friend after long separation we cannot but experience two equally disturbing emotions. If we discover that he has not changed at all, still uses the same phrases, that he has hardened on the old lines and shows no signs of growth or enrichment, we are naturally grieved. This means that his personality has not realized its full possibilities. Such realization demands change. But another equally unpleasant discovery is possible: our old friend is so altered that he is scarcely recognizable; he is a totally different person. He has not only changed; he has been a traitor to himself. In the mass of changes, the integrity of his personality has been broken, his existential center is lost. For personality is unity of destiny. Destiny is at once change and the maintenance of a unified center of existence.

This is the secret of personality—it presupposes a super-personal, higher form of being, of which it is the reflection, and super-personal values which it realizes and which form the rich treasure of its life-content. Personality cannot be self-sufficient. It must go out of itself to other personalities,

to the vast variety of human and cosmic existence; out of itself to God. Personality is destroyed by ego-centricism, by preoccupation with oneself. Personality is realized by constant victorious conflict with selfish interest, by triumph over hardened selfishness. Realizing personality means filling it with the universal: it cannot exist by its own particularism, alone.

Personality is not something finished. It is constantly creating itself: it is a given task; it is God's idea for each single person. Realizing personality postulates a creative process which extends into infinity. Personality is an act. Max Scheler defines personality as the concrete unity of all acts. But, Scheler to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not life which is active, but the spirit, the spiritual element in man. Life is passive rather than active. Only the creative act deserves the name of activity, where something new is created, where nonbeing becomes being. Personality postulates the creative nature in man. It postulates freedom, since true creativeness is that wrought in liberty. Creativeness is the opposite of evolution, which is determinism.

Only the creative being can be called personality. A subject completely determined by social and natural processes has not yet become a personality. Personality defines itself from within, in its relation to nature and to society. It combats determinism from within itself and only that may be called personality which has freed itself from determinism by outside natural or social forces. Personality is not born of such processes. Neither is it formed by society. The existence of personality presupposes originality and cannot accept merely evolutionary continuity. Personality is created by God and this gives it its supreme value; this is the source of its independence and its liberty. Only the individual is born in nature and formed by the social process—the individual in whom personality must then be attained.

Because personality has to combat determinism, it suffers. Realizing and affirming personality always means pain. To refuse this suffering is to refuse personality. This realization is an heroic conflict and refusal to fight for it is a refusal of personality itself. How often man refuses! Personality is opposed to conformity, it is refusal to conform to what nature and society demand.

It is thus clear that personality is a paradoxical combination of contrasts: personal and super-personal, finite and infinite, the permanent with the temporary, liberty and fate. And the basic paradox lies in this, that to arrive at the creativeness which is personality, it must both exist already, and be eternally created. That which must be self-creative must already exist.

And while personality is not determined by society, it is still something social. It can realize its own fullness only in communion with other personalities. The social projection of this view of personality demands a radical, a revolutionary revaluation of social values, it demands removing the center of gravity from society, the government, the State, the collective or social group, to the supreme value of the personality, of every human person. Thus, for instance, the socialization of economy, guaranteeing the right to labor and to a decent living for every human life, social legislation to prevent the exploitation of man by man, is a logical result of this theory of personality. Hence the only system which corresponds to the eternal truth of personality is that of "personalistic socialism." At the basis of this world outlook founded on personality, we have neither the idea of equality nor that of justice, but rather that of the supreme value of every human person, and his right to self-realization.

Marxism's attitude toward personality is full of contradictions. This is partly due to its vague ideas about anthropology. Marx's negative attitude toward personality is inherited from Hegel, with his recognition that the general is of greater importance than the individual. With Hegel, personality has no independent significance: it is only a function of the world-spirit. Hegel's anti-personalism was taken up by Feuerbach, whose humanism is racial, rather than personal. (Note: At first an idealist and a follower of Hegel, Feuerbach belonged to the left wing of that group and in himself was really the crisis of German idealism. At the center of his philosophy, instead of the universal spirit and the idea, he placed man. He enunciated the idea that man had created God in his own image, that faith in God is only an external projection of man's own nature.) Man realizes himself in, and in the last analysis is dissolved into, the racial, the collective life. Breaking into existence-philosophy, Feuerbach sought to release the "thou," as something other than object. But Hegel's stubborn materialism prevented Feuerbach's complete discovery of personality as real and original being.

Marx has a sort of medieval realism in his concepts. He follows both Hegel and Feuerbach and accepts the primacy of the racial man over the individual. The general, the racial, precedes and determines the partial, the individual. Society and class are more primitive realities than man or personality. Class is a reality which exists in the scheme of things, not merely in thought. It is human personality, not class, which is an abstraction. Class is something like "universalia ante rem." It is the class which thinks,

judges, evaluates, not the individual. The individual personality, as distinguished from the racial unit, is incapable of independent thought or judgment. Man is a social-racial being, a function of society. This determines in advance the totalitarian attitude of Communism toward State and society.

There have been many protests against this subjection of personality to the world-spirit. Among them Kierkegaard in pure philosophy is supported by the master works of Dostoevsky and Ibsen. Over against this subjection we set the integral and human personality: not in society or the State. Only human personality can be truly integral, complete: both society and the State are always incomplete and can never be considered universal.

Because he prefers the general to the individual, Marx's weakest point is his psychology. If we except Marx himself, with his occasional interesting psychological comments, the psychology of most Marxists is limited to vituperation. Not even the psychology of class has been thoroughly studied. The bourgeois type, instead of being analyzed, is simply presented as a blood-thirsty criminal engaged in instigating war. This is especially surprising if we compare the Marxists with Zombart, de Man, Weber, Zimmel, and others. With interest centered upon the general instead of the individual, and this interest conditioned chiefly by conflict, it is impossible to study psychology. Instead, we find moral judgment and denunciation.

This is a general defect in all Marx's doctrine of man. While Marx himself has certain prophetic elements, and in spite of his personal conflict with the society about him, the doctrine of man which has developed from Marx denies the prophetic which always means the elevation of human personality above the social collective, and conflict with the social in the name of justice. The call to this conflict is that of an inner voice, the voice of God. If Marxism were to be completely realized in human society, it would mean crushing out the prophetic element, which appears not in the religious sphere alone, but in philosophy, in art, even in social life. This annihilation of the prophetic would result from the final absolute conformity of man to society, complete adaptation, eliminating all possibility of conflict. This, the result of the anti-personal spirit of Marxism, is its most repulsive aspect. Marx himself was a personality battling against the world, but this Marxists cannot be. The socialization of Christianity in the past offers good examples of what takes place when the prophetic spirit is killed.

Anti-personalism is, however, only one side of Marxism. The true sources of Marxist attacks on capitalism are personalistic and humanistic. The

chief reason for Marx's hostility to the capitalist system was that it oppressed human personality, made man a thing. Marx used the German word "Verdinglichung." In this he was right. The capitalist system dehumanizes both proletarian and capitalist. Deprived of the tools of production, the worker has to sell his labor, and thus becomes a thing, necessary to production, it is true, but still a thing. Man's creative activity is taken from him and cast out into a world of objective things. And this subtraction is forced upon man from outside by influences which oppress and degrade him. In reality the differentiation between mental and physical labor is an infraction of the integral personality and should be abolished.

While he did not follow it through, this idea of "Verdinglichung" in Marx, especially in his younger years, is a bit of genius. Here are revealed the motives for his first hatred and denunciation of the capitalistic system. These motives are purely humanitarian: Marx proclaims revolutionary uprising against a social order in which human personality loses its integrity and part of it becomes a thing, an object of commerce. The proletarian is a man a part of whose personality has been taken from him by the oppressive economic system. (Among the Communists, this part of Marx's theory has been best developed by Lukacs in his *Geschichte und Klassen-Bewusstsein*.) Marx insists that if Socialists expect the proletarian to play a great part in world history this is not because they regard the proletariat as something divine, superhuman, but just because it represents an abstraction of all humanity, because the proletariat has been robbed of its human nature and must find a way to recover it. It is the class which must struggle to regain that humanity of which it has been deprived. This idea, thoroughly dialectic, is of special importance in the study of Marxism, the idea that man is in the process of being robbed of part of himself, and that this process is most intense among the proletariat. This leads to the idea of class consciousness: man mistakes his own activity for part of the objective world and hence subject to the same sort of immutable laws.

The influence of Feuerbach is noticeable on Marx's earlier years. What Feuerbach said of religion, Marx accepted and extended to other spheres. Feuerbach held that religion divided man's nature into parts: man makes God in his own image. What is really only man's own nature is presented to him by religion as something apart from and higher than himself. The poor man has a rich God, that is, all his property is taken from him and transferred to divinity. Belief in God thus "proletariatizes" man. Once a man

becomes rich, God becomes poor or vanishes altogether. Give man back his riches, and he becomes a totalitarian being, lacking no essential parts of his nature. These ideas of Feuerbach Marx used as the basis for his genial criticism of capitalism and political economy. And it must be said that they apply much better to capitalism than to belief in God.

The doctrine of the fetishism of goods in volume I of *Kapital* is perhaps Marx's most notable discovery. This fetishism is an illusory consciousness under which the product of human labor is seen as a thing, a material reality belonging to the objective world and subject to its fixed laws. Marx demolished the world of economics in which bourgeois political economy had been discovering its laws. Economics is not part of the world of things, it is only human activity, labor, man's attitude to man. Hence economics may be changed or controlled: man may rule economics. The riches man creates, alienated from him in the world of economics, considered as objective reality, may thus be restored. Man may become a rich, an integral being, may again have all that was taken from him. And this will be accomplished by the activity of the proletariat, just those people from whom the most wealth has been taken.

The "Fatum" of economics does not exist: it has been overcome. Man may free himself from the illusion that human activity is an object. And this liberation is the task of the proletariat. Marx defined capital, not as a real thing but rather as the social relationship among men in the process of production. This definition was a great shock to bourgeois economists. It places the center of gravity of economic life in human activity and conflict. In Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* there is an interesting passage where he says that the great mistake of materialists, hitherto, had been in their considering reality in the form of object, instead of subjectively, as human activity. Nothing could be more anti-materialistic. Nothing could better illustrate how dubious is Marx's materialism. This idea belongs to existence-philosophy rather than to materialism. For the materialist, everything is a thing, an object: for existence-philosophy everything is subject, activity. And in both Feuerbach and Marx there is an element of existence-philosophy. Marx's early idea of the exceptional activity of man as a free spirit rather than a thing was derived from German idealism, but still he lacks the full concept of personality.

Even economic materialism may be comprehended in two ways. It gives the impression, first, of a logical and extremely sociological determin-

ism. Economics determines the whole of human life, not only the structure of society, but all ideology, all spiritual culture. There is a definite set of laws for the social process. Both the Marxists and their critics have understood Marxism in this spirit of extreme determinism.

But this is only one interpretation, one side of Marxism. The fact that economics determines the whole of human life is due to past evils, to man's present slavery. The day will come when this slavish dependence on economics will be broken, when economics will depend on man, and man will become the master. Marx proclaimed not only man's slavery, but the possibility of his liberation. Economic materialism by itself is a rather sad theory, incapable of arousing revolutionary enthusiasm. But Marxism possesses in a high degree the capacity to enkindle revolutionary zeal. Recent Soviet philosophy is moving toward the indeterminist understanding of Marxism (See Berdyaev's articles on "The General Direction of Soviet Philosophy" D.A.L.).

Marx lived in a thoroughly capitalist society and saw how economics completely determined human life, enslaved human consciousness and evoked illusory concepts. But Russian Communists today are living in the epoch of the proletarian revolution, and thus they see the world from another angle. Marx and Engels spoke of the leap from the realm of necessity to that of liberty. Russian Communists hold that they have already made the leap. Hence for them Marxism is turned inside out, although they insist upon remaining Marxists at all costs. Now it is not economics which determines consciousness, but the proletarian revolutionary consciousness which determines economics: not economics determines politics, but the other way around.

Hence philosophizing Russian Communists try to construct a philosophy based upon the idea of auto-motivity. All the qualities of the spirit are attributed to the material: freedom, activity, reason, et cetera. Such a philosophy suits the revolutionary will. Mechanistic materialism is condemned: it is not in tune with the exaltation of the will to revolution, it is not a philosophy of heroic human conflict. Man is now discovered to be free from the power of the material, objective, economically determined world.

But it is the collective man, not the individual, who is free. The individual is not free from the human collective, from communist society. He attains liberty only in identifying himself with the collective life. This idea is found not only in Marx, but in Feuerbach as well. For Feuerbach, man

was a reality only in the social, only in the life of the race. Communism is unusually dynamic: it asserts hitherto unheard-of activity for mankind. But it is not the activity of human personality: it is a social activity, the activity of the collective. The individual man is completely passive in his relation to the collective: he acquires active power only as he is dissolved into the life of the human race. Communism asserts only this racial activity which Feuerbach defined, but which really goes back to Hegel's world-spirit.

Marxism may be interpreted humanistically. It may be seen as struggle against depriving man of his human nature, struggle to restore man's integral being. And Marxism may also be interpreted as indeterminism: the proclamation of man's liberation from the power of economics, from the power of fate. Marxism exalts the human will. It tries to create a new man. But it has its fatalistic side also, an aspect which actually deeply degrades mankind. Marx's doctrine of man is completely dependent upon capitalist industry, upon the factory. The new Communist man is created in the factory: he is machine-made. The spiritual culture of the new man depends upon the conditions of life in heavy industry. This is the reason for the dialectic in Marxism. Good is born of an ever-increasing evil; light is kindled by an ever-deepening shadow. The conditions of life in capitalist industry exasperate the proletarian worker, unman him, deprive him of his human worth, make him a being torn by resentment, anger, hatred, desire for revenge. The process of proletarianization dehumanizes, it robs man of his human nature. And in this the proletarian is the least to blame. But out of this progressive dehumanization, this terrible narrowing of man's consciousness, how can we expect a new type of man to emerge? Marxism expects a miraculous dialectic change of what it considers evil, into good, into the better life. But at the same time the proletariat is burdened with the "Fatum" of capitalist industry, exploiting, oppressing, robbing him of human dignity. According to Marxism the higher type of man will be the result of complete dehumanization.

Such a concept is thoroughly anti-personal. It fails to recognize the inherent value of human personality, its depths of being. According to this concept, man is a function of the world's social process, a function of the general, a means to an end, by which the new man is manufactured. Quantity of evil turns into quality of good. And in this process personal activity, human consciousness, creativeness or conscience, count for nothing. Everything is wrought by "sly reason" (Hegel) which is general.

All this indicates the complex and contradictory make-up of Marxism.

It not only declares war on the degradation of man by man, war against injustice and slavery, but also reflects the low levels to which bourgeois capitalist society has sunk, depressed by the spirit of materialism.

This is what both classical Marxism and Russian Communism fail to see. Feuerbach missed the point, also. One of the basic faults in Marxist humanism is that it involves subtracting from man his human nature. According to both Feuerbach and Marx, belief in God and in the spiritual world is nothing other than taking from man his higher, spiritual nature, its transfer into the sphere of the transcendental. Granted that man must recover his full nature—is this really accomplished? Not in materialist Marxism. Man does not regain his spiritual nature: it is lost, together with everything transcendental. Man is robbed of the spiritual, he becomes nothing but a bit of matter.

But a bit of matter cannot possess human worth. It cannot realize a complete, "totalitarian" life. Communism would give back to the proletariat the means of production which have been stolen from him, but has no idea of restoring the spiritual elements of which human nature has also been robbed. Thus the totalitarian life can no more be considered as really achieving something than it can be thought of as ensuring true human worth. Man's real worth involves the fact that he is a spiritual being, the image and likeness of divine being, that in him is an element independent of the external world, independent of society. Man's true worth, just as his fullness of life, is bound up with the fact that he belongs not only to the kingdom of Caesar, but to the kingdom of God as well. This means that man has higher value, more completeness, if he is a personality. But neither in Marxism nor in Communism do we find this idea of personality, hence they cannot really defend man's best interests. At best, Communism affirms only the individual, the socialized individual, and demands for him a totalitarian life. But personality is denied. The individual is only a being formed by society, by a process of training. Lenin said that after a period of dictatorship in which there would be no liberty whatever, men would **BECOME ACCUSTOMED** to the new conditions of social life and would feel themselves free in a communist society (Note: cf. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*. In his book, *Materialism and Empirico-criticism*, Lenin offers a rather ordinary defense of materialism and naturalism. This is a philosophy much inferior to that of A. Bogdanoff, which deserves the name socialist, while Lenin's does not.)

Now this preparation of the new man by the process of enforced train-

ing and habit is contrary to the principle of personality, which always presupposes autonomy. Marx began by struggle against the processes of dehumanization in capitalist society. In exchange for this dehumanization Marx should have proposed humanization. But what actually took place was a complex dialectic process in which humanism was transformed into anti-humanism. Marxism is one of the crises of humanism, one of the ways out of the kingdom of humanism which attempted to base man on man himself, recognizing man as a being sufficient unto himself and self-containing. The very process of dehumanization which Marx denounced in capitalism, takes place in materialistic communism. Communist, as well as capitalist industrialism may dehumanize man. Both may turn man into a technical function. In Communism man is not considered to be a free spirit, that is, a personality, but rather a function of the social process. He is a material thing occupied solely with economics and technics, and in his free time amusing himself with art, which exists for the purpose of decorating industrialized life. The anti-personalism of Communism is not a matter of its economic system, but of its spirit, or, better, of its denial of the spiritual. This must always be borne in mind in our thought of Communism. Personalism, on the other hand, demands the socialization of economics, but cannot admit the socialization of spiritual life, which means the death of the spirit, robbing man of his soul.

Again, the anti-personalism of Marx is due to its false attitude toward time. Marxism, and specially its practical application in Communism, considers the relationship between present and future to be that of means and end. The present is a means—no direct and definite end is achieved in the present. And means are approved which have no resemblance to the aim in view: violence and tyranny for the attainment of freedom, hatred and strife for the realization of brotherhood. A totalitarian human life is realizable only in the future, perhaps in the distant future. In the present man remains denuded of all his inheritance, he is alienated from himself. Thus Marxist Communism affirms man, the whole man, only in the future, while denying him in the present. The man of the present is only a means to the man of the future: his condition at present only a means to that in some future epoch.

Such an attitude toward time is incompatible with the principle of personality, with the recognition of the value of each human personality in itself and its right to realize its own life. It is incompatible with man's consciousness of himself as a whole rather than a part, as an end and not merely a means.

No man, regardless of the class to which he belongs, can be treated as a simple means to an end. No human person can be dealt with as an obstacle in the way. This, however, is a question for anthropology rather than sociology, and there is no real anthropology in Marxism.

Here are two problems, the problem of man and the problem of society: unquestionably the former comes first in importance. But Marxism insists on the primacy of the social, instead of the individual problem. Marx was a remarkable sociologist and in this sphere he made large discoveries. But he was not at all an anthropologist: his anthropology, bound up with rationalistic materialism and materialistic evolutionism, is extremely simple and out of date. Man is the product of nature plus society. More specifically he is the product of a social class—within him there is no inner, independent nucleus. Here anthropology is subjected completely to, and made a mere part of, sociology. Man is regarded as made in the image and likeness of society. Society is the higher being which man reflects. This view is opposed to an anthropology based not on sociology, but on theology, using that word in its larger sense. Man is not the image and likeness of society, he is the image and likeness of God. Hence within man there is a spiritual element independent of society and only therefore can we affirm the dignity of man as a free spirit, active and creative.

Philosophical anthropology teaches that man is a personality. It is a personalist philosophy. There can be no personality without a spiritual element which makes man independent of the determinisms of external surroundings, natural or social. This spiritual element is no contradiction to the human body, to man's physical, material make-up, to everything that ties him up with the life of the whole natural world. Abstract spiritualism is powerless to construct a doctrine of man's essential integrity, oneness. The spiritual element embraces the human body, all the "material" in man. It postulates the control of man's body and spirit, the attainment of a complete image of personality, the entry of the whole man into another order of being. The body belongs to the human personality and the spiritual in man must not be alienated from it. The body is a form which demonstrates the victory of the spirit over formless matter. The old Cartesian dualism of "soul" and "body," "spirit" and "matter" is completely false and may be considered as already in the discard. The real dualism is that of spirit and nature, freedom and necessity, personality and thing. The human body, even the "body" of the world, can leave the sphere of "nature," of "necessity," of "things" and

pass into the sphere of "the spirit," of "freedom," of "personality." This is the meaning of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The resurrected body is no longer natural matter, subject to determinism, no mere thing. Neither is it bodilessness, abstract spirit: it is a new spiritual body. The doctrine of the resurrection thus differs from the immortality of the soul: the former postulates immortality for the whole, the integral man, and not for some separate part of him, like the soul. Hence it is a personalistic doctrine.

This independence of the spiritual in man from the power of society does not involve opposing the "spiritual" to the "social." It does not separate one from the other. It means, rather, that man should form society and be its master, should realize his fullness of life in society rather than being defined by society and becoming its slave or one of its functions. The spiritual governs the social in man and this involves the attainment of human completeness and integrity. Society is not an end in itself. The end is man, fullness and completeness of life. Even the most perfect organization of society is only a means. And Marxism is anti-personal in so far as it fixes its object not in man who is called to eternal life, but in society.

The basic error in Communism founded on Marxism is its belief in the possibility of realizing not only justice, but human brotherhood, by compulsion. Communism believes that not only society, but the communion of human spirits can be organized by force. Socialism derives from the word society, Communism from the word communion, the mutual communing of men, one with another. Socialism differs from Communism, but not on the plane of the social and economic organization of society—here they may coincide. But Socialism may be considered as only the social and economic organization of society, its aims limited to this one sphere. Communism, on the other hand, is totalitarian. It strives for a complete world-philosophy: it wants to build a new man, a new human brotherhood, a new attitude toward the whole of life. Communism cannot consent to be accepted partially. It demands complete adoption, a conversion, as to any religious faith. But to accept only the social and economic phases of Communism and attach these to some other world-philosophy—this does not produce Socialism. Socialism stands for the building of a classless society, which will realize social justice and will not permit the exploitation of man by man. But the building of a new man, of human brotherhood, is a spiritual, a religious task. It presupposes an inner rebirth. Communism will not admit this—it is a religion itself.

Thus a Christian may, and in my opinion must, be a Socialist, but he can hardly be a Communist since he cannot accept Communism's pretense to being a complete and all-embracing world-view. Christian personalism should not oppose the building of a classless society: it should aid in the task. A class society which treats vast masses of human personalities as means to an end and permits their exploitation, which denies human dignity and worth to the worker, is contrary to all the principles of personality.

The true doctrine of human personality, personalism, should demand that socialization of economics which will guarantee to every human being the right to labor and to a proper human standard of life. Personalism demands for each individual the right and the opportunity to attain fullness of life.

But the socialization of society cannot by itself achieve the new man and the brotherhood of all men. It orders relationships and communication among men on the basis of justice, but it cannot bring about true communion, real brotherhood. Brotherhood has a personal character. It is always the meeting of personalities, of I and thou, the union of me and thee in us. This is not achievable by the external organization of society involving only a part of human personality and not reaching to its depths. No sort of social organization can build a complete, "totalitarian" life. And the illusion of possessing such fullness of life is paid for by terrible limitation of personality, impoverishment of its consciousness, oppression of its spiritual side. The Communist consciousness is caught in this illusion. Marxism creates this fallacy by an untrue doctrine of personality, of the whole man. A movement for the building of a new classless society, unquestionably more just than the present system, may be accompanied by a lowered spirituality, a narrowing of man's spiritual nature. But it may be that building a classless society, even if the effort be accompanied by materialist illusions and errors, will lead to a spiritual renaissance which is now hindered by class conflict and its concomitant evils. Once the classless society is attained, it will be clearly seen that materialism and atheism, the militant godlessness of Communism, all belong to the past, to the epoch of the conflict of classes. Then the new man will be face to face with the last secret of being, with the final problems of the spirit. Then will be clearly revealed the tragedy in human life, and man will long for eternity. And only then will men cease to mistake the partial for the totalitarian. Only then can personality become truly whole.

# An Inquiry Into Americanism

GAIUS GLENN ATKINS

THERE are just now among us acute differences of opinion about what Americanism really is. The word has become a slogan for militant groups and interests and a subject of inquiry for the more detached students of society, history and political science. We use few words controversially more often—or more loosely. We feel that its appropriation by our causes and interests is their battle half-won, and that if we can deny it to our opponents their cause is lost. There has long been a flood of books and articles which have tried to set out and interpret what may inclusively be called the American way. The want of any ruling agreement among them indicates the difficulty of the inquiry, and the baffling number of lines the inquirer may take when he begins to ask what is really American and how it can be differentiated from other national cultures. His own temper and inheritances are likely to give him his direction and shape his conclusions, and if he does not watch his step, he will get his picture out of drawing in the hope of making it arresting.

It all depends where one begins. The ideologist begins with the traditions, the economic determinist with the economic forces which have shaped our national life. The political philosopher of a religious turn begins with the "compact" in the cabin of the *Mayflower*, the constitution of the Presbyterian Church or the authority of the Anglican Bishop transplanted to Virginia, according to his church loyalties. The secular begin with the political philosophy of the English Utilitarian-individualism. Each protagonist, with a little forcing and an adroit avoidance of qualifications and exceptions, which is also the American way, can make his case. At any rate, that "way" is and always has been the joint issue of a historical and social process conditioned and often controlled by geography, race, religion, the heady exploitation of a continent, natural selection, a dominant idealism and an intense national self-consciousness.

America has always been an escape, an adventure, an experiment and, more or less, an accident. The man who discovered it was not looking for it. The gentlemen-adventurers who explored it sought the Fountain of Youth and the fabulous traffic of the "Coasts of Illusion." It was colonized

at cross purposes by trading companies who wanted its accessible and transportable wealth, and colonists for whom its remote loneliness was an escape from intolerant churches, stupid kings, debtors' prisons and dead-end streets. It was, therefore, from the first haunted by two nostalgias, the homesickness of the exile for what he had left and the homesickness of the seeker for what he could never find, or else, if he found it, was no longer washed with a golden light. In the end the practical trading companies turned out visionaries whose shares paid no dividends. The dreamer, the seeker, the exile turned out pragmatic and practical, having a power to maintain themselves against enormous hazards, implement their visions and evolve for themselves institutions native to their spirit and their necessities.

In addition the American Pattern has been haunted from the first by the lure of the "short cut"; the persuasion, that is, that here were quick roads to the realization of dreams and desires by which the old, slow, painful routes of discipline and toil could be escaped and the adventurer come easily to whatever goals his imagination furnished him—and the adventurer has always been fertile in imagination. The search for the "Northwest Passage" in industry, politics, social organization, moral order and even religion has given a quality to American life without which it can not be understood and has left a devastating mark upon the Continent itself. America has always been an easy way of going somewhere else.

The sophisticated in their analyses of American beginnings have not always sensed clearly enough the real contributions of intransigent religion to the American Pattern. They have noted its sombre creeds and its irritating self-righteousnesses. They have not always recognized what revolutionary conceptions of social and political authority lay behind the controversies about creeds and masses. The Valois, the Bourbons and the Stuarts did. Something, they knew, was in action behind Dissenter and Huguenot which would carry with it an entire shift of the seat of authority and substitute other throne-rooms in Church and State. The nebular social and political philosophies which the exiles shipped westward along with their poor household gear, their courage and their hope gained rather than lost from being invested with the august authority of theology and held by men and women who believed themselves colonists of heaven.

The estranging sea, then so unbelievably wide, served their purpose, directly the little ships which carried them were out of sight of their home ports. The disorder in European states made colonial affairs marginal,

dimly, distantly marginal. Those who exerted a remote and unimaginative authority over the colonies had themselves no clear sense of the destiny of the half-blind movement which began from the first to escape their control. That sense of destiny took slow, trial-and-error form between a coast line which reached from pine to palm and the forested hinterland of a continent sketchily explored and wholly unexploited. There was from the first among the exiles, the seekers and the adventurers a dim adumbration of a destiny all their own. Imagination crossed the Atlantic with the emigrant but it continued the lure of the "short cut." The repercussions of European fighting which involved the Northern colonies also served their destined ends, consolidated them as extensions of British inheritance and culture, ran the loose boundary lines of a nation still unmade.

Colonial participation in these wars was the prelude of their destined detachment from the European fabric and evoked prophetic anticipations of an independent political organism shaped from within by pressures from without. Also these wars, Queen Anne's and King William's and Pitt's wars, should have taught them what they never afterward admitted nor were able to ignore; that they were bound in one vascular system with all the continents whose shores their oceans washed. They were thus delivered from fighting for geographical boundary lines but they were unescapably involved from the first in the frontierless empire of trade and began and continued a part of the always embattled economic system of Western civilization. America has nursed almost from the first a delusion of apartness from world affairs which has been one of the most contradictory aspects of the American Pattern.

## II

All this was and has been only the historical frame in which the American Pattern took form. The more significant frame was always the Continent itself, remote, lonely, calling, commanding. Every transplanted habit, tradition and inheritance had to be readapted to strange conditions, acclimated. The very culture of the soil was an experiment. Those ways of living cooperatively with climates and seasons for generations, working with the very grain of the earth and conserving nature's own devices for the conservation of its own creations, which root a culture in the soil and make it one with earth and sky, were all to be learned; and the learners were impatiently unteachable. The Continent absolved their mistakes by offering them new

regions with which to experiment and rewarded with its own prodigal abundance their haste and their waste for two hundred years. (Then it began to balance its books with the lure of the "short cut.")

Migratory movements, always westward, continued across the Continent what began in the Old World. The restless and adventurous temper of men and women for whom pioneering was a tradition, who had the spirit of it in their spirits, supplied the subjective urge. The large families of a prolific stock supplied the human material. And there was always an incessant European immigration besides. The land, uncleared, unwasted, to be had for the taking, called them all, so they took it; took it from the Indians, took it from the English Crown, took it from each other, took it from themselves. The exploitation of a Continent became a romance, an epic, and the American Pattern.

Always at a price, of course; at the cost of tenacious rooting in the good earth; at the cost of long inhabited homesteads and farmsteads; at the cost of social stability; at the cost of traditions and disciplines which only stability can nurture and patient ways with the long-known and well-loved bring to fruition; at the cost of the Continent itself. This whole process selected, proved, rewarded the strong. It supplied a land of pure delight for the individual and an individualistic philosophy and that philosophy was in the air. In France it was political, in England it was economic, in America it became socio-political, a conception of a society organized to give the individual free play without exacting too rigorously a return of fair play.

The War for Independence hallowed the American enterprise, broke its leading strings with Great Britain and invested all revolution—save revolution against the American Pattern—with the sanctity of the insurgents' love of liberty. The organization of the Federal Government under a written Constitution was a necessity whose general form was predetermined and a tour de force of political genius. It was helped and hindered by the stubborn local pride of the colonies and their fear of centralized government. They reserved for themselves areas of administration whose boundary lines were determined by political rather than economic and social conditions. The issue was national autonomy, limited by the inheritances and interests of colonies become states whose boundary lines were in the long-run to cross and recross the more natural boundary lines of industrial and economic interests. The outcome should have been an elastic yet coherent system, and in substance it has been that. But it resulted also in an excess of govern-

ment and a No-Man's-Land between the powers of the Federal Government and the rights of the states which produced a century and a half of legal adjudication and one tragic period of Civil War.

Thomas Jefferson, more than anyone else, gave theoretical form to the social and political philosophy implicit in the American Pattern. It was a philosophy suited to a society without extremes, intelligent, mobile and capable of a high degree of self-direction upon its own terrains. Jefferson's political philosophy idealized this social and political order and clothed it with the glamour of Democracy. It was and has continued, the America of poetry and patriotism. But Jefferson reckoned without the industrialism which began almost directly to remake his idyllic America of farmers and small proprietors. The Hamiltonian philosophy of government "enabled" industrialism and seamed American life with persistent contradictions. The very excess and overlapping of government supplied industrialism an ideal machinery for its own aggrandizement and a series of shelters in one or another of which it could entrench itself against the rights, the irritations or the just demands of the true processes of Democracy which were destined to be increasingly conditioned by social and economic forces. Result: the American Pattern lost clarity and uniqueness. It became an aspect of Western Industrialism and its inherited ideology became the battle cries of opposed and opposing interests.

### III

This marriage of Democratic political theory to an industrial state has been prolific in "American ways" whose family relationships have been neither peaceful nor consistent, but unfailingly interesting. In general all the children, political, social, industrial and ideological, have wanted the prestige of the family name; argued for it; quarreled for it; fought for it, organized for it with a kind of protean resource, and permitted no outside interference in their family affairs. Their Continent, they hold, is the terrain upon which the American way must achieve its destiny and the family disagreements are no concern of outsiders. Unfortunately, another paradox. The family interests have reached far beyond the Continent and frequently made what outsiders were doing or leaving undone of vital consequence to the whole family.

It has been characteristically the American way to use political machinery to implement individual or corporate economic interests, but to call any way

un-American which sought to subject individual or corporate enterprise to social control. The economic philosophy of American industrialism in its theory and practice of laissez-faire should have marched with the Jeffersonian idea of an elastic governmental apparatus; held, both in source and action, close to the localized diversities of the Continent and its culture. It has not worked out that way. Industry has never had much use for pure Democracy except to use it for its own ends, and America does not yet see with any clarity that the foundations of Democracy are economic as well as political. It distrusts the efficiency of its own governments, Federal, State or Local, is suspicious of academic social intelligence and has had little creative social intelligence of its own. America has believed, on the whole, that the unrestrained competition and unsupervised interaction of all the forces which have combined in the American enterprise would in some way work together for good. Social foresight has always been at a discount, co-ordination of the nation's forces and conservation of the nation's resources have never yet received long-term popular support. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof is about the only part of the Sermon on the Mount which the American way has accepted as workable gospel.

The result has been what it has been. It is impossible to say what proportion of the nation's resources have been wasted, what unexpended balance still remains. The result is less debatable. Beginning with a national wealth of incalculable potential value and a fairly equitable distribution of wealth and income, the American way has resulted in an as yet steadily widening space between the extremes of possession and dispossession and a third estate of about one-third the population with a family money income below the standard of an adequate livelihood. It has shifted wealth from rural regions to urban centers. It has built buildings of fabulous splendor whose shadows fall across miserably housed slums. It has built cathedrals on college campuses while the lands from which came the wealth which built them have no beauty that one should desire them. It has been a strange and costly way, so qualified by its own contradictions that nothing one says of it is true unless he immediately say the opposite.

It has been and is a way open from the bottom to the top, and from the top back to the bottom again. It has made Presidents of the lowly born, Captains of Industry of office boys and millionaires of mechanics. Its belief in education has redeemed its distrust of intelligence. Its expenditures for education have partly absolved it for the costly social processes by which the

wealth so lavished was secured. It has always made a generous atonement for its folly, its fault. It has preached peace and multiplied armaments. It has passed more laws of more sorts than probably any civilized country, and more than any civilized country made the individual a law unto himself. Its humanitarian impulses and deeds have been constant and abounding but it has dealt in strangely inhuman ways with the Indian and the Negro. It is generous in understandings and fertile in suspicions. It handicaps itself scrupulously in sports and plays against its business competitors with few rules save winning the game. It goes to church on Sunday and ignores the implications of the Christian gospel on Monday. And it has taken a lusty, unfailing joy in all its inconsistencies.

#### IV

The American Way, being itself the issue of many different kinds of nonconformity, has not been indulgent to nonconformity against its own social and political institutions. The courteous argumentative give and take of contrary opinions has never been sufficiently cultivated among us. Our controversial blood pressure has always been high and while the Constitutional right of free speech is idealized, free speakers have been frequently and violently denied the opportunity to exercise it. The opinions of regions, classes, and interests have tended to pattern and harden in ways which make individual divergence always difficult, often lonely and sometimes dangerous. The American order has been unduly subject to jittery fears and, through the apprehension that its liberties were in danger, has itself endangered them. The pressure of mass-opinion has always been strong, often intolerant. This has tended to make the dissenter and extremist and the individualist a "crank." All this to the sore cost of intelligent and inquiring thought.

On the whole, however, we have permitted—and sought—the free discussion of issues and policies. The American instinct for government by mass opinion has historically resulted in two major political parties, and the currents of political opinion have thus been strongly enough channeled to secure for the majority party force enough really to govern. Minorities have been disciplined to accept defeat, never too cheerfully, but, save for one tragic exception, with good sportsmanship. The peaceful acquiescences of political minorities has been so far the working principle of American Democracy.

Checks and balances in our machinery of government have also so far safeguarded the body politic from the consequences of mass hysterias and

made dictatorship difficult, if not impossible, without the use of armed force. They have on the other hand resulted in much lost motion in legislation and administration. A widely held, strongly held and persistently held public opinion is needed to amend Constitutions or secure outstanding social or economic changes. This has slowed the movement of social and humanitarian legislation, perpetuated abuses and postponed many reforms. Unless the administrative and legislative powers are in full sympathy, positive political action becomes very difficult.

The American system does best, therefore—and worst—through its own initiative. The people want government but they do not want to be governed. The structure of American society is, in the free action of its members, controlled by their various vocations, interests, mores, traditions, temperaments and relationships. The elusive ideology of the American way gives unity, substance and meaning to its operations and regulates them by a balance of pressures. The American has little use for uniform authority or uniformed force. The rather friendly blue of the policeman is about all the uniform American children know and the rural child does not know that. Its authorities are inside its citizens. When that authority fails the result is an excess of lawlessness, but in about ninety-five to ninety-seven per cent of 120,000,000 people it does not fail. The American Pattern has, historically and in action, resulted in a vigorous and hopeful population feeling lightly the pressure of any authority and confident in their future. All this the American way accounts to itself for righteousness. It is resourceful and inventive, does not accept defeat as final, and seeing a thing to get done, has force to do it. There is, therefore, in our general processes, a power of self-correction which has hitherto more than saved them from the more serious consequences of their own faults and failure.

The American mind is sensitive to the distinctions of right and wrong, responsive to ethical appeals. The inconsistencies of the American way in account with its conscience are part of the record, but it has a conscience. The brutal a-moralism which is the poisonous flower of nationalism gone mad has not yet fatally infected us. Without a State Church the values and sanctions of religion have given a quality to the American way apart from which it can not be rightly understood nor historically explained.

## V

These social, economic and political processes have produced the Ameri-

can mind or else *au contraire*; very likely each has produced the other. Whether they have produced the mind that can characterize the American mind is another question. Actually the American mind in the concrete adds, subtracts and carries on generally much as minds have always done. It has fathered or mothered—or whatever a mind does—excessively curious mental odds and ends, especially in religion and related regimes, and yet in its most speculative flights it has a pragmatic goal: health, success, poise, power. For the American mind whatever works is true. It is inquiring, kindly by nature and reflective. Its reactions are on the whole predictable in the patterned regions of politics, economics, religion and social conventions. Its exceptional exactitudes are in the fields of technology. For all its idealisms it is essentially empirical.

The American way has created an American literature and a literature about American literature. Nationally it has reflected the changing phases of what Lynn Harold Hough calls "the civilized mind" since the Eighteenth Century. It stems from English stock but has profoundly modified its inheritance. Unless a writer be writing about something of which he knows nothing save by report, his actual setting must furnish him subject matter, and his own relationship and observations will give color and content to what he writes. All distinctive national literature has been thus evoked. It is a slow process, and it has taken time for American literature to thus become essentially American.

It has, historically, always been easiest for a compact and homogeneous people in a little land to subdue their spirit and their setting to literature and art. It has not been easy thus to humanize America. The finest expressions of the spirit in literature are always subtle. You must have lived in their land to recognize them. They are the seasons and the crops, sunlight and clouds, the look and the feel of a landscape, the ways of people, their dialect, their humor and their humanity. American poetry and fiction have been increasingly thus marked, colored. They belong to the American scene. The English tradition has been recast. French and Russian influences have been naturalized.

The American way has produced an American culture. It has been and is literature, art, architecture, education, Chautauquas, book-clubs, Torch-clubs, service clubs, night schools, summer schools, tourist homes, tourist camps, the theatre, the summer theatre, the movie, the radio, Charlie McCarthy, Amos 'n' Andy, broadcasted symphonies punctuated by some melo-

dious mention of motor cars; just the efflorescence of the American way. Its distillation is American society. Its issue will be American history. In the mass it is a mass culture, patterned and promoted, self-seeking and self-conscious. It is not now peculiar to America, it is the way of Western civilization, but almost every phase of it is here heightened, intensified and speeded up in tempo. Not a little of it is the contribution of the American way to the world at large, which is perhaps what the European means by the Americanization of Europe. One can only say that the planet has taken to it kindly.

It is a leveling culture, on the whole, leveling the mass up. A rural schoolboy can identify musical classics, the folk in a lonely farmhouse hear Beethoven of a winter night. It is an excessively mechanized culture; that goes without saying. The enjoyment of it depends upon possessing the things which implement it; if the farmhouse has no radio the winter night is only a starry silence; if it has no motor car its world is very small. House-furnishing, clothes, gadgets, are the same everywhere. All the store windows are alike in display. The rich variety of regional and racial culture which all the conditions of American life should have made possible have been smoothed out, as beauty shops promise to do for faces upon which the years and experience have written their vital record. We are trying to recapture the vanished—which is very likely impossible—to retain what of variety is left, and create a less patterned culture. That, too, is the American way.

## VI

Finally, and first as well as last, the American Pattern is the entirety of the ways in which Americans live and move and have their being. Inclusive areas of it are the timeless ways of a very human humanity. Other areas are the ways of Western civilization made specific through our inheritance of the English language, laws, literature, love of freedom and maintenance and defense of government by representation. What at the heart of all this is distinctively American is as elusive as it is definitely recognizable. Perhaps that also is the American way; to be so like and to be so different. The way itself is the deposit and projection of the steadfastness of the exile, the force of the nonconformist, the restless adventuring of the pioneer, the grasping for possession of the dispossessed; the playboy with a Continent of fabulous wealth for his toy. It has been forged in the labor of subduing that Continent and turning it to human needs and uses. It has been tempered both in sweat and blood. It has shaped its institutions to its own proper uses, supported

them with an American philosophy and glorified them with an American idealism.

Old simplicities of life and labor still show through its modern sophistications; its epics are the careers of men who started with no more than their courage, their native force, their two hands—and what they have done! What they have done may be anything from making and selling a motor car every three minutes to becoming America's sweetheart. But this patterned success must appeal to the popular imagination, lend itself to headlines, contribute to the convenience or interest of life—and make money. America has not grudged the successful their success; especially if they started from scratch. Such careers are only another demonstration of a glittering Chauncey Depew sentence: "The Cross on Calvary meant salvation; the cross on San Salvador meant opportunity." As if the American way completed the Scheme of Salvation.

This ideology of opportunity has been, among other things, a social prophylactic, has long worked against the tempers which breed revolutions. The unsuccessful succeed vicariously in the Edisons, the Fords, the Lincolns and the Mary Pickfords. There was an open road from any schoolhouse to a castle in Spain and the elect got their castle often enough to save the whole belief from becoming an illusion. No room is small if it has an open door. The horizons of possible achievement have kept Dead-End streets from being dead-ends. Youth saw competence and fame waiting beyond the familiar horizons of their countrysides; even if they never reached them, they were there. Some sound instinct, fostered and kept alive by the whole of American history and tradition, has insisted that this fluid social condition be maintained, even at the cost of the real well-being of great sections of the American population.

## VII

One can only evaluate the American way by its past and its present. The actual ways of life it has created are far enough from the picture patriotism paints. "Uncle Sam" is either caricatured or romanticized. A study like *Middletown* shows what, in documented detail, the American way has done to industrial masses and equally to the minds and spirits of those who have profited by it. Such deposits of the American way leave much to be desired. Someone said of pre-war England that it was like a drawing room in a dying light slowly invaded by shadows. There are streets in Middletown upon

which the nobler lights of life have never shone. Its shadows are the more portentous because those who live in them do not seem to know that they are there, or what causes them.

And yet! The American way has written *Middletown*, begins to take account of its own limitations and unhappy issues there incarnate, stirs itself to do something about Middletown, does not mean to accept Middletown as final, furnishes the idealisms according to which Middletown must be reconditioned. It is this capacity for learning through trial and error, this refusal to accept its own defeats, this sense of holding, as a mandate from history, the responsibility for the realization of the values which lend their final meaning to the human enterprise, which must temper every criticism of the American way and touch its most shadowed stretches with a prophetic light.

When everything for and against us is said, there remains a record of noble accomplishment and the promise of accomplishments even more noble. The realization of the finer values of civilization is now more nearly within our power than the power of any other nation. Much of our comparatively sheltered security is due, of course, to our fortunate geographical situation and the spacious resources of the continent. But that is not all; there still remains the American way. The world would seem to have become the terrain for the fierce action of embattled philosophies of the State. Historians of the future may see with a clarity and analyze with a dispassionate understanding now impossible, the sources and the issues of forces now in action. But the dominant philosophies of the State, opposed to the American way, are plain-spoken and their deeds support their words. The individual has no rights nor value as against the State. He exists only for the ends of the State, and what the ends of the State are no dictator who comes trailing clouds of apologists has ever said, nor do he and his philosophies seem to know, save that it exists for its own aggrandizement and its own glory. The values of life are lost in a fog of lying words, strutting and posings which presently become ruined cities, desolated fields and rotting dead.

### VIII

It is impossible that there should not be in the few remaining democracies a subtle boring in of these hostile philosophies. They take various forms, some of which are, as yet, comparatively harmless as the reaction, for example, of our younger thinkers against Liberalism. (That may not in the end prove so harmless.) Some of them are short-cuts to economic recovery.

Some of them are an emergence of the Fascist temper which the control and direction of great industries always engenders. Some of them are councils of despair. All of them imperil the American order. Its gravest peril might be its own unimaginative rigidity, its unwillingness so to recast its machinery as to make it responsive to changing social and economic conditions, especially the maladjustments of our present industrial order.

The future of the American way, apart from the peril of war in which, along with Western civilization, it may be involved for an indefinite period, rests with the willingness of the American people to undertake such economic and social rehabilitations, to undertake them creatively and intelligently, to find processes of reform and advance consistent with our finest inheritances and hold tenaciously to their accomplishment. When Americanism becomes an alibi for a socially sterile conservatism or the slogan of reaction, the way itself will be undone—as so many other humanly precious things have been undone—by sacrificing the spirit to the letter and so losing both.

Henry W. Grady once said with that rhetorical flair which has been itself a minor American characteristic, that the American flag fluttering up the mystic heights of the future would make the way by which the nations of the earth should come. He would not be so sure today. The majority of the nations seem to be choosing other roads. So much the more reason, therefore, to cherish the American way, reform it, and defend it by the one invulnerable defense, the demonstration of its own inherent rightness. It is an inheritance that must not be lost, a great human experiment that should not fail, a promise without which the world would be poor. For all the alternatives to it seem to be a return to ways whose very dust is red with wasted blood and which are still haunted by the sighs and complaints of our piteous humanity.

# Why Change the Bible?

FREDERICK C. GRANT

## I

“**W**HAT, again? I thought the Bible had just been changed!” Probably more than one person has uttered this question, or at least shared the puzzled feeling that lay behind it, when they first heard that the Bible is to be revised once more. There are those for whom the Bible, just as it stands in the English Version, is a sacred book, a perfect and inviolable collection of sacred writings, divinely inspired, and hence can no more be altered than it can be supplemented or subtracted from. Any proposed alteration whatsoever can therefore be only a change for the worse. Much of the sentiment reinforcing this view is inherited from the period before the Revised Version saw the light, and easily transfers to that Version—now that it apparently stands in like jeopardy with the Authorized. It has taken fifty-odd years to grow accustomed to the Revised Version; and are we presently to begin all over again, and accustom ourselves to still another revision? True, there are alternative versions before the public: Doctor Moffatt’s Bible, Doctor Goodspeed’s New Testament, the American Translation of the Old Testament, the Jewish Old Testament, the Riverside, Twentieth-Century, and Weymouth New Testaments, and now, most recently, Father Spencer’s translation. Are not these enough? Or is the proposed revision to be some kind of averaging of these modern translations, made official, and recommended for use by church publishers, Bible societies, and other printers of the sacred text?

It may be stated at once that this is not the proposed method of revision, as outlined in the official publicity of the Revision Committee (*New York Times*, December 5, 1937). The modern translations are excellent, for their purposes, and are all of them useful in the study and for private reading. But there is one purpose for which the English Version of the Bible exists, toward which, with all their freshness and accuracy of rendering, probably none of these translations has aspired—or at least has not followed as its major aim: and that is, *use in public worship*. In the achievement of this purpose, three considerations are indispensable, and may be stated in an ascending

series of importance. (1) The version must be *accurate*, not only in the text employed for translation, but also in the use of English words, whose meaning has changed in the three-hundred years since the Authorized, and even to some extent in the fifty-odd since the Revised. (2) It should be smooth, euphonious, *readable*. By "readable" we do not mean ease in reading privately and silently, but audibly and publicly. In the ancient world, all writing was intended to be read aloud; in some quarters audible reading has been the practice of students until modern times; and there are sound psychological reasons to support such a method of study. But today, the public reading of the Bible is almost the sole survival of the ancient practice. As a result of general neglect, the art of reading (that is, public, audible reading) is in danger of becoming one of the lost arts. For this very reason, then, the version of the Bible used in public worship ought to be supremely readable—in public. And certainly it was so originally intended. Torah and Prophets and Hagiographa in the Old Testament were meant for public reading; and in the New, the Epistles were certainly written to be read aloud, and perhaps also the Gospels—at least it was not long before they were so used. Finally, (3) the version used in public worship should preserve continuity with the *traditional* English version, as far as this is compatible with the aims of accuracy of text and smoothness of rendering. Any new translation faces insuperable obstacles, if it is designed to supplant the familiar version. And this is quite properly so. Habit, custom, familiarity are assets to religion. A faith which wrote a new creed every ten years, or got out a new Bible every generation, however "progressive" it might claim to be, would probably not survive its first generation. The Bible is one of our choicest common treasures. Its familiar phrases linger on the ear, like music heard repeatedly and loved; each time, it brings something fresh and illuminating; each time, its freshness is inextricably woven into its familiarity—new and old are subtly and inseparably combined. Half the force of religious growth lies in this union of new and old, this interweaving of conservatism and progress. And even though it might perhaps be maintained that for purposes of religious education, accuracy and freshness alone are desirable, and continuity with the past may be discounted; still, wise teachers of religion refuse to yield to this pseudo-scientific plea. The heart of religion is worship; the social quality of worship and of ethical growth alike is increasingly recognized among us today; and a religious education that dealt only with problems of behavior, personal or public, and yet paid no regard to tradition, form, custom, institu-

tion, or worship, would really not be religious education at all. These principles are widely and perhaps increasingly accepted at the present time. It is obvious then that the Bible which is to be used in public worship is of equal importance for the Church School.

The principles adopted by the Revision Committee, and already publicly announced, surely commend themselves to all who care for the Bible as the Book, par excellence, of our religion. Their first aim is to secure greater accuracy of rendering, and, beyond this, to bring the version into closer conformity with modern scholarship. We know considerably more about the original text of the Bible than was known in the 1870's. For one thing, more manuscripts are available now than then. The curious and interesting Koridethi Gospels is one such discovery—a ninth-century manuscript from Tiflis, copied by a scribe who knew no Greek but wrote as a child might, and yet copied from an excellent older manuscript of the "Caesarean" family. Another is the Washington Gospels, now in the Freer Library—a fourth- or fifth-century manuscript witnessing both to the "Caesarean" type of text (in part) and also to the so-called "Neutral." Then there is the famous Sinaitic Syriac, from the fourth or fifth century, discovered by Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Gibson and first published in 1892. There are the papyrus fragments, among them the already famous Chester Beatty series, only recently published—dating from the third century. Moreover, a whole series of Old Latin manuscripts has been edited and published since the seventies.

As a consequence, we not only have additional ancient manuscripts, in the New Testament field, which were not known to the Revisers of 1870-81; but we are now able to make out somewhat more clearly the stages in the early history of the transmission of the text. Instead of claiming priority, and all but infallibility, for one type of text, the so-called "Neutral" (chiefly that of the Vatican and Greek Sinaitic manuscripts), as preferred by Westcott, Hort, and Weiss, we now recognize that there were five or six main types of manuscript text in circulation in the early Church, and that all these types deserve consideration. These types were more or less localized, but not wholly so—and much of the difficulty in editing the Greek New Testament comes from the cross-influences of one type upon another. The copying of manuscripts, like marriage, often meant the combining of two or more strains into a single family line. The main types or classifications now discernible are these: The Alexandrian (Vatican and Sinaitic); the Caesarean (Koridethi, parts of the Washington Gospels, and others); the "Western," including the Old Latin

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—African and Italian and European (Gallic); the Old Syriac (Sinaitic Syriac, et cetera); and the later ecclesiastical or Byzantine. But if we are better able to recognize the family traits of these groups, we are not much nearer to a determination of the reading of the autographs. In the Book of Acts, Professor Ropes preferred the "Neutral" text; Professor Clark prefers the "Western." Probably no one type of text is in every respect closer to the autographs than any other; and it may be that, instead of clinging tenaciously to one type, or to the text of some one modern editor, scholars will have to take into account other factors than simply the manuscript evidence. Authors' style and thought, for example, may deserve to be given far more weight than has hitherto been the rule in textual criticism. But for the purposes of the revision of the English Bible, perhaps the best procedure will be to take a standard modern edition of the original, say that of Westcott-Hort, or Nestle, for the New Testament; and leave the consideration of variant readings to experts familiar with the manuscript evidence.

The Old Testament text is in somewhat better state, as far as the purposes of revision are concerned. The new edition of Kittel's Hebrew Bible, just completed, is probably as close an approximation to the text as it left the hands of the tenth-century Massoretes as we shall ever get—short of a new manuscript discovery in some hitherto unopened Genizah (or Synagogue store-room for discarded manuscripts) in the East. Unlike all previous editions of the Hebrew Bible, since the editio princeps of Bomberg in Venice, 1524-25 A. D., the new Kittel relies upon a manuscript, now located in Leningrad, which is some generations older than Ben Chayyim's text, found in thirteenth-fourteenth century manuscripts and followed by Bomberg. This Leningrad manuscript is not the oldest, but it can be proved to be identical with the oldest—the master codex is treasured in the Sephardic Synagogue at Aleppo. (Efforts were made at least to photograph this manuscript; but the Synagogue authorities refused. But no matter: the collation made by Mischaël ben Uzziel lists the distinctive readings of that manuscript, that is, its divergence from the text of Ben Naphthali, and so we now have a Bible practically as Ben Asher left it when he died, about 950 A. D.) There are versions, of course, whose manuscripts are much older than the Massoretes: chiefly the Greek version known as the Septuagint. Many a passage in the Old Testament, now obscured in the Hebrew, can be elucidated from the Greek or the Syriac or even the Latin version. But as a rule scholars prefer to adhere to the Hebrew, wherever it can be made to render a consistent and intelligible

meaning, and to turn to the versions only where the Hebrew is hopelessly obscure and untranslatable.

One feature of common interest is the proposal to abandon the impossible hybrid, "Jehovah," and go back to "the Lord" as used in the Authorized Version, and in Synagogue Services probably since the days of the Maccabees. The truth is, we do not know how to pronounce the Old Testament name for God. The four consonants, Y-h-w-h, appear in the Hebrew Bible with the vowels for the word *Adonai*, "Lord," and are always so read, namely, *Adonai*, in the Synagogue. But the English Bible, and English-speaking Christianity generally, has attempted the impossible, and created the barbarous word "Jehovah." If one thing is certain, it is that the vowels of Y-h-w-h were *never* those of *Adonai*; and it is far simpler, more accurate, and more reverent to follow the Synagogue and translate the unpronounceable proper noun as "the Lord." The rendering "Yahweh" is still not accepted by all scholars, and is undoubtedly still too unfamiliar a word for use in a book for reading in Christian worship. Doctor Moffatt's translation, "The Eternal," conveys too philosophical a set of connotations; it goes ill with some of the older parts of the Old Testament, and it never quite squares with the quality in God most emphasized in Hebraism or Judaism, namely, not his eternity or timelessness, but his dynamic personality, his constant activity, and his character as "the Living One."

The second principle of the present Revisers, as announced, is to go back to the Authorized Version for their standard of literary excellence. This does not involve a restoration of the archaic language of the old version, but rather the attempt to recapture, if possible, its majestic prose rhythm, as a Bible "appointed to be read in churches." (Whether the "Authorized" Version was ever actually authorized or not, is beside the point; it was designed for this purpose, and the effort was successful—whether or not the official stamp of approval was ever placed upon it by King or Council.) The marvelous English of that version is one of the inalienable possessions of the human race, like that of Shakespeare, like the German of Luther's Bible, like the Greek of Homer, the Latin of Virgil, the old Italian of Dante. It is a *ktêma es aei*, can never be surpassed, ought never to be surrendered. It is one of the defects of the current Revised Version that it did surrender, in hundreds of passages, and for no good reason whatsoever—whether of necessity or of preference—the superb, pellucid, rhythmic English of the Authorized Version in the interest of a crabbed literalism which might pass in a

schoolboy's sight-translation, but is really inexcusable in an edition of the noblest prose work in the English language, above all in one designed "to be read in churches," and for popular use, for memorization, for the spiritual and ethical guidance of youth and of generations still unborn.

As a matter of fact, the literalism was misguided. Swift upon the heels of the Revised Version, and of Westcott and Hort's Greek Testament, came the revolutionary discoveries of Deissmann and others, and the unearthing of thousands of papyrus letters and other documents in Egypt. We now have, so Doctor Goodspeed tells me, a datable papyrus document for every single year of the first century! And the upshot of it all is that the New Testament, far from being written in a strange, exotic, unique kind of "Biblical Greek," was written, we now recognize, in the language of every day: the language of artisans and sailors, of farmers and villagers and clerks, book-keepers and merchants—the *Koinê* or Common Greek of the Hellenistic world, as it was written and spoken from Egypt to Gaul, and from Cappadocia and Pontus to Carthage and Cyrene. The nineteenth-century Revisers were of course unaware of all this, and, accurate classicists that they were, they tried to stretch the idiom of the New Testament upon the Procrustean bed of classical grammar, syntax, and lexicography. But we know better, now. The definite article, for example, need not always be translated; or, when omitted in the Greek, left out in the English. "Behold, *the* sower went forth to sow." Why "the" sower? Is it for the sake of exegesis, since Christ is preeminently "the" Sower of the Word? But the Greek does not require it—not *Koinê* Greek. "Behold, a sower" is just as good—indeed better, and no doubt closer to the original of the parable. And why "went forth," rather than "went out"? Is it to preserve the sense of "ex" in *exêlthen* (Mark 4. 3)? But "out" does just that—and "forth" is really a bit too pedantic—like many another needless archaism and pedanticism in the Revised Version. The Latin Vulgate is simple, beautiful, and accurate: "Ecce exiit seminans ad seminandum"—not "the" sower, but "one sowing," "one who sowed," "a sower." Similarly we know now that the usage of the *Koinê* verb was almost as loose as the English—"When they *shall* say unto you" is only a purist's refinement upon "When they say." And the aorist—that pitfall of most beginners in Greek!—need not always, in fact need not often, be translated by a pure or simple past tense. Many a time and oft, it is simply timeless; and the attempt to force it to express "past action" is futile and unnecessary, and not really justified by the sense.

To a large degree, then, at least as far as the New Testament is concerned (the situation is not so serious in the Old), the work of revision in the seventies needs to be done over again; and it might not be amiss to take the Authorized Version once more as a basis, and revise it as it should have been revised in the seventies; or better, as it can now be more accurately revised in the light of the new knowledge of Hellenistic Greek. As a matter of fact, the revision of 1881-85 went much farther than was anticipated by the proponents of revision in the sixties and seventies; and to many of them, like Bishop Wordsworth, Bishop Ellicott, Doctor Field, Doctor Perowne, and even Doctor Sanday, it came as a dreadful disappointment. Instead of a further revision of the Authorized Version, it turned out to be in many passages a new translation; and in a vast number of cases only a needless deformation and mutilation of the earlier version—which was clear enough, superbly beautiful, and at the same time accurate, and in no way a pedantic and schoolmasterish rendering. The New Testament Revisers of 1881 had been commissioned to revise “plain and clear errors” of the Authorized Version. Instead, they fell in with Bishop Lightfoot’s pet scheme for etymological and grammatical “faithfulness,” even to the extent of rearrangement of the order of words (to correspond with the Greek order) and the consistent use of the same English word, as far as possible, to render each Greek word—especially in parallel passages in the Gospels. As a compensation, the text was peppered with archaisms not in the Authorized: “unto,” “howbeit,” “soever,” “aforetime,” “twain,” “tarry,” for example. As a result, instead of a moderate revision, limited to the corrections of “plain and clear errors,” thirty-six thousand alterations were made in the New Testament—an average of four and a half to every verse! As Dr. J. Agar Beet wrote in the fall of 1881, in reviewing the New Testament Revision, “the chief failure of the Revisers seems to be in their use of their own language as an instrument for reproducing the sense which the writers of the New Testament intended their words to convey.” Even Bishop Westcott was not wholly pleased: “The precise and literal exactness which is required in a version of Scripture for study is not required in a version for use in public service. For such a purpose the main object must be to secure a plain and rhythmical expression of the sense of the original, even at the sacrifice of the letter.”

It is true that some of the Revisers of 1881 hoped that a further revision would be made, after trial use. But this was a futile hope, considering the terms of publication and the copyright held by the University Presses

of Oxford and Cambridge. The American preferences were held back, as agreed; but when the "American Standard" finally appeared in 1901, it was no improvement in style, and its crabbed literalism of rendering was quite as bad as the English Revised. Now, at long last, a further revision is called for. Let us hope that it may not end with confusion worse confounded; but that it will, if possible, undo some of the harm wrought by the Revised Version, and at the same time bring the version into greater accord with modern scholarship. To this end, let us hope that the present Revisers may be fully aware what a priceless treasure of English literature—to say nothing of its religious value—is now entrusted to their hands. The required revision may well be thought of in terms somewhat parallel to a revision of Shakespeare, let us say, for the modern stage. To rewrite Shakespeare, on the plea of preparing a script for present-day use, would be a futility and a desecration—and perhaps a box-office failure as well. Who cares to hear the modernized version by Mr. X, in place of the triumphant, deeply human lines of the original—say of Hamlet's soliloquy, or Falstaff's meditations upon the theme of honor? And will people respond to the public reading of a version of Scripture which, under cover of revision, merely modernizes, merely substitutes trite and colorless current phrases for the sublime diction of the traditional version?

The truth is, the Authorized Version is itself a revision, and the culmination of a long process of translation, correction, and experimentation. Closest to it among its immediate forerunners is the Geneva Version—an ancestor which continued to survive, and competed with it for supremacy down to the days of the Covenanters, and even later. But just as there were other Elizabethan dramatists, early and late, and only one Shakespeare, so there were other Bible versions—but only one that outtopped them all, and became *the* English Version, *par excellence*. And just as the contemporary revision of Shakespeare, in school editions (the spelling, for example), and for use upon the stage, requires only a moderate amount of tampering, so the revision of the Bible should be strictly limited in scope, and ought quite seriously "to go back, for its standard of literary excellence, to the King James Version." He would be a sorry creature indeed who ventured "to lay hands upon his father Parmenides" and modernize Shakespeare to the extent to which the 1881 Revisers altered the Authorized Version. Much of the current talk about "modernizing" the classics, and about "humanizing" knowledge, is, I fear, simply playing into the hands of the intellectual

Bolshevism and degenerate taste seen over many a wide area of the present day. It may be a question if we shall really have much left, in the way of classical literature, art, and music, to hand on to coming generations, at least if the counsels of some of our contemporaries prevail—men who are professionally engaged in education, too, and certainly should know better!—On the contrary, what we should, of course, aim at is to raise the reader to the level of the Bible, not lower the Bible to the level of the morning newspaper or the weekly news-magazine.

The answer to our question, "Why change the Bible?" is that the Bible has always been changed, that is, revised, re-translated, corrected, from time to time, as language has changed, as older renderings grew archaic, or as the science of exegesis advanced, and a better understanding of the original became possible. The time for such a change has now arrived, apparently. And we earnestly hope that the change may be effected without further injury to the English Version, and with at least some repair of damage already done, so that our classic English Scriptures may stand out once more pre-eminent in the field of literature, and may continue to "minister grace to the hearers" through the medium of the unforgettable, haunting music of its sublime diction and style.

## II

We have often heard the King James' Bible referred to as a "miracle of English prose." In its effect, in its prevailing influence, it is just that—and belongs on a level with the Anglican *Book of Common Prayer* which it was designed to accompany and with which it was often bound up. But the antecedents of the miracle can still be made out, not for purposes of detraction—since it is surely no condition of a miracle that it must always be sudden—but in order to understand the factors that made it possible.

For one thing, the earlier versions (for example, the Geneva, and the Bishops') often anticipated the choice renderings which finally went into the Authorized: for example, John 6. 3: "And Jesus went up into a mountain, and there he sat with his disciples"—a verse straight and unaltered out of the Genevan, as that out of Cranmer, and Cranmer out of Tyndale; naturally, for the translation is perfect. The Rheims version of 1582 had made it read *the* mountain, and inserted a "therefore," to give continuity: but neither change was felicitous, nor necessary. So also verse 4: "And the Passover, a feast of the Jews, was nigh." This is perfect also, and likewise goes

back to Tyndale, Cranmer, and Geneva—though they said “Easter,” not “the Passover.” But Rheims is literal, like the modern Revised, and reads: “And the Pasche was at hand, the festival day of the Jews.” Rhythmic enough, but a bad translation for all its literalism!

Even the Latin anticipates the Authorized, in passage after passage: for example, Acts 2. 17f.:

“Et érit in novíssimis diébus | dícit Dóminus  
effúndam de Spíritu méo | súper ómnem cárnem  
et prophetábunt filii véstri | et filiae véstrae  
et iúvenes véstri | visiónes vidébunt  
er séniores véstri | sómnia somniábunt. . .  
et dábo prodígi- | a in caelo súrsum  
et sígna in térra deórsum.”

This is translation, superbly done—of a majestic passage of prophetic poetry; and is itself almost poetry, even to the caesuras.

The same is true of the prose—for example, Luke 23. 50: “Et ecce vir nomine Joseph, qui erat decurio, vir bonus, et justus.” Or Luke 8. 19: “Venerunt autem ad illum mater, et fratres eius, et non poterant adire eum prae turba.” Many a passage of the Vulgate has an epic quality, for example, the lines which describe Peter’s release from prison: “Et ceciderunt catenae de manibus eius”—one can almost hear the chains slip off: (Acts 12. 7.) But it is the poetry that is done best, and quite naturally so, for example, Mark 1. 3:

“Paráte víam Dómini,  
réctas fácite sémitas éius”

—where even the Greek is a line of poetry (from Second Isaiah):

“*Eutheias poieite tas tribous autou!*”

What Saint Jerome did in producing the Vulgate, at Pope Damasus’ bidding, was to take the rugged Old Latin translations and revise them, and place upon the standard Latin Version, in many and many a passage, the stamp of an inimitable classical sonority and rhythm—a fit book for use in public services of worship, as it was for a thousand years and more in all of Western Christendom; and in the Roman Church to this day (with some very minor exceptions: for example, the Old Latin Psalter is still used in Saint Peter’s, Rome).

Moreover, the King James Revisers were schooled in classical literature,

as well as steeped in the Vulgate. From the age of six or thereabouts, as educated men, they had been nourished upon Virgil and Homer, and they could no more write a clumsy, bumpy, hideously unrhythmic sentence than they could have endured the jagged cacophonous prose of some modern symbolist. Saint Augustine was still a staple in theological education—and his prose is polished gold, refined, chased, and burnished, and kept standard in the Church by a millennium of unceasing study. It is no accident then, or a thing unaccountable, that these early seventeenth-century Revisers produced a rhythmic, euphonious version—superior in fact, in this respect, to all that had gone before, from Caedmon or Wyclif to the Genevan Version—not to mention the Rheims.

The open secret of their style can be briefly formulated:

(1) Their prose rhythm is by preference dactylic, as a rule—here the classical influence is obvious at once. For example, “There wént out a sówer to sów”—which is certainly preferable, on other grounds than grammar, to “the sówer went fóρθ to sów,” where the accent falls on “forth,” not on “went”—in spite of the fact that students are taught to accent the colorful verbs and nouns, not adverbs and prepositions, as their guiding rule. (A version for public reading ought certainly to permit the stress to fall naturally: good rhythm is of course the best guide to good sense, in all genuine literature, whether poetry or prose.)

Or take the twenty-third Psalm: “The Lórd is my shépherd; Í shall not wánt. . . . He restóreth my sóul—passages fortunately untouched by the Revisers: on the whole, as we have said, the Old Testament was much better handled than the New.

These lines are formed of perfect dactyls—and that is a large part of the secret of their unforgettable beauty. (Though we have heard them misread, ignoring both rhythm and punctuation: “The Lórd is my shépherd, I shall not wánt.”)

Another example is the easily misread conclusion of the trial of Peter and John, after the healing at the Beautiful Gate: “For the mán was above fóerty years óld. . . .”; this the Revised turns into, “the mán was móre than fóerty years óld,” as if such a healing could be expected up to forty, but only a miracle could help a man “*more* than forty.”

(2) Another principle they followed was to prefer weak endings, in most narrative passages; iambs, and final stresses, were reserved as a rule for mandatory or otherwise emphatic statements.

For example,

"Bléssed<sup>1</sup> are the póor in spírit:  
For theírs is the Kíngdom of héaven."

Compare even the Ten Commandments:

"And Gód spake áll these words, sáying" (*not* "all thése words") . . . but contrast with it what follows: "Thóu shalt have nó (why "none"? R.V.) other góds before mé," where the sense simply is *not*, "Thou shalt have no óther gods befóre me," and where the sense is wholly lost in a bungling, non-rhythmic reading. (And contrast with this, likewise, the Catechism version: "Thóu shalt háve none óther góds but mé." This keeps the emphasis on the final word, but turns the rhythm into mere singsong—even when rendered, "Thóu shalt have none óther gods but mé.")

"Thou shalt not kill. . . Thou shalt not steal. . . Thou shalt not bear false witness": this is either iambic or choriambic prose rhythm, with the same crisp, mandatory emphasis at the end, the same echo of that crashing thunder of Sinai which we hear in the Hebrew original—though the Hebrew would place the emphasis upon "Thou," as the singular imperative, and conveys the meaning that better things are required of the members of the divine Covenant than is the way of the nations round about.

Evidently the old Jacobean Revisers knew what they were about, and chose a rhythm suited to the sense. Ernest Sutherland Bates is quite right, when he says, in his new edition of the Bible "to be read as living literature," that these translators were "conscious literary craftsmen." But surely he is mistaken when he refers to "the cumbersome punctuation of the King James Version—as if the matchless beauty of that translation lay, not in the diction and the phrasing, but in the profuse use of colons and semicolons" (though he goes on, and quite properly, to add others, namely, quotation marks). "Cumbersome," perhaps—for the private reader; but not for the public reader, for whom this version was designed as "appointed to be read in churches." For the said punctuation marks are a guide to the reader of Church "lessons" or lections—like the sub- and supra-linear accents of the Hebrew Bible—and if observed will lead him to avoid many of the mistakes of unintelligible gabbling, stumbling haste, irreverent and breathless expedition, as if he were hopeful to be through and done with the "scripture reading" as soon as possible and go on to more important things; or—alas, but we have heard Scripture so read—as if his eyes had never lighted upon

<sup>1</sup> Pronounced "blest," in 1611; cf. O. E. D.

the appointed passage before, and haste might possibly cover his ignorance and carelessness. Better ten verses read intelligently and intelligibly, and slowly, than twenty read pell-mell and with no regard to rhythm, balance, or the steady march of thought.

The same errors crop up in reading the Prayer Book—especially, perhaps, a meaningless singsong rendering of the Versicles: for example, “The Lord be *with* you,” said like a good-bye, rather than the profounder and permanently meaningful “The Lord be *with you*”: *Dominus vobiscum*! To take another example, it is not, “O Lord, *save* the State,”—as if He might perhaps destroy it!—but “O Lord, *save* the State”: “save,” that is, preserve—and the State is one object of our prayers along with others. In the Litany, it is not, “. . . have mercy upon all *men*,” as if women were not to be prayed for—or perchance, did not need our prayers or their own—but, “. . . have mercy upon *all men*.” And it is simply not, “Lord, *have* mercy upon us,” but “Lord, have *mercy* upon us,” as the old Plain chant makes perfectly clear.<sup>2</sup>

Our trouble is that we do not take the time to study carefully our own literature and language; and the neglect of public audible reading in the schools is responsible for this condition, in large measure. Even the colleges, even the theological seminaries, at least until recently, have neglected this fundamental element in education. It is no wonder then if our standards are low, and clergy and people alike have little understanding or appreciation for beautiful, genuinely interpretative (but not necessarily dramatic!) public reading of Scripture. Though we have heard examples of beautiful reading, when the congregation at once showed its appreciation by closest attention, and by grateful comment afterwards. Perhaps the finest contribution a new revision of the Bible can make to our public worship will be the better reading of the Scripture Lessons, as men come to realize once more that reading is an art, an art supremely rewarding and worth mastering.

These simple and obvious rules are as observable in the Authorized Version as they are, to say the least, in all good English prose before these present times of pell-mell haste and of cumbersome pseudo-scientific jargon and of general carelessness in speech. To sum up, they are as follows: Prefer a dactylic rhythm for ordinary narrative prose; prefer weak endings in narrative passages; use iambic rhythm only in mandatory passages; use strong endings for stress; let the sense determine the rhythm. So perfect is the Authorized Version that, in most places, if anyone will follow the

<sup>2</sup> For example, the English Litany of 1544.

natural rhythm, he will be bound to read and interpret the sense of the passage before him. And the congregation will understand it too: such a reading of such a translation is indeed "the best commentary." But these rules were quite overlooked in the Revised Version, and many of its renderings might almost suggest a total ignorance of English literature and idiom! It would therefore be great gain if our present Revisers seriously laid to heart the sad results of the 1870 Committee's bungling, and undid as much as possible the damage it wrought upon the English Version—and at the same time applied "modern scholarship" more fully to both the translation and its underlying original text.

True, there are passages in the Authorized that are far from perfect. Acts 21. 39 reads, for example, "But Paul said, I am a man (which am) a Jew of Tarsus, (a city) in Cilicia"; the Revised has improved this to read, "I am a Jew, of Tarsus in Cilicia." The change undoubtedly is for the better, thanks to better knowledge of Greek syntax. As understood in the seventeenth century, the apposition of "man" and "Jew" made simply inevitable the A. V. rendering, as also the renderings in all the earlier versions, from the Latin onward—except Wyclif's! That fourteen-century translator had it, "Poul seide to hym, for I am a Iew of Tharse of Cilicie a citeseyn which cite is not unknowen." It means, of course, simply, "I am [not an Egyptian, but] a Jew, a Tarsian, a citizen of the well-known town in Cilicia." But the scholarship of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras stood in the way, for once; historically viewed, the translation must be excused this and other rare examples of cumbrousness. But what shall be said of the literalism of the nineteenth-century Revisers, who translate Mark 14. 10, "And Judas Iscariot, he that was one of the twelve, went away unto the chief priests, that he might deliver him unto them"? Not content with this, they add the ponderous, impossible marginal note: "Greek, 'the one of the twelve'"! And this is supposed to be an improvement of the simple, beautiful, straightforward and accurate King James rendering: "And Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve, went unto the chief priests, to betray him unto them." I think then that the bungled verse in Mark cancels out the improved one in Acts: and alas, how many more there are in the Revised which quite unnecessarily complicate and mar the beauty, weaken the force, and destroy the liquid flow of our classic English Version—in the interest of pedantic literalness and of a tasteless, unimaginative transcription of the order of the original! If our twentieth-century Revisers do no more than restore the older version, wherever pos-

sible, and then bring it into closer accord with modern scholarship in such details as the meanings of words, and the substitution of modern English for words and phrases now grown entirely archaic, they will earn the thanks of all English-speaking Christians everywhere.

An example of what may be done in the way of revision of a classic Bible-translation is to be seen in the recently published *Probe-Testament and Psalms* of the Württemberg Bible Society. For several years now, the Revision Commission of the German Bible Societies has been at work on the Luther Bible. It is true, earlier revisions have been made, slight in extent, and comparable to those made in the Authorized English Bible up to the end of the eighteenth century. True, also, that modern German is not so completely altered from that of Luther's time as is modern English from that of the days of Elizabeth and James VI-I. The changes are correspondingly slight in the German text. Luther's "hie" gives place to modern "hier," and the declension of proper names is abandoned for the most part—"Christi" still remains, as in current German. But wherever a word has grown hopelessly archaic with the lapse of years, another of similar age and flavor but still in current use is substituted, if sufficiently synonymous. This is not a bad rule, and deserves consideration by present-day American revisers. For certainly the Germans have realized that they had in their hands a priceless treasure, a German literary classic, a religious Scripture endeared, precisely in its traditional form, to millions of readers the world over; and they have carefully avoided both the Scylla of undue literalism and the Charybdis of modernization. May our fortune, as readers of the English Bible, be equally as good as that of the Christians of Germany, when the present Revisers shall have completed their task!

## New Emphases in Christian Social Teaching

JOHN C. BENNETT

**F**IVE years ago I prepared a paper on this same general subject. Before consenting to prepare this article I went back to the earlier paper to see how far my thought had changed during the five years and found that there were enough changes in emphasis to justify another attempt at the same subject. Changes in my own thought would not be worth recording in such a place as this if it were not for the possibility that they may be symptomatic of rather important general changes in American Protestant thought concerning the function of the Church in society. At some points, in reference to the author of my earlier paper, I feel as Augustine did when he wrote to a friend who was sure that he knew the truth about the origin of the soul, "Let not my senile caution offend your youthful confidence."

Underlying the changes with which I am dealing there is one fact—the tragic character of our historical situation. Changes in theology come partly from growth in personal insight which is the result of our more private experience and changes in theology also come from events in history. The events of the past five years could hardly leave the thought of any of us untouched. Actual war, the threat of more war; actual tyranny, the threat of more tyranny; actual economic insecurity, the threat of economic collapse—these are the things that haunt us and through them all there runs a degree of cruelty and fanaticism that our minds can hardly grasp at all. But these events and these trends are not in themselves the worst aspect of our tragic situation. Worst of all is the limitation upon our choices as we face the future. Evil is one thing if we see some way ahead which has real promise even though it be very costly, but it becomes something quite different when twist and turn as we may we find every way blocked by the threat of even greater evil. To be sure, this situation is not without meaning. In the nineteen-twenties the world still had promising choices. It was then possible to make concessions without encouraging blackmail. It was then possible to be firm without risking world war. But we did neither then when a modicum

of moral insight and common sense would have dictated both. And now the guilty and the innocent alike—the innocent more than the guilty—seem to be given up to the kind of “divine wrath” which Paul describes as the fate of the first century world. I know of no statesman, publicist, theologian, or prophet who is suggesting a policy which is politically possible and which holds much promise of saving the world from that “wrath” in the form of world war.

The limitation upon our freedom to choose policies which have real promise in the immediate international situation is the overshadowing fact. It is enough to make a whole civilization cry to be delivered from the body of this death. And yet I do not want to introduce what I have to say about the function of the Church in society with a one-sided description of the situation. There are still possibilities that general war will be averted even though no one is wise enough to say how it can be done. It is still possible that the nightmare of some publicists who fear an endlessly cumulative expansion of the areas of dictatorship is false and that for any dictatorship there are limits to the absorption of new and hostile populations without internal breakdown. It is still possible, even if general war comes, to limit its area and perhaps human revulsion will find means now not predictable to shorten it. But in any case, 1940 or 1945 will not mark the end of history. In the long run Berdyaev is probably right when he says that war is making itself impossible. But there are always, even at the worst, further possibilities for Christians and Christian groups, possibilities of achieving some degree of detachment from immediate events in order to build for what Paul Tillich calls “the day after tomorrow.” The asceticism which seeks to keep the individual righteous in an evil world is quite impossible, but it is not impossible to develop an asceticism without self-righteous illusions the purpose of which is to preserve values for the future—to preserve a spirit free from hate and uncorrupted by falsehood, to preserve a witness against diabolical practices sanctioned by the nation, to preserve a clear vision of the conditions which must be fulfilled if the world is to be saved from the vicious circle of victory and revenge.

In addition to these degrees of hope and margins of freedom in the general world situation I should add that the churches on this continent have greater freedom than anywhere else. They can still be an important factor in the struggle for economic justice in this country. They have less excuse than the churches anywhere else to forget the lessons of the last war

and the peace which followed, or at any time to capitulate to the State. One suggestion of an immediate sort—merely to indicate that our American churches can still take action with reference to the European problem—is that our churches press now through their leadership and through their members for the filling of our immigration quotas from the oppressed minorities of Europe, and push as hard as they have ever pushed in the past for the many causes which have captured their loyalty to make the economic provisions which such a move would necessitate. If the churches do not rise to some such action the reason will not be that we are caught in a situation so evil that there is no good to be chosen, but rather that we have not the will to choose the good which is at our door.

The first shift in emphasis which has grown out of the existing world situation in large part is that the message of the Church to society should be a message based upon the whole range of Christian theology and not so exclusively, as has been the case with the American social gospel, upon the application of Christian ethical principles. I do not for a moment mean to suggest any separation of ethics and theology, but it does make a difference whether the teaching of the Church begins with what society ought to do in the light of Christian principles or with what God and man, what the Church and the world are. My former paper was primarily an ethical indictment of the existing economic order. That is very easy. Ethical indictments of the economic order in even sharper form have become the commonplaces of the speeches of the President of the United States. We need such teaching no less but we need theological teaching more. The fact that those who were responsible for the preparation of the Oxford Conference on Life and Work found it necessary to turn their attention to theological questions is at least some confirmation of what I am saying. Confirmation from quite a different source is offered by Mr. Aldous Huxley who in his book, *Ends and Means*, seeks to ground his social program in a world view. He might have been more successful in his venture if he had given more sympathetic attention to Christian theology.

Society needs theological teaching in part as a basis for ethics. It may not be true, and I do not believe it to be true, that those aspects of Christian ethics which are most clearly relevant to the life of society must have their validity buttressed by theology, though there are many who do believe that to be necessary. I believe it can be shown that the present forms of opposition

to Christian ethics which take the form of nationalism and racialism and heedlessness concerning means can be shown to lead to the disasters which in terms of what Professor Hocking calls "negative pragmatism" are refutation of any ideal. On the other hand it does seem to be clear that without a theological basis Christian ethics are precarious in the face of group fanaticisms or political idolatries.

Not only as a basis for ethics but for the sake of definite guidance concerning the possibilities of society, for the sake of preparing men for repentance without which there can be no salvation, and for the sake of hope and morale is theology important for Christian social teaching.

The transcendence of God, so long as it is not interpreted in terms of sheer otherness, but always held together with the belief in a real incarnation of God in human life, is of great social significance. This faith in God who is beyond every human ideal and every human achievement is the basis for prophetic judgment upon society. Without the vision of God as transcendent in His being and in His will, man is able by endless devices known to theologians and to priests and to prophets of the school of Hananiah to use God to give religious sanction to His own will. When the transcendence of God is thought of in connection with His universal fatherhood, we have the surest guarantee of the unity of humanity as against all forms of tribalism. When the transcendence of God is thought of in connection with His sovereignty, every human sovereignty, especially the sovereignty of the State, is put into its proper place.

The balanced view of man which is characteristic of Christian theology over any long period of time is the source of very important social guidance. Complete optimism and complete pessimism are both reactionary. The optimist who sees the ideal society either here or just ahead of us without drastic change is one kind of reactionary. Hegel was an example of that kind and perhaps also Stalin—under difficulties. The pessimist who has no faith in human nature, who believes that any change will probably be for the worse, who fears chiefly that any tampering with the existing distribution of power will bring anarchy—he is another kind of reactionary. Thomas Hobbes and some types of Continental Lutheranism represent that kind. The Christian view of man on the one hand gives us faith in human possibilities. This is true whether we think in terms of the necessity of the conscious acceptance of divine grace before those possibilities can be realized, or whether we give a place in our thinking to the unrecognized working of God's Spirit outside all

the fences erected by theological and ecclesiastical systems. On the other hand, the Christian view of man keeps us aware of the temptations which constantly assail human nature and prepares us to distrust in particular the man of power. Distrust of political oligarchs and dictators, distrust of men of property who have irresponsible power over other men, distrust of nations, even righteous nations, which have the power which goes with military victory are all strongly suggested by the Christian view of man. Moreover, Christian teaching about the sin and self-deception of all of us gives us a clue to the enormous importance of the task of the Church—stressed in my former paper—in uncovering to its own members or helping them to uncover to themselves the degree to which they are controlled by class interest and national interest; in helping them to see the roots of social evil in their own minds and hearts. In this way the Church can make a contribution in undercutting the false moral props of every social order and thus in moderating the social struggle. The Christian view of man becomes a warning against the illusions of all forms of utopianism. The social importance of this warning is clear when we realize that enthusiasts for a utopia in one decade will in the next decade probably be disillusioned cynics, or reactionaries who defend what seems to them the new order with firing squads, or else they will have become zealots for still another utopia.

There is another side of Christian theology without which the message of the Church to society would be a message of judgment without redemption. Here our contemporary guides in these matters are less persuasive than in their analysis of man's evil plight. Their fresh thinking has been done about the existing condition of man and when they come to redemption they usually fall back upon vague but sophisticated eschatologies or they take refuge in an unconvincing orthodoxy. But this other side of Christian theology is in many situations the most important part of the social message of the Church. There are times for exhortation and for condemnation, but there are times when our greatest need is hope and morale, and hope and morale which do not depend upon individualistic escape from the struggles of society. Here are a few of the elements which should enter into this side of theological teaching; the transcendence of God as the ground for hope that God is not limited in His redeeming activity to existing processes; every doctrine which stresses the real activity of God in human life—the incarnation, the work of the Spirit, faith in God as immanent; recognition that even divine wrath has its positive contribution to make to redemption, that it sets limits to evil

by punishing men beyond their endurance and goads them into discovering new ways of life; the promise of forgiveness for those who honestly face in penitence their involvement in social evil which is beyond their control; the Cross as proof of the real power of the divine which seems to be defeated; the Church as the scaffolding for an order of life which can exist now in this world in spite of evil and tragedy; the ultimate faith in God as sovereign love which will not be defeated—a faith which can be given content by means of various eschatological affirmations, personal immortality, or resurrection, but which is more fundamental than any of these affirmations.

A second shift of emphasis is a readier admission of the precariousness of technical and political judgments. The Church, in its official teaching and any spokesman of the Church in his identification of Christianity with any social program or objective, should be careful to distinguish as far as possible that which is of the Gospel and that which is a matter of the best judgment of a mind trying to see the world from a Christian point of view in the light of all the facts. Paul's example is a good one when he says, "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give my judgment." The example is no less helpful because the result of his judgment was only partially happy. I do not want to overstate this as though spokesmen of the Church are to be the more paralyzed the more complicated the issue. We cannot make sharp distinctions here and we cannot draw up rules. Cautious avoidance of error has never been one of the chief marks of the Christian. The best thing for spokesmen of the Church to do is to become aware of the dangers, test their witness, and then trust the spirit.

Let me illustrate the dangers by calling attention to some issues concerning which Christians should be most careful. Any judgment about American foreign policy today must include some answer to this question: Would the application of sanctions to any of the aggressor nations cause reprisals of the sort which would lead to war? That is a question which would probably call forth one answer in 1935, another in 1938. It is a matter that depends upon technical knowledge which is not a part of the message of the Church, but still more upon predictions of human behavior which are at best uncertain. Another illustration: in the nineteen-twenties in England I greatly admired the English Churches for their close identification with the League of Nations Union which seemed to be the most effective peace organization in the world. But that close connection between the British Churches

and the League of Nations which was as defensible as the connection of the Churches with political organizations ever can be has made it difficult for the leadership of the Churches to disentangle themselves from policies which would lead to a military alliance of one group of nations against another in the name of the ideal of collective security. Whatever may be said for or against those policies now from a political point of view, sanction of them by the Church as in some special way Christian policies would be a betrayal of its trust. Again: in the nineteen-twenties it seemed clear to many Christians that the capitalistic system was so evil that a commitment of the Church to collectivism was justified without asking too many questions about the nature of the collectivism. But we have seen so many kinds of collectivism in Europe and even in America that our problem is obviously more complicated. We want to know the precise forms which this new order will take. We can see no guarantee that Socialism might not become totalitarianism; so we must be wary at least when we suggest that there is some special connection between Christianity and Socialism. There are many questions here concerning which we can get no clear light from the gospel. One would be: what are the possibilities in the reform of capitalism either in terms of decentralization or in terms of centralization and social control? Surely there is no dogmatic answer that the Christian can give to that, though he may have strong opinions. The question is more complicated when we compare the evils which might still remain in a reformed capitalism with the new evils which would appear in some other system. Well, I can only say with Paul—concerning that form of the question, I have no commandment from the Lord, I have my own judgment, and I am not as sure as Paul was that it is right. There is a group of Christians in England, known as the Christian Left, who know the answers to these questions and identify those answers with Christianity, and who see these answers to a large degree embodied in the institutions of the Soviet Union. In an issue of their magazine as recent as February, 1938, their Christian Stalinism is unchastened. Now there would be no ground to criticise them if they recognized themselves as Christian experimenters in a precarious region where we all must risk making mistakes; but their present statement of principles (called "provisional," to be sure) says, "We recognize that the task of the Christian Left is the true task of the Church." The policies of the Christian Left are a good example of what the Church should not do in society. The chief thing to be said for them is that they are less harmful than the Christian Right, which does not have to organize itself under that

name and which can count on the inertia of the organized Churches and the class bias of their leadership to further its cause.

A third shift in emphasis is very familiar to those who have followed the literature connected with the Oxford Conference. It is one of the insights which Dr. J. H. Oldham has made it impossible to ignore. It is the idea that when the Church functions in society it functions most effectively, not through its official agencies, not even through its clergy, but through its lay membership in the course of their work in the world. It is in the countless decisions of its members as citizens or as producers and consumers and investors that society is influenced and not by what is done by representatives of the Church in their official capacity. Merely to state such an idea of the activity of the Church is to suggest that at present the members of the Church in their public life reflect for the most part, not the perspective of their Christian faith but the perspective of their social group. But to state that difficulty is not to disprove the validity of this conception of the functioning of the Church. Rather it indicates the point at which the leadership of the Church should face realities. If the Church is really to affect society it must aim to raise the level of the decisions of churchmen in the world. The task of the minister as teacher is here clearly marked out, also the task of the educational boards and agencies of the churches. What the minister proclaims as an independent prophet has less effect than what the laymen in his church do. Much of the difficulty suggested by the caution which is dictated by the precariousness of technical and political judgments can be overcome if it be recognized that the task of those who lead and publicly represent the Church is not primarily that of changing society themselves. It is the task of contributing to the total thinking and attitudes of the lay members of the Church the vision, assumptions, standards, motives, habits of self-criticism, the habit of social criticism, hope even in the face of frustration which should profoundly influence any important social decision, no matter how many other factors of a technical sort may also enter into it.

A fourth shift in emphasis is the idea of an inclusive Church. We must frankly admit that on many of the issues which are of first importance honest, loyal, sensitive Christians will differ. The inclusive Church will include radicals and conservatives, pacifists and those who believe in the necessity at times of using military force. This conception of the inclusive Church is based upon several grounds. It is based in part on what I have called the precarious-

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ness of technical and political judgments. It is based upon the belief that Christianity transcends social systems or social programs. But it is based on this further fact that the Church is a community, not of saints but of sinners. But here there is one common confusion. Though the Church is a community of sinners it differs from other communities of sinners at two points. One is that its members should know that they are sinners. The other is that its members recognize a definite standard and a definite loyalty in the light of which they are sinners. If these two points at which the Church differs from other communities are taken seriously then it is clear that while the Church is inclusive in contrast with certain sectarian ideas, it is also exclusive. Those who accept the standard and the loyalty as binding upon them and who are ready to be judged by them are a peculiar people. There are many who should have no place in the Church and they should be encouraged to eliminate themselves.

This view of the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the Church has a very important application to current discussion. It means that there is a place in the Church for some kinds of radicals and some kinds of conservatives, for some kinds of pacifists and for some kinds of non-pacifists, and that the Church should create an atmosphere in which many others would eliminate themselves. The conscientious believer that force must at times be used in the restraint of aggression certainly belongs at the altar, but the complacent militarist who has a certain type of piety in one compartment of his soul should be brought to see the contradiction between what the Church stands for and what he stands for in public life. The conservative who honestly fears the evils in a new society not only belongs at the altar but he may make an indispensable contribution to any wise social decision. But the conservative who retains a type of piety in one compartment of his soul and whose conservatism is rooted in callous indifference to the needs of masses of the population and in a desire to maintain his own privileges should be brought to see the contradiction between what the Church stands for and what he stands for in public life. These illustrations could of course be multiplied. I think that we should always be on our guard when people talk about all the various systems and programs which Christians can support. There are times when we can at least draw some lines. It has been recently said in an unexpected quarter: "The saints, with Isaiah, have always accounted their righteousness as 'filthy rags,' and that not because they fell short of their ideals, but because they saw both their sins and their ideals in the white light that falls upon God's

altar."<sup>1</sup> There is a truth in those words which is essential to Christianity, but let us be careful. These ideals before God's altar are not all on a level. If they are we may well question whether or not it is light which we find there. The ideal of anti-semitism, the ideal of a completely regimented society, the ideal of the militarist who says that the battlefield is to men what motherhood is to women, the ideal of the son of Mussolini, who has recently written of the beauty which he saw when he dropped bombs upon Ethiopian cavalymen—the beauty as of the opening of a rose—do these ideals fare any worse in the white light that falls upon God's altar than the ideal of mutuality among nations, of equal opportunity for all persons regardless of class or race to develop their capacities? I use extreme examples, but if there are extremes which obviously differ even at the altar perhaps we can find between them many gradations of ideals. It is true that all ideals and programs which have been advocated by men who have been exposed in their own souls to this white light that falls upon God's altar are still to be kept under God's judgment, that they are never free from human corruption. But to suggest either rhetorically or as a one-sided form of theology that all human ideals are equal before God is moral nihilism, and it is a denial that in Christ, who as a man and a teacher, did not completely transcend all other men and all other teachers, the Word was made flesh.

A fifth shift in emphasis is a return to what is conventionally called evangelism. Here I am not suggesting the return to a method called "evangelism" but to evangelistic concern within the Churches. Doubtless there are types of evangelism to be avoided. Doubtless there is place enough for a direct social message in all sound evangelism. But even a very one-sided personal evangelism may be of vast importance for the social work of the Church. The reason for this is clear if we recognize that at the present time there are so many groups even within what has been called Christendom which flatly deny fundamental Christian assumptions. If you can take the more conventional Christian assumptions for granted you have something to build on, the importance of which is evident only when those assumptions are absent. Racial discrimination may flourish where men are

<sup>1</sup> Charles Clayton Morrison in *Christendom* (Winter, 1938). I am sure that the author of these words would not intend to suggest that ideals are on a level, but the words are typical of much contemporary writing which represents a mood that is always on the point of making that devastating suggestion. Christian thinkers must be careful to distinguish their warnings against self-righteousness which apply most to the righteous from their objective evaluation of ideals and of moral achievements.

pious and where the Church is numerically strong. The first impression that it makes on us is: How hypocritical! But you can go on to say: Thank God that there is that in the minds and hearts of people which under right guidance can be used to put racial discrimination on the defensive. You realize that when you discover racial discrimination in combination with a frankly racial and tribal religion. I do not for a moment mean to suggest that we should welcome a return to crude or one-sided types of evangelism. All I am speaking for is the vast importance of winning people to a fundamental Christian commitment, of bringing them within the orbit of the Church, of teaching them the most elementary Christian assumptions. Unless we do this the Church will lose contact with the consciences of the people who must be won to the acceptance of new social goals.

It is always well to remember that in this mixed body of people which we call the Church there are many different degrees of Christian commitment and of understanding of what Christian commitment involves in society. We need in the Church those groups which are prophetic in their detachment from the pressure of conventional opinion and in their willingness to identify themselves with the economic and political struggles of those who have so far been the victims of society. But we also need a large rank and file of people in the Church who are capable of being led to the position where they know what the prophet is talking about and where they recognize that there are truths in his message which have a claim upon them.

# The Relation of College Women to the Church

MILDRED H. McAFEE

**I**T seems to me vitally important that the church and the college should understand each other. They are each committed to certain responsibilities which are not shared by the other, but they have so many purposes in common that the failure to work together would be a great social inefficiency. If these two institutions will co-operate, their combined strength is potent enough to perform some of the miracles in social relations of which we dream and for which we are too hopeless to work.

I am going to take for granted the contribution of the church to the college. The church created the demand for the college and its membership supplied the original demand. The church still makes generous financial contributions to the maintenance of colleges all over the land. Its leading clergymen supply the preaching strength of our colleges. Its seminaries and divinity schools train our college professors in religion and Biblical history. Church-going families send an astonishing proportion of the students in our various colleges, and a large number of our teachers are conscious of an ecclesiastical foundation for their zeal to enlighten an oncoming generation.

Let me concentrate on the other side of the relationship and discuss the contribution of the college to the church.

When I think of what some of our faculty members mean to the councils of the church—the scores of individuals who, as college professors, have served the church—I am sure we should not overlook that contribution. However, the college can hardly claim the credit for making its Christian teachers significant contributors to ecclesiastic tradition. It may encourage them to write the books which shall be stimuli to religious thinking, it may provide the leisure and the funds for the research which shall add to the understanding of religious truth, but we must admit that this is a minor gift of the college to the church.

Its major gift is, of course, its graduates whose college training will be a good, bad, or indifferent factor in the future of the church.

The kind of factor it will be depends, obviously, on the nature of the college and of the graduate. It is folly to assume that there is such a thing as *the* American college. My own experience has included acquaintance with enough types to make me hesitant about generalizations. There was the one with some 250 students in a rural community in the South whose president told me not more than twelve or fifteen years ago that he questioned whether a dozen people within a five-mile area would accept the theory of evolution as a hypothesis. There was the Kentucky college in a village of seven thousand where we had two departments—the woman's college for a while having altogether 45 students, the number gradually growing to 125. There was the coeducational college in Ohio with its 1,700 men and women in college and conservatory. And there are the two women's colleges I know best—not to mention the city colleges, the colleges within state universities, the teachers' colleges, the vast variety of institution which goes by the name of *college*. When I think of the difference in experience of students in the colleges which I know best, I am acutely conscious of how stupid generalizations are.

Having admitted so much about the college variable in the situation, let me remind you that every graduate has a past for which no institution can be held responsible. What college men and women will contribute to the unity or disunity of the church depends more, I suspect, on their pre-college experience with the church than on their undergraduate contacts with it. In our rarely humble moments, college officers have to admit that other institutions like the family have considerable influence on students. Parents are a great comfort to us when we want relief from the responsibility for our failures. I suppose they should share some of our satisfactions in our successes.

It would be desirable, from my point of view, if every college graduate had become sufficiently familiar with the work of the church so that he welcomed the opportunity to serve it. I could also wish that all students could cultivate such a hunger for beauty that they would be forever contributors to the agencies providing music and art to their communities. I wish that all our graduates would participate actively in civic, governmental affairs, contributing whatever gifts they have for social betterment.

I *wish* this 100 per cent result, but frankly I don't expect to see any college achieve it. There are even moments when I am not perfectly sure that I wish everyone to become actively interested in everything. I responded

with disconcerting enthusiasm to the quotation in a book recently published by the American Association of Adult Education which read as follows:

"A new service club has been organized here lately . . . I belong to three clubs now and, the Lord help me, I shall never join another. Even as it is, I find myself trotting around town, grinning like a dog." (*Women in Two Worlds*, p. 77.)

I do not, however, classify the great historic Church with the service clubs and it would seem to me ideal if all educated people could find satisfaction in working through it. However, there seems to me no more prospect that the college will fire the imagination of all its students in that direction than that it will achieve 100 per cent efficiency at every other point in its program. Surely, however, it can be expected to introduce some students who have not previously known the church so that they will be more active after college than they were before entrance. In the main, however, it is to be expected that church-minded freshmen are more apt to be church-minded graduates than are the young people who have had no pre-college church acquaintance.

We all know that the chief criticism of the college as a church-influence is in its failure to retain the interest of the previously interested. 98.81 per cent of Wellesley's entering class last fall indicated a church affiliation. Friends of the church want and have a right to ask how many of them will be as useful to the church at graduation as they were at entrance. Ideally, they should be more useful.

I have no statistical answer to that question, but I should like to approach its answer by making a few comments about the undergraduate's relation to the church. I shall be talking now almost entirely from the point of view of a residential college for women whose students are away from their own homes.

The normal experience is for the freshman to lose her sense of intimate association with the church to the same degree that she loses it with reference to the other community groups of which she has been a part. She soon loses her enthusiasm for active participation in scouting, girl reserves, camp-fire tribes. To most high school young people, their society, their class, their organization is the church—except for the Sunday morning service which they may or may not attend. Naturally the associations are broken when the freshman leaves home and when she is at home for vacations she may or may not find it easy to re-establish them. Like all her other home associa-

tions, the church bonds are compared with the college associations and may or may not be found wanting. In any case, "church" is apt to mean the home church from which a leave of absence is taken when the student enters college.

She may gravitate to the opportunities for religious instruction on the campus. In the classroom she is apt to find instruction in Biblical history which is not of the quality she associated with Sunday school. She may appreciate its intellectual quality or she may regret it, but in any case it differentiates her college experience from her church experience at the point of their common interest.

This is almost certain to be true of the services of worship she may attend. If the service is planned for a non-student group, she is apt to feel like a permanent visitor, welcomed but not really incorporated into the "town church." If services are shaped specifically for students, they will be different from the type to which she is ordinarily accustomed. They will almost always be non-denominational to make all students feel at home. They are apt to be planned to conform with certain scholarly standards which are not always acceptable even in a scholarly community, and are certainly not reproduced at home. Our college organist shares the abhorrence of all professional musicians for some of our more traditional but musically atrocious hymns. We rarely use certain old favorites and a student recently said in my hearing, "I do wish we would sometimes sing a real Presbyterian hymn, something like 'Fling out the banner' "!" Our effort, laudable and desirable, to improve the taste of our student worshipers runs the risk of either alienating them from our chapel service or from their home church on their return. We deliberately seek the best preaching we can get—and spoil their taste for mediocre preaching.

Some students express their religious interests through work with the Student Christian Movement, a movement in which I heartily believe. I question whether its warmest student adherents identify it always with the church. I reiterate that the church to the ordinary young person—and probably to the older one—is a community institution. College professors, theological seminary professors, student leaders of student assemblies, can—and often do—run along effectively, inspiring, with no apparent connection with the church as the undergraduate knows it.

Even denominational representatives share part of this apparent isolation from the church. The student pastor may have a denominational affiliation, but he is not apt to stress it and, except where his function is to make

students feel at home in a "regular" church, his relation to students is apt to dominate his relation to the church. My observation is that this is less true with the Episcopal clergy than with others, since their ritual reminds students of their familiar church experience.

I have been talking about the students who maintain an active interest in whatever forms of religious activity are available on the campus. If *they* find it difficult to associate their undergraduate activities with the church, how much more difficult it is for the student who, having lived in a church atmosphere all her life, becomes immersed in other aspects of college life and makes no effort to identify herself with specific religious forces.

I wonder if you will understand me if I say that the better the educational job being done by the college, the less the obvious need is for specifically religious activities. Consider the elements in the religious organizations to which you belong. You attend church for a series of motives. You go for worship, and are led into that experience by the sound of the organ, the word of the minister, the argument of scripture, or possibly by the sense of participation in a corporate act—singing, responsive reading, collective listening—rare experience in the hectic, impersonalized, individualized existence of a great city. Any one of those elements is apt to arise in the experience of a college student—apart from any situation designated as religious. Day after day the student is subjected to truth, to beauty, to appeals for righteousness as inherent parts in the educational process.

She lives in a community motivated by good will, by an interest in individual welfare, by a determination to maintain high standards of morals and taste.

I wish you might all listen in to meetings of the governing board of our College Government—or it might be even more revealing to hear students discussing discipline problems. The assumption of the profound importance of each person who misbehaves as well as of the corporate responsibility for such misbehavior is the kind of thing most of us have to go to church to hear about.

*Good* educational institutions these days come as near to being Christian as most churches do, but they run the risk of letting students leave without reminding them that much of their motivation is fundamentally religious.

One of the very difficult tasks of the Christian Association on any Christian college campus is to avoid seeming to monopolize an attitude which is characteristic of all the other reputable organizations on the campus. As soon

as students formulate a Christian conviction they want to take some action in reference to it—and when they undertake to work on problems of better human relations on the campus they find it hard to avoid duplicating College Government activities. They tackle world affairs and there is the Peace Society or the Public Affairs Group incorporated so closely into the life of the community that the Christian student sometimes wonders how he can demonstrate his Christian purpose.

I think I have said enough to point out some of the reasons why the ordinary student from the ordinary college may find herself not wholly at home in the ordinary church.

It seems to me important to observe that she is not altogether at home in any institution when she undertakes to establish herself after college. She has grown up in college. Her family rarely realize that. They see her during vacations when she likes to relax and be waited on as a welcome guest. She is, however, accustomed to a marked degree of independence as a college senior. The first year at home is apt to be a distinctly problematic one in family relationships.

Her relation to that other vital institution, the State, is apt to be altered by her college experience. She has acquired an historic perspective which makes her critical of partisan claims. She has acquired a somewhat mature attitude toward sensationalism. She is suspicious of being swept off her feet emotionally. Students will give their utmost for sacrificial purposes, but they will be reluctant to act blindly and stupidly in the name of patriotism.

Her dislocation from the church is not abnormal. Four years at college breaks most bonds with the earlier years which need to be re-established after graduation.

Doubtless many of you join the critics of our colleges who deplore their whole program because of this result which I so frankly recognize. There is a highly reputable, probably a more modern, school of thought which believes in educating young people "on the job"—the same kind of job they would have if they were not in college. If a student would study industry, let her enter employment. If she would study government, let her enter politics. This program has much to commend it and I follow the experimentation of its exponents with interest.

There is, however, something to be said for this other method of abstracting the student from the tensions and strains of the work-a-day world, introducing her to a controllable community in whose management she can

have a genuine responsibility, and then giving her a long look at the world around her. Her library, her laboratory, reveal aspects of the world which it might take her years to discover as she traveled through it. From the vantage point of the college she begins to see the world around her as having some pattern, some shape by which it can be apprehended, at least in part. Before she becomes involved in the current of its forces, she begins to get some sense of their direction and begins to choose those with which she wants to be associated.

There is a chronic problem before all administrative officers of colleges which try to provide this type of laboratory and observatory experience. How much should the student emerge to sample so-called "real" experience? Shall she picket a strike in order to understand the labor situation? Shall she attend the mass meetings to discuss the boycott on Japanese goods in order to participate actively in a critical world situation? Shall she lobby at the state capitol to encourage repeal of the Teachers' Oath in the interests of freedom of speech? Shall she teach a Sunday-school class and attend Christian Endeavor and maintain her relations with the same type of church work she has always known or shall she do in college what she can do only there? These and scores of other practical questions are not easy to answer when you try to maintain an effective college.

An hour on the mountaintop loses its significance if we return from it to fit back exactly where we were before our trip to gain new horizons. If we really wanted our sisters and daughters to return from college just as they were when they left, their education would be a questionable investment.

They ought to return—if their experience has been profitable—able to be far more valuable members of a community when they shall have found their new places in it.

Let me mention in closing, three attitudes on which those of us who are interested in religious unity can count as contributions from college young people, if we want to use them.

(1) College students have learned the power of tradition and the possibility of changing it. We all know that young people are proverbially conservative, and college students actively dislike to violate their own traditions. And yet, within broad limits, they have learned to participate in modifying institutions. They watch a rapid succession of student leaders, each group annually revising something, legislating this practice in and that one out. They are used to making decisions, administering organization

funds, executing incredibly complex plans. Some of them do these things very awkwardly. Some are skillful beyond belief. The point I would make now is that they are accustomed to participating actively in a constantly changing organization, guided in large part by their own efforts. A college is ashamed of itself if its older students sit quietly by without offering suggestions and assuming responsibility for community welfare. Students with that experience, that self-confidence, have learned to work within a given system and have co-operated normally with adult members of the community, and they are not stupid young hot-heads, determined to run the universe. By and large, they are a humble and rather awed group, not expecting much welcome after college. They are, however, accustomed to being taken seriously. If they are to be used in the church they may be expected to modify existing practices, and sometimes they will make mistakes. If they are not given enough freedom to move about within the church, being included as participating workers with a beginner's share in the management, the church will lose them to other agencies where they can feel themselves genuinely needed.

(2) Another attitude with which the church can well reckon is the assumption of relationship to a world order rather than a narrowly limited one. College students live almost unconsciously oriented to a world whose culture is exhibited at its best on college campuses.

The modern student has sincere and intelligent respect for other races and nations. It would seem presumptuous to the student of oriental art to be condescending to the Japanese or Chinese. As you probably know she is apt to be suspicious of the missionary movement because she thinks missionaries think they are better than the nationals. She should know better, but she often doesn't. She would be interested in teaching in the Orient but she would sympathize with her students, for she feels too inexperienced to teach them well.

She believes in offering Christian thought to anyone who wants to hear, but she feels less adequate as a leader of religious thinking than as a teacher of English, and religion seems too important for a layman to be its spokesman in a non-Christian world. She respects the rest of the world and will be driven from the church by any trace of condescension on our part.

(3) Her college experience is apt to make it hard to draw a sharp line between religious and secular activities which are socially motivated. The principles for which the Church is established seem to her more significant

than the institution itself. The Foreign Policy Association discussions of Far Eastern affairs will seem as important as a specific missionary program. Racial discriminations, economic distinctions, social injustice of all kinds, seem important, and the ordinary young graduate is paradoxically intolerant of intolerance.

This all boils down to the observation that when she first leaves college the graduate is unimpressed by the traditional sanctity of any institution, even the church. I insist that she respects what it stands for, she recognizes its social effectiveness, she needs it for her own development, but it will have to prove its vitality in the new day. She will have little interest in denominationalism except as it is an administrative convenience, though she will share whatever traditions she has learned to know from childhood, but she cannot welcome barriers after she has lived in a free community of socially minded scholars.

She challenges the church to let her use it as a channel for her contribution to a world which she sees as a unit. May a united church accept that challenge.

There would be no justification for asking the church to adapt to college-trained women if it were not adaptation in the direction of its own ideals.

Christ's whole approach to his day and age seems to me to warrant encouraging a growing, flexible, adaptable church institution, reckoning with all mankind as brothers—sons of the same Father-God, determined to spread the kingdom of God, not by monopolizing it, but by injecting secular activities with divine purposes. It is not the college graduate only, but a far larger group of modern young men and women who are challenging the church to let them use it as a channel for their contribution to a world in need.

## The World Council and the American Church

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

**I**N the last number of *RELIGION IN LIFE*, I gave an account of the conference of Church leaders held at Utrecht in Holland during the second week of May of this year, to draft a constitution for a World Council of Churches. In that article I pointed out some of the difficulties which had to be overcome, and commented on the unity of spirit which made agreement possible at all points without sacrifice of conviction.

The Utrecht Conference had a second and more immediate task, which presented difficulties of its own. It had to define the relation of the proposed World Council to existing organizations, international and regional, and to provide for the continuance of their work during the intervening period. Here the conditions in the different countries proved so different that no single uniform plan was practicable. It was left to the sections to work out their own problems as might seem most feasible.

On one point, however, there was general agreement: that the World Council would succeed in the important responsibilities intrusted to it only if it was based upon representative local bodies accepting its principles which were themselves united. It is the purpose of this article to inquire in some detail what the acceptance of this responsibility may mean for the Churches of America.

This is not easy to foretell. Our experience at other stages of the movement for unity is a warning against too hasty generalization. While the survey of the quarter of a century which has elapsed between the Edinburgh Conference of 1910 and the Utrecht Conference of 1938 reveals a steady trend toward a more inclusive unity, our view of the form that unity is to take and the assumptions which it takes for granted have been at more than one point radically modified.

A case in point is the Stockholm Conference of 1925. Two assumptions underlay the work of that conference. One was that it was easier to agree in matters of practice than in matters of theory. A second was that men were rational creatures and hence if you could show them what it was sensible for

them to do you might expect them to follow your advice. Both have been proved false by the event.

The Stockholm message was based upon the first assumption; it set forth a social ideal in which the Christian principle of brotherhood was to be applied to every relation of life, and it appealed to different groups of society to make this ideal their own. But the experience of the intervening years has shown that the acceptance of a common ideal—even in the realm of social ethics—by no means guarantees that it will be realized in practice. Ask any one of the leaders of the conflicting movements which appeal for our allegiance today to describe his ideal for society and he will answer you substantially in the terms of the Stockholm message. They are all in favor of the kind of life there described. But when you ask him further how we are to achieve this ideal in fact the paths diverge. It is not only that Communists and National Socialists differ from Democrats. Democrats are themselves divided. How far in our present highly organized society can we still trust the principle of *laissez faire*? At what point and in what form must the principle of state control be admitted? Here those who alike profess themselves believers in the New Deal part company. Clearly then if we are to find some way of realizing our practical aim we must first reach clarity as to the sense in which we understand it. This was the new insight won by the Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences and explained the large amount of time which they gave to the discussion of what seemed to many purely theoretical issues.

More far-reaching still has been our disillusionment as to the second assumption which underlay the Stockholm Conference; that men are rational creatures and if you can only show them what is sensible for them to do you can rely upon their doing it. The fact is that the motives which lead men to act as they do are in large part irrational motives—habit, prejudice, a willingness to accept external authority for the purpose of evading personal responsibility and conversely the love of power and prestige. In such a world as now exists the arguments of scholar and statesman find scant consideration even if they are fortunate enough to make themselves heard by any numbers of persons.

Hitler has been our great teacher as to the power of the irrational. A master of the art of molding public opinion, he has achieved his aim not by argument but by iteration. I have heard it said—I do not know how truly—that Hitler attributes the failure of his first *putsch* to the fact that he tried

to win men to his cause by reason; the success of the second to the fact that he was content to rely upon assertion.

It was my fortune to be present in Germany on the occasion when Hitler made his first speech after the burning of the Reichstag. Those who were physically present and heard him speak have described his power over the audience as almost magical. So irresistible was the contagion of mass emotion that English auditors who were present found themselves lifting their hands in the Nazi salute and shouting "Heil Hitler" with the rest. My own experience was very different. I heard Hitler speak over the radio in company with a group of a dozen or more German professors who had gathered for a conference on the social responsibility of the Church. What we wanted to hear from Hitler was a reasoned statement. What did Hitler propose to do and how and why? But we waited in vain for our answer. What we heard was not a program but an emotion, and as it became clear as the hour wore on that that was all that we were to hear, one after another those who had been listening in gave up in despair and turned to other things.

It is with such a world and with men of such instincts and passions that the World Council will have to deal. We must keep this constantly in mind in attempting to answer the question, What may the World Council mean for the Life of the American Church?

One thing we may say with confidence that it should mean; a symbol about which the imagination of men can center and their emotions crystallize. How much we need such a symbol recent events have shown with startling demonstration. Man lives by symbols and the men and institutions which have ruled man have ruled him because of this fact. What were the Roman Catholic Church without the Holy Father, or National Socialism without the Fuehrer; or Fascism without Mussolini! In contrast to these concrete centers of loyalty and emotion, how barren and empty the alternative presented by our divided Christianity. What have we to offer comparable to the concreteness and accessibility of the symbols of these rival faiths? Even our movements for unity have not been able to unite. There have been Faith and Order and Life and Work and the International Missionary Council, and the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, and more besides. One of my friends, a Canadian Baptist, voiced the prevailing confusion by his appeal for a little pamphlet which would serve as a guide to those who wished to find their way about the different world movements for unity.

That day, thank God, may now be over. Specialized interests and movements no doubt will still be needed and will still be found. But they will take their place as particular forms and organs of the one World Council through which all non-Roman Christianity, and in due time we may hope the Church of Rome itself, will find visible expression.

With a symbol of our existing world unity the World Council may furnish us with an organizing principle for our efforts after national unity. Today those efforts though real and encouraging are uneven. The Methodists North and South and the Methodist Protestants have come together. The Presbyterians and Episcopalians are talking of doing so. But there are still wide reaches of our American Christianity where organic unity, if ever practicable, lies in the distant future. The press of events demands a speedier solution. It will not do to wait until after we are dead to find some center through which our existing national unity can find visible and tangible expression. We need such a center now.

Desperately as we need it we do not yet have it. The Federal Council—the most inclusive of our existing agencies of unity—still leaves many important bodies outside; Lutherans and Episcopalians on the right, extreme Liberals on the left. No Catholic Church, Orthodox or old Catholic, is a member. Moreover, the membership of those who are participants is largely clerical. The great body of Christian laymen, men and women, have little part in the activity of the Council and still less in shaping its policy.

Here the creation of the World Council presents American Christians with a unique opportunity. What the Federal Council alone has not yet been able to achieve may become possible through the common membership of all the American Churches in the World Council. Men and movements who do not touch one another directly may be related indirectly through it.

When five years ago I visited Kottayam in South India as a member of the Lindsay Commission, I found that in that single city there were three independent theological seminaries, all of the ancient Syrian Church—the Church which of all existing Churches claims the greatest antiquity except that of the Church of Rome. When we remonstrated with the authorities on the ground that as representatives of Catholic Christianity they ought to give a demonstration of unity by coming together in a single seminary they admitted that this was true. But they contended that such a unification was eschatologically impossible in Kottayam. If, they said, you will establish an independent theological seminary outside of our Province we will all come in.

It is a principle capable of wider application than to the Syrian Church. What as American Christians we cannot do directly at the moment we may be able to achieve by common membership in the World Council.

We have a precedent here. It will be remembered that when the United Church of Canada was formed by the union of the Presbyterians, the Methodists and the Congregationalists a considerable number of Presbyterians remained outside, and while the separate Canadian Churches have found ways of co-operating in special tasks like Evangelism and Social Service they have no Federal Council which includes them all.

This gap is in the way of being filled by the establishment of a Canadian branch of the World Council in which all sections of the Canadian Church, Anglicans, Baptists and Presbyterians, as well as the United Church of Canada, are represented. Indeed, Canada seems too narrow a unit for the organization which our Canadian friends visualize. They would like to see a North American branch of the World Council, grouped in two sections, one for Canada, the other for the United States.

The same procedure is possible on our side of the border. Why should not all the Churches represented in Oxford and Edinburgh, Catholic and Protestant alike, be members of one North American branch of the World Council. When this has taken place it will be only a matter of time and tact before all our existing agencies of unity find their place as constituent parts of this more inclusive unit.

A third thing that the World Council may do is to furnish a natural point of contact with individuals and groups who are not adequately represented in our existing church organization. I have referred to the fact that the Federal Council is largely a clerical organization. In this it reflects the situation in the constituent Churches. In Protestant theory laymen share in the universal priesthood of believers, and no view of the Church is adequate which does not do full justice to the structural place which they hold in its life and government.

But in practice their function—so far at least as the men are concerned—has been largely that of looking after the temporalities of the Church and distributing its charity. Only the Presbyterians have taken the principle of universal priesthood seriously and given laymen equal rights with ministers in the government and spiritual leadership of the Church.

One result of this unequal arrangement appears in the differing attitude taken by ministers and laymen on social questions. The ministers, con-

scious of their responsibility for holding up a high ideal for society, are prone to make pronouncements about the duties of social classes to one another, in the shaping of which the men who must carry out the policy recommended have had little part. Hence we find a sense of straining between pulpit and pew. Business men claim that the ministers are talking about matters they do not understand. Ministers are apt to respond by criticizing business men for lack of social vision. What is needed, if the social witness of the Church is to be effective, is that laymen should be taken into council at the start. If the proposals of the clergy prove misguided or unpractical, then responsibility must be put upon the laymen to present an alternative policy more effective but equally Christian.

Here the churches of Great Britain have much to teach us. Their attitude on social questions is not less advanced than our own but they have used laymen far more than we in their study of social issues. The result is, if we are to believe a distinguished student of social questions like Mr. Seebohm Rowntree, that the attitude of the average English business man on labor questions is a generation ahead of our own.

Here the World Council offers us a great opportunity. No question more insistently occupies those who met at Utrecht than the necessity of giving laymen a responsible place in its deliberations. Experience has shown that it is not enough to put that responsibility on the various churches, urging them to appoint a due proportion of laymen; it simply will not be done. Accordingly it has been provided in the constitution of the World Council that at least a third of the delegates shall be lay persons, men and women, and that the same proportion shall be observed in the constitution of the central committee.

This is an example which may well be followed in our American churches. If the representation of laymen is too limited in the Federal Council and in our other agencies of unity, let us see that the mistake is corrected in the composition of the American branch. The example set will be certain to have its influence in other aspects of the life of the churches.

But organization alone will not do for us what needs to be done. There are tens, yes, hundreds of thousands, of men and women in our churches who hold no official position but who are as keenly interested in the cause of Christian unity as the clergy and as desirous to do their part to bring it about. With them, too, the World Council furnishes a needed point of contact. In Great Britain there is a society called the Friends of Reunion which in

unofficial ways works to keep the ideal of unity alive. Why should we not have in this country a society of Friends of the World Council whose function it should be to make the work of the Council known and to relate the existing membership of the churches to it. Membership in such a society should not conflict with membership in any other organization. For the very purpose of the World Council is to furnish a single center about which all the other agencies for unity may be grouped.

Of this we may be sure, that the World Council will not fulfill its true function in the life of our American Christianity until it has a branch not only in every denomination and in every community but in every congregation. Here the Friends of the World Council might furnish the nucleus of a missionary movement which would preach and, better still, practice this unity in every part of our land.

A fourth contribution which the World Council may be expected to make to the life of the American Church is an example which may be followed in other fields than that of formal religion.

If one asks which is the greatest evil from which our community is suffering today the answer is that it is the suspicion which divides the different classes of society. Wherever we look we see mistrust and fear. Government distrusts big business, and big business, government. Capital distrusts labor and labor, capital. Business men are themselves divided between those who are ready to accept radical change in our social order as a necessity and are trying to make the needed readjustment a peaceful one, and those who still hope that when the Republican Party comes into power again all will be as it was before. Labor on its part is rent by the strife of the American Federation of Labor with the more radical policy of Mr. Lewis and his C. I. O.

Under these conditions it is impossible to secure the unprejudiced consideration of any proposal. Men's minds are made up beforehand; while ostensibly we are living at peace, our psychology is of war.

Against such a situation pronouncements will prevail little; only example will bring effective help. Let those who profess to believe in Jesus Christ show that the religion He brings is able to change the spirit of men, and those to whom we speak will begin to take our council seriously.

Here our experience at Utrecht may prove of far-reaching significance. In the past religion has not always been an influence for peace. Its wars—and it has had its wars in abundance—have been no less bitter than the wars of the nations, because the weapons used were words instead of guns. But at

Utrecht it was found that the things which Christians had in common were more important than the things in which they differ, and so, even in matters which in other ages would have involved the bitterest controversy, it was found possible to secure unanimity without sacrifice of conviction.

What America needs above all things is to carry into all phases of its life the spirit of Utrecht. The coming of the World Council will be an encouragement to believe that this is a practicable ideal.

How the changes outlined above are to be brought about only the future can show. If the experience of the past is to be our teacher they will come gradually, and after a process of trial and error in which mistakes will be made and false steps have to be re-traced. When one considers the size of the country, the number and diversity of the elements to be united, the habits formed under other conditions that will have to be changed, it will be easy to be discouraged and to predict failure. Yet when one measures the distance that has been already traversed during the quarter of a century which we have passed in review, doubt gives place to confidence and fear to hope. One may no doubt be disappointed by pitching one's expectations too high. For those who believe in the living Christ the great danger is that we shall pitch our expectations too low.

## Religious Philosophers in the Old Testament

MARGARET B. CROOK

IT is a mistake to say that the Hebrews were not philosophers. It would be better to say that they did not distinguish between philosophy and religion. They were forceful thinkers; determined foes of the ancient hierarchies of the gods, they swept the mind clean from idolatrous associations. At first, as passionate spokesmen for the Holy One of Israel, they were concerned with the establishment of monotheism. The One God was the omnipotent ruler, not only of Israel, but of all peoples. In several ways they over-simplified religion, and in doing so created for themselves problems that they could not leave unprobed. They succeeded in divorcing the individual worshiper from his local and household gods to such an extent that there came a time when they could no longer evade exploration of the whole matter of the relation of the individual to the One God.

A problem of similar nature came before the Greek world also; but by virtue of their earlier religious revolution the Hebrews could face certain of their problems one by one. When they began to look into the relation of the individual to the universe, the One God was for them accepted beyond question; and they worked against a firmer background than did their contemporaries.

They faced the question, when it came before them as a practical matter, with all the courage with which they had earlier faced that of the oneness of God. They simply went to the Lord, as a man goes to his friend, and asked Him about it. Jeremiah did this, and the writer of the Book of Job followed him. They tried to grasp the principles of the heavenly rule over mankind as they would have grasped those of a king or priest; and they almost broke themselves in the doing of it. The great teacher known as Ecclesiastes—or Koheleth, as the Hebrew has it—realized the limitations of the method, and drew his conclusions by other means.

Some made another kind of approach to the question. Granting the universal supremacy of the One God, they assumed that Wisdom served as the intermediary between God and mankind. For some Wisdom was one

and the same as the divine Torah—the Law that Moses had brought down from Mount Sinai. The search for a key to the problem was keenly conducted in the third and second centuries before Christ; the many attempts to provide one that survive in the Old Testament, and among the books of the Apocrypha, bear witness to the pressure that the matter exerted upon thinking men. The presence within the Hebrew Canon of such daring and unorthodox books as Job and Ecclesiastes shows beyond question the value attached to attempted solutions.

The assumption that the individual might approach the gods to plead his own cause was a very old one. Worshipers had always been careful to keep in good standing with their patron deities, and if one god did not serve, another might. The more difficult problems arose when distrust of polytheism began to prevail, or when the single universal Being, austere remote, took the place of the many less gods. But even the ancient past was not without its difficulties, and in the remains of early pagan writings we can glimpse the beginnings of later trends.

Perhaps it was always the assumption, or at least the hope of mankind that he who paid due service to the gods would be served by them, and that a man was justified in going to them for aid if they failed to provide it. Thus a fragmentary story in the Sumerian language, that comes from Nippur in Southern Mesopotamia, voices a plea to the god Enlil for aid to a worshiper in distress by reason of invasion and drought. Another appeal, in Babylonian cuneiform, tells of a sufferer who likewise lived at Nippur, whose ritual offerings to the gods had been without flaw, but who was nevertheless afflicted with terrible sickness. The sufferer cried in vain to god and goddess, to seer and enchanter in his search for a remedy. He questioned the counsel of the gods, and whether a man could understand their thoughts—whether their thoughts were worthy of a man's understanding—since it appeared that what is innocent in itself, is evil with them; and what is contemptible in men, is good with them. The story points to the apparent worthlessness of the many gods, and (on a tablet which may provide a continuation of the story) favors the claim of Marduk, god of Babylon. A spell from Marduk affords relief to the sufferer. (G. A. Barton, *Archaeology and the Bible*, 6th ed., Pt. II, c. xxii.)

But the religious revolution of the Hebrews had gone so far in placing the Lord as the supreme power over the nation, that at one time the claims of the group had virtually expelled those of the individual. Amos and

Hosea of the eighth century had taught that if the nation falls away from the Lord, the whole people suffers retribution. The question poised by Abraham with regard to Sodom represents in Bible story the same type of thought. Would the faithful or the idolators weigh the heavier in the judgment of the Lord? Fifty, forty, even ten righteous men might suffice to save a city from otherwise merited doom (Genesis 18). This is not individualism, although it has sometimes been taken as such. The question of corporate responsibility, never absent from the thought of the ancient world, overlay, in the teaching of the Hebrew prophets, those earlier traditions in which the gods had been accessible to their individual worshipers. When ultimately the wise men of Israel, having accepted the universal monotheism of the prophets, found themselves confronted with the matter of the claims of the individual upon the attention of the Lord, they simply assumed that the Lord who ruled the destinies of the nations, was capable also of ruling that of each and every individual. They taught, as they continually do in the Book of Proverbs, that it was God who dealt out rewards to the virtuous, or retribution to the wicked.

There is teaching in the Book of Jeremiah which has often served as a basis for the assumption that the Lord dealt individually with His worshipers, though a careful reading shows that Jeremiah is still speaking of the nation as a whole. The Prophet had said that the Lord would endow the great and the small, that is, the entire people, with knowledge of His requirements; "the word in the heart" was something that a man found there without the intervention of the learned teacher (Jeremiah 31. 31ff.). But occasionally Jeremiah goes further, and does appear to assume that the Lord is watching over each and every person.

"Can any man hide himself, so that I cannot see him?  
Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord,"

(Jeremiah 23. 24).

The prophets themselves had always been regarded as having access to the Lord, endowed by His spirit, they had uttered His "word." But they had exercised this privilege as guides of the national destiny, or as deliverers of doom-bearing oracles to the people as a whole. Once more Jeremiah goes upon the further assumption that the prophet who delivers the unwelcome message has a personal claim upon the protection of the Lord (Jeremiah 15. 15-16; 20. 7-13). Thus, leaving aside the famous eighteenth chapter of

Ezekiel, which may be a late piece of work, we can see that the wise men could well have justified themselves by the mouth of Jeremiah when they teach, without hesitation, that the Lord will reward the good and frustrate the crafty (Eliphaz in Job 4). Undoubtedly the Wisdom writers searched the Books of the Prophets for light upon their difficulties, just as the Christians later searched the Scriptures for proofs of the coming of the Messiah.

Perhaps also the truth is that the question of the relation of the individual to the supreme Deity could not long be excluded from Hebrew religious teaching, and that it found its way back by various avenues. Once the rule of the Lord over each and every person had become the generally accepted belief, then the more active minds among wise men would often be exercised by the problems that it raised up. It was no accident that they—teachers of civic and family ethics to the youth of the day—took the lead in probing the matter of the relationship of the individual to the universal God. By the third and second centuries B. C. the question had become a major problem, and the debate that centers around it became responsible for much in subsequent Jewish, and Christian thinking.

The greatest of these inquirers, one who stands nearest to Jeremiah in his approach to God, is the author of the Book of Job. He is well acquainted with wise men of varying degrees of dogmatism on this issue. He confronts three of them with the afflicted Job. In this way he brings face to face, in the most poignant manner at his command, those who refuse to accept any variation from the now general assumption that the Lord deals with each and every man upon his merits, with the minority—Job is one to their three—which is willing to indulge in searching questioning of both God and man.

Job opens the "Symposium," as it has been called, of chapters three through twenty-seven, and three times over appeals to each of his friends in turn for enlightenment. Eliphaz who has received his wisdom through visions of the night, Bildad who derives all knowledge from the fathers, Zophar who stands pat upon the doctrine in question, all speak, as Job bitterly points out, as though wisdom would die with them. Job, like Jeremiah, laments the day that he was born, claims, as did Jeremiah, that the Lord is bringing his suffering upon him for no fault of his own. He knows by all the standards by which it is reasonable to ask a human being to abide, that he is without blame; he asks God to meet him upon the grounds of reason. In his distress he turns from God to man, and from man to God; he swings from heights of splendid affirmation to depths of despair in quick succession. His

terrible journey of exploration stands out against the mounting hardness of the three wise men, and the silence of God.

A writer who feared that wisdom was being brought into disrepute added the great hymn of faith (Job 28), and perhaps tampered with the final speech of Job, and of Zophar whose expected reply does not appear. Then follows Job's self-examination, and the majestic appeal to the Lord (Job 29-31).

How did it—how could it end? Where did the author leave off, and where did later writers—who could not, for the fascination that the theme had upon them, keep out of it—begin their contributions? Was it the writer of the "Symposium" who represented the Lord as setting forth in reply to the suffering Job His vast and marvelous powers? The point has always exercised the commentators; but this is exactly what we should expect the writer of the "Symposium" to do, if we have correctly understood the general nature of his most pressing problem. He pictures a man—Job—against the magnitude of the universe and its Creator, and he uses every resource of intelligent debate and emotional appeal at his disposal to move God to reveal His plan, and the wise men to abandon their dogmatism and become open-minded. But how to find the meeting ground between the great Lord of all and the moral individual—that is the problem. Shall the Lord explain to puny man the principles of His governance as though He too were a man? What should a writer, who had made this kind of approach to the question, do but remind the questioner that he was capable of thinking only the thoughts of men, and not the thoughts of God.

It is difficult for the modern reader to realize the lack of distinction in Jewish thinking of the pre-Christian centuries between the tangible and the intangible. To point the difference between God and man the writer of the Book of Job spreads before the inquirer the visible universe made and ruled by God. The result appears to us like a boastful anti-climax when the Lord, with the advantage of His superior position, displays His achievements before the eyes of the suffering Job. Job is asked to realize, when at length he does appear before God, that it is not, as he had expected, to argue his own case, or even to receive light upon the problems of the destiny of individuals, but to look upon the immensity and the intricacy of the works of God, as God reveals them to him.

It has also puzzled the commentators that in the end Job should apologize to God, as though he were in the wrong. The modern reader is apt to consider that Job, who had charged the wise men with speaking unrighteously

of God when their theories represent Him as punishing a righteous man, and who has shown great daring and persistence in his search after the truth, might have fared better at the hands of the Almighty. But it is only when our own preconceptions are put aside that we can approach the point of view of the author. We have to take it that this great lyric thinker knew the business of his own day, and gave the kind of answer to an all-engrossing question which was within his reach at the time.

We need not be distracted by the verbosity of Elihu who adds so little to the argument; it is generally recognized that his speeches represent an addition by another hand. Nor need the folk-tale with which the book begins and ends divert our attention from the main issue. Folk-tale was a well recognized vehicle for the words of the wise in the ancient world. The eyes of our author are not upon the folk-tale to work a revolution in it; he is using it, as anyone in his day would have used it, to carry the new teaching with which he has filled it out. The testing of Job by Satan, to which the Lord consents at the outset, bears more closely upon the problem under debate; it gives occasion for the Lord to proclaim His own confidence in the moral fiber of Job.

To that pressing question of his day—Does the Lord rule the destinies of each and every individual?—our author replies that the Lord has other things to attend to, and by inference we are left to understand that there are times when suffering and affliction may have to be taken by the good man in his stride, without letting them destroy his faith.

This is Spartan teaching; and the author's preoccupation with the great question in its bold outline leaves him no occasion to explore more difficult questions that were yet to arise. God had stipulated to Satan that, though all else were taken, Job's life was to be spared. The author leaves it to Shakespeare, in his *King Lear*, to pose the question of the relation to the universe of the good man whose mind gives way under stress, and who dies in his affliction. For purposes of his argument, our author required a man who kept his wits, and his bones and skin; who, though he came to the verge of distraction and death, was not required to yield to them. His treatment of Job is so powerful, and so moving, that we are apt to pass over this basic requirement, that the man with whom the author makes his searching experiment must be able to review his own integrity, and at length hear, and grasp the significance of the voice of God. The author's eyes are not primarily upon the deserts of Job, not upon the vindication of the suffering righteous

man; that timeworn theme was popular enough in his day, and long before it. He had in mind the newer and later problem of the right attitude of the good man to the truth when he has discovered some part of it. If Job thought himself neglected and overlooked, it was not for him to demand trial as he might before a human judge, not to protest and complain, not even to expect the meticulous attention of the great Artificer, who is not waiting to hear Job's own particular defense of himself—does not need to hear it.

Even those who may have been ready to acknowledge that the Lord did not intervene in the affairs of each and all, must still have been moved with a desire to discover the principles of the divine rule. Amos had said that the Lord would do nothing without informing His servants, the prophets (Amos 3. 7). Doubtless many a wise man, training the youth of his day in civic and family virtue, felt that the problem was pressing upon him, and that he was justified in looking into it.

Of those who stormed high heaven, only to discover height above height, the cry of one explorer was treasured in the Book of Proverbs. His words form a notable fragment which must have registered the relentless self-judgment of many. Reconstructing an obscure passage as little as may be, we read: The oracle of the man who says,

I have wearied myself, O God,  
I have wearied myself, and am exhausted.  
For I am more like the brutes than man,  
I am without understanding,  
I have not learned wisdom,  
Nor have I the knowledge of the Holy One.  
Who has ascended into heaven, and come down again?  
(Proverbs 30. 1f.)

The writer asks, in effect, "Has anyone?"

Evidently the search for actual verifiable evidence of the ways of God is now in full swing. The presence of this honest and desperate fragment in the orthodox Book of Proverbs shows us that the wise men of the third and second centuries B. C. were not ashamed of the failure of one of their leaders to solve the mighty problem of God's rule.

Kohleth, another distinguished teacher, more master of himself, more skilled in technique of inquiry, undertook certain further investigations. He probed here and there wherever he found an opening. If the mind reeled before the assault in general, there might be some portion of the whole that

could be attacked, and certain specific conclusions that could be drawn. Koheleth did not carry his appeal to God; he looked instead for evidence concerning the ways of God. Late prophetic teaching had implied the presence of an end toward which God would have men work, an end in which universal justice and peace would be established (for example, Isaiah 2. 2-4). Koheleth does not refer to such passages, but he searches for signs of the great objective, and he does not find them. The monotonous succession of the generations as of rivers that run to the seas, and never fill it, leaves him with a sense of arriving nowhere. Solomon, the wisest of men, in whose name Koheleth offers some of his soliloquies, may accumulate wealth, great buildings, beautiful gardens with men and maidens serving and singing therein, and at last may hate his labor, for he will have to leave the fruits of it to another—and who knows whether his successor will be a wise man or a fool. Concerning the end, for which he searches, he says,

Then I beheld all the work of God, that man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because however much a man labor to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea moreover, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it. (Ecclesiastes 8. 17.)

As he looked at the fortunes of the righteous and the wicked, he found no leading principle traceable there. Time and chance were over all alike, God was far from intervening on behalf of mankind. The race was not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise by virtue of any law that a man could formulate. Once he made the courageous statement that there was not enough evidence for the investigator to draw conclusions concerning the nature of God Himself, whether He was moved by "love or hatred," whether, in fact, He was friendly to mankind or at enmity with them (Ecclesiastes 9. 1). Koheleth was not the first to complain of "a warfare" against mankind; Job had done so before him (Job 10. 17). But the "warfare" against Job could be accounted for, in the eyes of the reader, by the announced testing of Job by Satan. Koheleth has no such consoling device to offer; he is probing after evidence on a later and more scientific basis. He held that a man could not sum up the ways of God with mankind in the form of a doctrine of reward and retribution, nor in the form of ultimate objective, might not be able to state them at all; but he could at least state his own limitations, and, knowing them, recognize within them what he knows.

Thus Koheleth found a certain satisfaction in life in a limited and practical way. There was joy—that no one could deny—in labor, in eating and drinking, and loving. Youth, not age, was the best thing in life; and the young man should rejoice in his youth before the throes of age come upon him, or death bring him to an end (Ecclesiastes 9. 7f.; 11. 9ff.). He was not an Epicurean selecting the happy mean with a calmly judging eye upon the utmost securable well-being; he was too robust. He must have attracted a considerable following among the youths whom he instructed, for they cherished his work and held it worthy of a place among the writings of the fathers.

It was not to be expected that the versatile wise men of Israel would follow without protest the lines along which the heroic investigators were leading them. Others, working concurrently, arrived at other conclusions.

Much of the teaching contained in the Book of Proverbs had been common currency of the wise men before the author of the Book of Job had thrown down the gauntlet. From the first nine chapters of the Book of Proverbs—the latest section—we gather that he had not uttered his challenge in vain. These writers accept the ethical monotheism of the prophets, never questioning the nature of the supreme God; but only rarely do they represent Him as intervening directly in the affairs of men. They assume that He has means of His own for conveying instruction to mankind; Wisdom makes clear the will of God to men. Righteousness is a matter of response to the heavenly agent, a man can know the good, and serve the Lord if he follows the heaven-sent instruction. This is teaching very closely akin to that of the orthodox wise men of the Book of Job, but with a significant difference.

These later teachers hold that man rules his own destiny in that he can accept or reject the proffered guidance; in so far as he elects to follow Wisdom he can secure length of days, and peace of mind; but if he rejects the overtures of Wisdom, he takes the path to destruction. There is here in more developed form, and applied to the individual, that choice between the two "ways" proffered to the nation by the Lord Himself in the Book of Deuteronomy (11 and 28). Evidently these writers were being drawn to a study of the Torah—the Books of Moses. Man is not looking to himself alone, the guidance that comes from above is his to lay claim to, he can reach out and find understanding, for Wisdom has the well-being of mankind at heart.

Once in the Book of Proverbs (8. 22f.) Wisdom is magnificently por-

trayed as the helper of God from before creation, the "master-workman" who was present when the deep was formed and the firmament spread forth, and is the intermediary between God and man, rejoicing before God, and rejoicing also in the inhabited earth. Most of these writers prefer their Wisdom feminine; but between the two portrayals the figure of Wisdom gathers force. Her ostensible origin can be traced in the earlier chapters of the Book of Proverbs where "wisdom" is a "way" of life, a "path" of uprightness, indicated by the Lord, and comprising instruction coming forth from His mouth (Proverbs 4. 10f.; 3. 6). Sometimes Wisdom is hypostatized in contrast with the Lady Folly (Proverbs 4-5). This is the form in which she holds her greatest appeal for subsequent writers. She is a figure fully in line with the graphically simple and pictorial tendencies of Hebrew phraseology. Time and again in the portrayal of Wisdom, but not in any systematic way, we are reminded of the account of Creation in the first chapter of Genesis—of the function of the creative Word of God going forth to establish order in chaos, in separating the waters, and forming the firmament, in establishing mankind upon the earth and giving them dominion over all living things. This well established, and instructed humanity of Genesis 1 holds a strong appeal for the wise men, whose business it is to train in godly precedent the youth of the privileged classes.

The simplicity of Hebrew ideology, and the concreteness of the language, with its singular lack of abstract words, did much to enable the Hebrew philosophers to leap hurdles which gave pause even to Aristotle. That most distinguished philosopher found difficulty in bringing God—"the unmoved first mover," the first cause of all things—into action.<sup>1</sup> But the Hebrew thinkers picture the breath of God, the creative Word, going forth from the mouth of God as simply as a man speaks his will. Thus wherever and however Wisdom is portrayed, she (or he) is reckoned as coming from God, an agency vaguely personified, bridging simply and effectively the gap that stretched between the supreme Being and the inhabitants of the earth. These thinkers held that God from the beginning has had mankind in mind, and calls forth in man the moral response. So far as a man treads the path indicated he follows after life, and length of days, and wealth above rubies falls to his lot, and the beneficence of peace with God is upon him.

Little wonder that certain writers, notably the great scribe who compiled the Book of Ecclesiasticus—Jesus ben-Sira—proceeded to identify Wisdom

<sup>1</sup> *Metaphysics*, Para. 1072-3.

with the Torah itself, that other guide to ordered religious conduct of which the first chapter of Genesis is the prelude. Wisdom says of God (Ecclesiasticus 24. 9),

"He created me from the beginning before the world;  
And to the end I shall not fail.  
In the holy tabernacle I ministered before him;  
And I was established in Zion."

Ben-Sira was a scholar steeped in the Law and the Prophets, and the other books of the fathers, learned in all the tradition of the sages, and he found Wisdom a harsh task-mistress, "an instructress" whose demands were beyond the reach of all save men of leisure. For himself he strives to make of "her fetters—a covering of strength," and of "her chains—a robe of glory" (Ecclesiasticus 6. 29). He is aware of the problems that had been faced by the writer of the Book of Job. A man is so far master of his own destiny that he must not say, "It is through the Lord I fell away." And yet, having done what he can, if he does not receive recognition, or if he sees the unworthy prospering, he must not let doubt assail him, thinking that the Lord has no use for him; but he must endure to the end, calling no man happy before his death (Ecclesiasticus 11. 12).

The work of ben-Sira is a compendium of all that he considered valuable. He does not approve of Koheleth, and possibly he was spurred to give his students all the traditional teaching, and to add something himself, that he might, from many angles, turn their thoughts away from that stark investigator and his restricted conclusions.

In the immediately pre-Christian Book of the Wisdom of Solomon, likewise in the Apocrypha, Wisdom is set forth in a fashion savoring of the subtleties of a later age. Perhaps the writer had had contact at Alexandria with lecturers on Greek philosophy. He provides a finely skillful description of Wisdom.

"She is a breath of the power of God,  
And a clear effulgence of the glory of the Almighty."

She is beneficent, loving toward them that seek her, and easily to be found; she is pure, incorruptible, and can only abide in holy souls; the evil cut themselves off from her ministrations (Wisdom 7. 22ff.; 1-4). Once again the simple-thinking wise man overleaps hurdles that would have given pause to a Greek philosopher. He is not disturbed by the distinction between

spirit and matter; he does not raise the question, that was to trouble some of the early Christians, asking how could the wholly pure emanation from the Almighty have contact with sinful flesh; he simply says that Wisdom does, or does not, abide with man according to the state of a man's nature. As a practical theologian he attributes to Wisdom, as the writers of Proverbs had already done, the source of all kingly authority and human government (Proverbs 8. 15; Wisdom 6. 21). With a touch of ancient Semitic naïvete, the writer introduces also a picture of Wisdom as the beloved daughter of God, dwelling in the household of heaven, and wooed by Solomon (Wisdom 8. 2f.).

This writer, who has loaded Wisdom with descriptive epithets, and with functions both cosmic and civic, never attempts to co-ordinate a consistent philosophy of Wisdom out of his abundant material. He leaves it for his learned successor, Philo of Alexandria, at the opening of the Christian Era, to make the equation between the creative Word of the first chapter of Genesis and the Logos—the Divine Reason—of Plato, the thought of God by which all things in the universe are ordered.

The wise men of Israel were experimenting with life and religion. The Law and the Prophets, and the tradition of the sages who had preceded them—these were for them the beginning, and not the end. They had many doors to open, much of struggle and disillusionment to face before they could turn to the weighty task of formulating post-Christian Judaism on the one hand, or make, with joy, their contribution to the doctrine of the Word made Flesh.

# Tragic Reality and the Life Abundant

By HORNELL HART

## INESCAPABLE CONFLICT

**T**HE universe is permeated with growing patterns. But the very growth of these patterns produces conflict and destruction. The incompleteness and miscarriages of the organizing process produce agonizing results. While the fundamental trends in the history of our world have clearly been toward increasing organization and co-operation, it is equally clear that conflict, mutual destruction, suffering, frustration and deterioration have been widely pervasive.

Theologians have been prone to argue that the evil in the world is due to man's sin. But San Francisco, Tokyo, Pompeii, and other great cities have been visited by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tornadoes, and it is clear that the resulting destruction did not discriminate between the righteous and the wicked. Millions of farmers have been ruined and even starved by droughts, floods, and unseasonable frosts.

Conflict and destruction are inherent in the very growth processes of the universe. Disease germs are products of evolution, yet they turn human tissues into agonizing masses of decay, make youths into cripples and invalids, kill the fathers of little children, and distort the intelligence of brilliant minds. A large fraction of all the organisms in the world are destroyed in becoming food for other organisms. Crop-destroying insects are among the most successful products of the struggle of existence.

Evolution produces not only brotherly love but also poisoned stings and fangs. Parasites develop on all biological and economic levels. Slavery appears among ants as well as among men. The mating urge, so powerful in the creative process, leads to murderous rivalries, among animals as well as among humans.

This is a world in which people who love each other and need each other desperately are torn apart by death. This is a world in which rich opportunities are often lavished upon the lazy and incompetent, while the potentially brilliant and creative are left to decay or to be broken under intolerable burdens of poverty, ignorance, or militarism. This is a world in which peace-

loving peoples, eager to build up education, health, industry, and creative life, can be invaded ruthlessly by militaristic nations, can have their helpless women and children slaughtered and their cities reduced to ruins. This is a world in which vital knowledge about how to relieve pain or to save life is often kept back from those who perish for the lack of it. This is a world in which the recording of the life even of Jesus of Nazareth was left to men who waited until years after His death, and then wrote stories about Him which contradict each other at many points.

Any experienced criminologist can point out young murderers whose vicious and anti-social lives have been the product of congested slum conditions in growing cities—youths whose normal urges and enthusiasms have been perverted by diseased environments. Social workers can show examples innumerable where life ambitions have been wrecked and aspirations extinguished by the gyrations of a half-organized economic system. Physicians seek vainly to save the lives of great leaders of mankind, dying agonizing deaths from incurable cancer. Psychiatrists point to innumerable personalities gone to wreck—because a trusting little girl discovered that her mother was a liar, a cheat, or a whore, or because a couple who entered marriage trustingly and idealistically blundered so tragically on their wedding night, or because of some other reason involving no guilt on the part of the sufferer. Psychopathic hospitals are thronged, both with nymphomanics whose sexual lives have been thwarted, and with paretics whose undisciplined sexual indulgence has infected them with the malignant syphilitic spirochete.

Evil as well as good is inherent in the nature of things. Every growing pattern in the world (whether it be a crystal, plant, animal, personality, scientific theory, religious sect, city, nation, or civilization) has an autonomy of its own. It tends to act and to expand on the basis of its own nature. The very fact that this is an evolving universe, not a static one, means that a large fraction of needed adjustments have not been worked out. Sometimes the growing patterns clash simply through ignorance of one another, or because they have not completed the patterns of co-operation with one another. Sometimes the conflict is due to the fact that one pattern attempts more or less successfully to use other patterns as raw materials for its own expanding activity. Sometimes an animal, a personality or a group takes its satisfaction perversely in the very process of destroying other patterns, for the sake of the thrill of power and of observing the sufferings of the victims.

In addition to these inherent sources of conflict between individuals and

between groups, there is the fact that our thrill-cravings frequently run counter to our long run interests. Sometimes desires are so clearly irrational and disruptive as to be called pathological. Many people, for example, have apparently incurable longings to set buildings on fire, to be looked at naked by strangers of the opposite sex, to steal objects for which they have no use, to torture, to be tortured, and the like. But, putting these extreme cases aside, practically everyone has powerful impulses to act in ways likely to shatter future happiness. We long to enter an illicit love affair at the risk of family and career. We crave intensely to tell the boss just what we think of him, or to quit a tedious job, with no other source of livelihood in sight, or to get thoroughly drunk, or to overeat to the point of acute indigestion. Sometimes we are aware of this tussle between immediate cravings and long-range values. But a large fraction of the motives which determine people's actions dare not come out into the open. They operate subconsciously, so that our thrill-cravings may persuade us to act in ways which our intelligence would disavow if we brought the real facts fully into consciousness.

Conflict, then, widely pervades the universe as we know it. Physical, biological, social and mental conflict appear to be inherently part of the processes of existence as we know them. Indeed, it seems plausible to hold that if resistance and conflict were eliminated, the problems of the universe would be solved instantly, and existence would cease. Patterns and functioning are difficult to conceive of except in terms of tension, resistances, contrasts, risks, and hence of what we call evil.

#### TRANSMUTING SUFFERING INTO CREATIVE POWER

At the present point we are not concerned primarily with finding meta-physical explanations for the existence of evil in the universe. It need merely be said that any religious or philosophical interpretation of reality, in order to be tenable, must take account of the kind of facts reviewed in the first section of this chapter. But what we are primarily concerned with, at this point, is indicating a basis for a usable pattern of action—an acceptable way of life—in this kind of a world.

Let us begin with a somewhat extreme example. A man of forty has built up a fairly thriving business and has a beautiful home in a growing city. He has a wife and a boy of ten, to both of whom he is deeply attached. He and the boy are already partners in their playtime and in their plans for the future development of the business. But the city is visited by an

earthquake. The boy is killed, and the wife is paralyzed for life, from the waist down. The home and the business are destroyed and only a fraction of the loss is covered by insurance.

This man's expanded personality has thus suffered a series of shattering shocks. Mentally and physically he is stirred to the depths. The energy-generating processes in his body are extremely active, and he is full of excited emotion. Even after this has led to a state of temporary exhaustion, he swiftly returns to an intensely energized condition. The crucial problem is, what form will this emotional energy take? It will probably express itself in one or more of the following: hysteria, terror, grief, despair, aversion, anger, courage, sympathy, or civic social idealism.

The energy which flows into these different emotions is all basically the same. The differences between them depend upon the attitudes which the man takes—how he interprets what has happened to him, what he expects will follow, and what he proposes to do about it. This general statement needs to be considered more in detail.

If the emotional energy generated in this man by his catastrophe should overflow in disorganized laughter, weeping, bodily writhing, incoherent babblings, and the like, his behavior would be called hysteria. If his energy should take the form of wild endeavors to escape, and horrified imaginings of evils still to come, the emotion would take the form called terror. If the man's attention centered entirely upon his dead son, his injured wife, his wrecked home, and his demolished business, the outflow of his emotional energy in bewailing what had happened would be called grief. If his energies ceased to flow, and he lapsed into a paralyzed conviction that nothing possibly could be done about the losses which he had suffered, the dammed-up pool of this same emotional energy would be called despair. If he found someone to blame for not making the city quake-proof, or for not protecting his family and property, the outflow of the basic emotional energy through patterns of mental, verbal or physical attack upon the persons whom he held guilty, would be called anger.

Instead of using his energies to bewail, to run away, or to attack vindictively, the sufferer from the catastrophe might hold his explosive impulses in check; he might focus his mental, emotional and physical resources upon rescuing his wife and other loved ones from danger, protecting his property from further destruction, repairing the damage, and discovering possible opportunities for new business. His emotional energies, thus utilized, would

be called courage. Or, instead of being largely absorbed in his own problems, the victim might turn his attention to other sufferers. He might seek to relieve the suffering and protect the interests not only of his wife, but of children who had lost their parents, of a man who had been caught under a falling timber, or of a family whose home had caught fire. His emotional energies, when used in this way, would be transmuted into the forms called sympathy, fellow feeling, and brotherly love. Finally, this same victim of the earthquake, after attending to the immediate needs of his own family and his neighbors, might turn his attention with other citizens to the problems of protecting the rest of the city from destruction by fire, of providing emergency facilities for feeding, housing and healing the population, of planning for the reconstruction of the devastated area and of preventing future disasters. In this case, the emotional energy would take a form which might be called social idealism.

The question whether the victim of this disaster would experience despair or courage, terror or sympathy, anger or social idealism, would depend, not on the material circumstances in themselves, but upon the attitudes which he took toward those circumstances. If he has acquired understanding and self-control, he can decide for himself whether he shall experience evil or good. He can deliberately divert the streams of his own energies from channels of destruction into channels of construction.

These principles apply, not only to the rare emergency, but also to the everyday disturbances which generate emotional energy in our personalities. Two people who love each other have blundered into a conflict. The hearts of both of them are beating rapidly, their breathing is abnormally frequent, their ductless glands have poured into the blood stream the chemicals needed for intense activity. What form is the activity to take? The energy may flow into angry attack upon each other, or into obdurate and resentful avoidance of each other. On the other hand, it may be used, by one or both people, as an aid to clarified understanding, outspoken and yet considerate discussion of the causes of the difficulty, readjustment of relationships which have not worked well, and discovery of new joint activities which will lift the companionship to a new high level.

Again, the high-pressure emotional energy might be generated in an employee by the fact that he had been discharged in order to make room for a person of inferior ability who had influence with the chief. Here, as in the other cases, the energy produced by this attack upon his expanded personality

might be allowed to flow out in despair, anxiety, rage, resentment, or other destructive forms. On the other hand, it might be so channeled as to drive the discharged person into the discovery and development of new capacities, the search for a position better suited to his abilities, the cultivation of a deeper knowledge of human nature, the capacity to meet injustice and disappointment more courageously. Note that the creative mastery of the emotional energy does not *guarantee* a new and better position to the discharged person. It increases the likelihood of such an outcome, but it does not assure it. If the new job does not come, that presents another tension or turmoil in the expanded personality, and that, in turn, can be allowed to produce explosive and disintegrative reactions, or to impel creative reactions.

These principles apply, not only to meeting physical and social disasters, but also to grappling with intellectual difficulties. Here is a young person who has been taught to believe that the world was created and is ruled over by a loving Father, and that if we pray to Him, He will save us from suffering and disaster. The young person has a friend whose mother is injured in an automobile accident. The two young people pray very earnestly that she may recover. Instead, she dies. The young friend is puzzled and perplexed. He begins to observe the world more critically than before, and he finds many things which refuse to fit into his belief that the universe is ruled by a God who always sees to it that the desires of human beings shall be fulfilled if they pray to Him. This discovery upsets the young person's beliefs. These beliefs were part of his expanded personality, and the disturbance generates emotional energy. How is this energy to be applied? Some people, under such circumstances, use their energy in attacking their old beliefs in other people. Some sink into intellectual despair. Some run away from the problem, and apply their mental energies to science, to business, or to art. But here, as in the other cases, it is possible to transmute the energy of doubt into a courageous search for truth. Spurred by the very disillusionment, the seeker may grapple with facts as they are. He may apply his full intelligence and experience to the problem of discovering more of the meaning of life. As a result he may emerge into a vision of reality more clear, more honest, more valid, and more inspiring than the old view which he has had to abandon.

The emotional energy connected with any form of disappointment, pain, or suffering may be transmuted into creative power, and even into joy, if we learn how to take constructive attitudes toward things which seem to menace and attack us. Nothing can really hurt us except our own false attitudes.

Those who master the methods for transmuting disaster into creative experience discover that life's fundamental values can go on growing richer in spite of sickness, unemployment, poverty, defeat, betrayal, imprisonment, and even imminent death. Bunyan wrote *Pilgrim's Progress* in prison. Gene Debs, on being sentenced to the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta for having said much the same things about the causes of the World War which President Wilson said with impunity after it was over, addressed the court as follows:

"Your Honor, years ago I recognized my kinship with all living beings, and I made up my mind that I was not one bit better than the meanest of the earth. I said then, I say now, that while there is a lower class, I am in it; while there is a criminal element, I am of it; while there is a soul in prison, I am not free."

Debs ran for president while he was in prison. When he left, he carried with him the warm affection of his jailer and of his fellow prisoners. Hugh Latimer, the English martyr, turned to his fellow sufferer as the fires were being kindled under them, and spoke as follows:

"Be of good comfort, Master Ridley, and play the man; we shall this day light such a candle by God's grace in England as (I trust) shall never be put out!"

The list might be extended indefinitely of such triumphant uses of what lesser men would have called adverse circumstances. So complete is the potential power of the disciplined spirit to gain new impetus and new insight out of what others would call tragedy, that we must grant the potential capacity of courage and faith to transcend evil entirely.

#### WHAT OF THE PEOPLE WHO CANNOT TRANSMUTE THEIR DISASTERS?

Yet not everyone will succeed in turning his disasters into assets by channeling his emotional energies into creative action patterns. Here is a person who has suffered from sleeping sickness, and the disease has damaged his brain cells in such ways as to alter his personality. Here is an employe in a hotel or a factory who is compelled to work such long hours that he is continually poisoned by fatigue, and cannot react normally to the emergencies of life. Here is a man who has served a term in prison, who wants very much to go straight, but who is hounded by the police, spied upon by ex-convicts, put under pressure by former criminal associates, and finds it impossible to get honest employment because millions of men with good records are also out of work. The blow of one failure after another may break his spirit, however

strong he may have been to start with. Or, here is a child, whose father and mother both use him as a target for their own baffled emotions. Whenever the youngster attempts to express himself normally, his parents interfere with him, thwart him, rail at him, and abuse him. Under such circumstances, healthy development for the child may be made impossible. As to such people, it may be worth remembering that consciousness can determine attitudes to some extent as long as people are conscious at all. Within limits, however narrow those limits may be, any person who reads these words can, if he wishes, alter his attitudes so as to decrease his destructive and miserable emotions, and to increase his creative and joyful experiences.

More common than these extreme types will be the people who are not interested in transmuting their emotions. Large fractions of the human race react very largely on impulse. They pick up behavior patterns unthinkingly from other people. They do not care to stop being angry or self-pitying. They become so immersed in terror, despair, grief, or hysteria that they have no control over themselves. The emotion has simply to wear itself out, and to produce its consequences. Such people are not likely to have read this far in this article.

People who have read this far may be interested in two different ways in the people who make no effort to transmute their disasters into creative experiences. First, they may raise the question as to the justice of a universe in which even this way out of suffering is closed to so many. This question simply renews the issue raised at the beginning of the article. One phase of the incompleteness and conflict in the universe is the fact that though roads are open to truth, to beauty, to love and to joy, so many people do not find them.

The second problem raised by these who make no effort to transmute misery into joy is more directly profitable. It is the question as to what we should do about them. They are part of our world. To a greater or less extent, they rouse energy in us—whether the energy of mild interest, or the intenser energies of sympathy and love. A first step toward making these energies most fully creative, both for them and for ourselves, is to seek to understand these fellow human beings of ours as vividly and fully as we may. We need to comprehend them, not only from without but also from within. We need to put ourselves mentally into their places, to see life as they see it, to share their viewpoints—but without losing our own insights. This is an exceedingly difficult thing to achieve. We may catch only brief

glimpses of their worlds. But these glimpses can be expanded beyond any limit, by patient, sympathetic introspection, by fellowship, and by the sharing of experience and of life.

This process of sharing is likely to be one of the highest services we can render to a fellow personality. To try to make him over into our pattern would be likely to rouse his resentment and his resistance. But to be his comrade, his confidant, his understanding friend means to give him a chance to be himself more fully and truly than would otherwise be possible to him. In so far as our patterns of life may be of service to him, he will take them over voluntarily far more readily than under compulsion.

For ourselves, the process is likely to be even more rewarding than for him. The more varied the personalities whom we understand deeply and widely, the richer our own individuality becomes. Instead of gaining the enrichment of one single type of life, we may take in, through these friends of ours, the expanding experiences of many diverse personalities.

The experience of the mystic, in which in one swift flash one's unity with God and with all life becomes overwhelmingly vivid, is not achieved out of nothing. It is the harvest of long years of fellowship, of sympathy, and of appreciative perception. We can move deliberately toward that fruition. Day by day, we can share more and more of the life of humanity. One has only to gather in the store of wide experience, shared comprehendingly and fully, to become increasingly part of the world-soul. The moment of full vision may be accelerated or retarded, but the fulfillment is sure.

#### A FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION

The methods just discussed lead toward a solution which goes beyond the mere building of an expanding and harmonious personality. The focus of values shifts from the personality which inhabits a single physical body, to the adventure of humanity and the drama of the cosmos.

The field of participation in the life process is expanded to universal dimensions without losing the intimacy and vividness of personal experience. This means seeing life as a little child, a great lover and an ardent scientist all at once. It means being so hungry for life that one drinks it in through the eyes of other men, through history, through the discoveries of one's fellow explorers. It means using newspapers, books and stories as avenues of exploration into the life of mankind. It means savoring all the detail of existence, without losing its broad sweep—being deliberately naïve, and

taking life at its full face value, without losing deep insights and wide perspective.

In one sense, this involves losing oneself. One gets beyond the illusion of separateness. The particular personality, inhabiting that physical body which one calls "mine," loses its unique importance. It becomes one of the innumerable millions of units through which the supreme drama takes place. It becomes one observation post in which the All-Consciousness observes itself through us. It becomes a tool of action, in which the Master-Purpose may come in part to realization. Yet all that one's personality has ever experienced or achieved comes fully into play. We transcend the past, not by obliterating it, but by incorporating it into a universal perspective.

The whole of life—not of one's personal existence, but of the existence of mankind, and of the evolution of the universe—becomes a magnificent and divine adventure. We participate in that adventure on various levels. We inquire into the origin of the solar system, read the record of the rocks, seek to apprehend the structure of the atom. We immerse ourselves subjectively into the forms of flowers, the depths of starry skies, the rhythmic turmoil of storms. We participate in the growing processes whereby architects, painters, poets, and composers interpret beauty for themselves and for their fellow men. We share the inner experiences of leading actors in the world struggle between Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, militaristic imperialism, and co-operative commonwealth. We joy in the love and laughter of life at high tide. We listen to the poured-out perplexities of fellow humans; we seek to discern what they truly want from life, and to aid them to discover and to attain it.

Seeing life in these wider relationships, the impulse to do evil fades away. Those who cling to rapacious appetites—those who are cruel, lustful, grasping, self-indulgent—are not likely to see the universe from this point of view. When one does see it thus, the drama of existence becomes so clearly founded upon growing truth and love that one is moved to play one's part creatively, not destructively. Yet one sees that there is a place in the scheme of things even for those who are deliberately exploitive, destructive and cruel. One seeks to understand them, to aid them if one can in the search for clearer insights, and to aid also those who rise up in the normal processes of rebellion, revolution and reconstruction.

This solution of our life problem is like to, and yet is a development beyond, several conceptions which have appeared in earlier pages.

1. The conception of an expanding personality involves the broadening of the interests which are linked with one's body, to include the community and the nation. This fuller solution carries that process to completion, by including all of humanity and of the known universe. But it involves also the shifting of the center of reference away from the individual personality to the human enterprise and to the cosmic process as a whole.

2. In common with philosophical idealism, this solution uses the intellectual conceptions of universal and all-inclusive mind. But it is not intellectualistic. It consists in a pattern of action, not a mere philosophical theory.

3. The conception of life as a drama is embodied in this solution. But the cosmic drama may be viewed in two sharply contrasted ways. One might become an aloof observer, watching human insects swarm about their hives, and giving to the phenomena of existence a cold and impersonal attention—or possibly watching with a cynical and even malevolent interest. Our solution excludes the possibility of being an unsympathetic or antagonistic spectator. We are to participate wholeheartedly in the drama. At the same time we are to comprehend and appreciate the pageant as a whole, impartially and yet vividly, so far as it can be perceived.

4. The experience of the mystic is also closely akin to this solution. But that experience is usually regarded as an emotional revelation, vouchsafed at rare moments to a few rare souls. This solution is a way of life, open to all who care to choose it. As a product of this mode of living, rapturous awareness of the universal consciousness may come. But the success of the solution is not to be measured merely in terms of emotional thrills, however ecstatic they may be. The test consists in a demonstration of fuller and fuller participation in the universal life—in co-operative activity, in understanding of the meanings of existence, in the apprehension of beauty, and in love. The experience of the mystic may be unattainable, but one can go forward deliberately into the sharing of the universal life.

Not instantaneously, however, will one win the full and permanent mastery of this solution. The significance of it comes in flashes. One sees it vividly, and then loses the vision. One awakes for a few glorious moments to the larger self, and then sinks back again into the limited viewpoint of the narrow personality. What one needs to do is not merely to long for renewed revelation, but to practice patiently and methodically the new viewpoint. It is a matter of insights which can be cultivated, and of skills which

can be developed. One can train oneself, gradually, to act upon the proposition that the happiness and the success of every other person with whom one deals is as important as one's own happiness and success. Over and over again, decisive opportunities will come in which one can either gratify and favor one's own personality, or can promote equal or greater success (unostentatiously) to other personalities. To achieve the solution, one must persistently practice vivid awareness of the other person's interests and needs. Meditation, properly applied, is a vital help to this end.

The question will be raised: What is the relation of all this to Christianity? But is not this idea the very heart of the Christian message—this sharing of life with all men—sharing their sufferings, their wrongs, their aspirations and their joys even up to the limit of identification?

"Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows. . . . He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. . . . Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. . . . Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. . . . As we have many members in one body, and all the members have not the same office: so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and severally members one of another. . . . And whether one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it; or one member is honored, all the members rejoice with it. . . . There can be neither Jew nor Greek, there can be neither bond nor free, there can be no male and female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. . . . We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the Brethren."

As one goes forward, it becomes evident increasingly that this is the fullest, truest, most thrilling way of life attainable.

## Repentance

PAUL S. MINEAR

**S**ANE discrimination and balanced judgment are almost as rare in religious controversy as in civil war. Antagonists are unable to appreciate the truths implicit in the philosophy of the opposing forces. Protestant Liberalism won its independence from Fundamentalism by a rather indiscriminate attack upon all the doctrines which its enemies used as weapons of defense; but recently the front lines of conflict have shifted. The liberalism that prided itself on its complete independence from the archaic dogmas of its rivals is now on the defensive. It is becoming aware of the perennial truths of doctrines which it had hastily identified with the contemporary fictions of its immediate antagonists. It is forced to admit that its own distinctive ideas, easily assumed to represent eternal insights, are relative to a particular culture more definitely than the doctrines it had shelved.

We are witnessing a renaissance of many basic Christian beliefs—the sovereignty of God, the sinfulness of man, the reality of grace, the transcendence of the divine kingdom. Closely related to these and sharing in their revival is the necessity of repentance. One might have known that the term repentance would not long remain outmoded. No word so vitally related to the abiding heritage of prophetic religion, so closely linked to the universal experience of mankind, can be completely supplanted by concepts which blossomed all too quickly from seeds of twentieth-century liberal culture. No idea so organic to the message of Jesus can long be discarded by his professed followers. “Repent ye, for the Kingdom of God is at hand.” How difficult it is to expunge from the historical record this first word in Jesus’ message, this first demand of God.

The recent distaste for the connotations of the term repentance was not so much a distaste for Jesus’ demands as a revulsion from a specious interpretation and a crass application of those demands. His prophetic call was submerged in the revivalist’s mumbo-jumbo. Repentance became a commodity monopolized first by ignorant peddlers of religion and later by more suave and sophisticated supersalesmen of the faith. As a synonym for “conviction of sin” it became a technical term applied to the first stage in the conversion process. The potential or professional convert came subcon-

sciously to seek this experience for the sake of its emotional after-effects. Inevitably the term came to represent the epitome of morbid introversions of the conventional sinner, the spiritual hypochondria appropriate to certain occasions as the first step down the "sawdust trail." Such repentance might be defined as a sentimentalized and negative remorse conjured up by reflection over past sins and motivated by fear of future punishment.

Jesus' demand is almost the complete antithesis of this latter-day perversion. For Him it is no static event, no induced emotional state, no periodic repetition. For Him it is not negative but positive, not compartmentalized but totalitarian, not oriented toward the past and distant future but grounded in the present and the immediate future. It is a dynamic quality of life which consistently and continually interprets one's whole life—personal and social, conscious and unconscious, assumptions and actions—in the light of a moral reality that transcends self, that makes ultimate moral demands upon one. It is the shift in the very center of life that results from a viewing of the present in the light of the eternal, a seeing of the self from the perspective of the divine. It is continuing, rigorous and creative self-criticism in the light of God's will, a radical revolution in man's life that originates in the confrontation of the righteousness of God and the claims of His kingdom.

Defined in this way the enduring significance of repentance becomes apparent. Repentance and pride become mutually exclusive; repentance and humility become mutually inclusive. The degree of repentance determines the degree of deliverance from the subjectivity, according to which we measure all ideas and actions by our own norms, to the objectivity, by which we submit our own norms and actions to the scrutiny of transcendent truth, beauty and goodness. None can claim objectivity, but all can recognize the claims of the Objective. Only through repentance can these claims condition the conscious direction of life. Only the repentant can achieve self-transcendence, that quality of life whose other name is freedom. Only he can freely choose new standards and new forces which will decisively change himself and his future, thus rising above that web of blind forces which have been determining his fate. Repentance creates a tolerance that is not merely indifference, encourages a self-awareness that avoids both inferiority and superiority complexes. It stimulates that "depth after depth of sincerity in self-confrontation," Clarence Day's test of a civilized person. Genuine repentance is a judgment when human life is tested by divine standards, and the primary condition for the experience of genuine grace and forgiveness.

As pseudo-religion is a perennial enemy of true religion, so false repentance is a chief obstacle to true repentance. No small factor in the human propensity to sin is the desire to escape the demand for penitence by means of the subtle sanctification of a spurious substitute. Two substitutes in particular have seen heavy service. The first is the application of penitence atomistically to isolated phases of one's past conduct; the other is its application to others more sinful than one's self.

It is not hard to emasculate the divine demand by applying it to specific acts on the periphery of life without shifting the center. One has a bad habit, condemned by his own moral standards or by the mores of his social group. In a state of uncomfortable disequilibrium, he regrets this habit and its consequences. Penitent, he suppresses the habit or adopts a substitute more consistent with the standards by which the first was labeled "bad." Few will dispute the need for repentance in this area of personal experience. It is a common-sense cathartic for mental health and a necessary tool of social control. But it falls far short of being a radical religious adjustment. And if it be substituted for the more profound experience it becomes vicious.

Its danger lies in its deceptiveness and in its inadequacy. It is deceptive because it induces one to feel that in conquering a particular isolated habit he has satisfied the moral demand of God, has re-established right relationship with Him, thereby easing his conscience prematurely and enabling him to feel a keen pride in his successful conquest of sin. In conquering a personal sin, one may win a battle but lose a war.

Such an experience of repentance is inadequate because it may be based simply upon commonly accepted social norms, norms which themselves are by their very nature sinful. The isolated sin is condemned; the basis of judging actions remains immune from critical exposure. Repentance becomes a vital religious significance only when it is applied in radical fashion to the very bases of our judgments, our accepted assumptions, our standards of living.

"Why do I say that America is the worst of influences? Because it imposes vices which regard themselves as virtues, from which therefore there is no repentance at hand. It imposes optimism, imposes worldliness, imposes mediocrity. But our mediocrity, with our resources, is a disgrace, our worldliness a sin, our optimism a lie." (Santayana, *The Last Puritan*, p. 187.)

An analogy from another area may serve to illustrate the difference between superficial and deep repentance. An untrained pianist undertakes to play Beethoven. Laboriously he seeks to eliminate one after another of the

more obvious discords. But his chief trouble lies in his false perspective and false assumptions. He assumes that with a little practice but without arduous discipline of training he will ultimately be able to achieve his goal by correcting his separate errors step by step. But he will never fulfill his intention until he repents not so much of individual flaws as of the whole presumptuous attempt, until he realizes the requirements laid down by reality, until he submits himself to years of training with a great master. Only when he sees his own musical criteria in the light of objective criteria which transcend his own can he begin his real progress.

The first escape from the demand for genuine repentance, then, is by the "gnat-camel" route; the second escape is the "mote-beam" method. One accepting this method can admit the drastic nature of the change involved in repentance because he applies the need for this change to others. This method is particularly attractive to members of a religious community, those who have once repented and are now serene in the fellowship of the saved. They are now the bearers of the message of repentance to outsiders. Why? Because their lives do not conform to the standards of the Church, those standards so easily identified with secular norms of existing society. The sword of God's judgment becomes the policeman's club. Today Jesus presents again the divine demand for repentance to the Church, challenging its very bases of moral judgment in the name of the divine kingdom.

The "mote-beam method" is even more attractive to religious leaders, whose profession demands the preaching of repentance to others. This preaching frequently reflects the tacit assumption that the ethical norms of the preacher are beyond the need of radical self-criticism. And whenever this happens, sermons become moralistic, pseudo-prophetic, and blasphemous. Without knowing what has happened, the preacher may find his activity based upon the unconscious assumption that the kingdom of God is the Church, that it is the First Church of Center City, that it is represented by the pastor of this church. The standards of his success are the standards of the kingdom's success. If this standard be formulated in terms of physical equipment or numerical growth, he locks the door of the true kingdom of God against himself and his people. If the standard be simply the degree to which his people conform to the pattern of life expected of respectable people of the community, he likewise shuts the door. He may seek "to feed the sheep," giving to the poor, visiting the sick, comforting the sorrowful, becoming a social service worker in the kingdom of man. But he is not a

servant of the kingdom of God unless, in addition to these activities, he confronts them with the demands of that kingdom, unless he leads them to judge their own lives by the standards of that kingdom. And how can he do this until he repents his own pride of profession and subjects his own presuppositions to the light of God's transcendent purpose?

Prophets have always directed their bitterest invectives and their strongest pleas for repentance at contemporary religious leaders. The Church as an institution shares the sin of society. The leaders of the Church too frequently seek to serve the Church by sanctifying that sin. To the prophet, their greater pretension makes greater their guilt. Blind leaders of the blind are more culpable than the blind themselves, for they are confident that they can see. It is so easy to use sanctities to cloak iniquities. And when the prophet seeks to realize the imperatives of his God-given message he frequently finds bitter opposition from those of his own religious household. Leaders who taught him the ideal he is following seek to discredit him and to protect themselves in their smug self-righteousness.

Of the relation between prophetic religion and the official clergy Jesus offers for us the best example. His stinging exhortation of the scribes and Pharisees is so uncompromisingly severe that it remains one of the most troublesome elements in the gospel tradition. Ecclesiastics find a satisfactory interpretation of the "woes" difficult, and consequently tend to ignore their true relevance. The Early Church, engaged in bitter struggle with Judaism, preserved and heightened these "woes" as evidence of the blindness and bigotry of their adversaries. Throughout later history, "Jew-baiters" delighted in using them in the same way, assuming that Jesus' condemnation was true of all Jewish leaders and of no Christian leaders, thus nourishing the pride of Christians at the expense of Jews. More recently, the growth of tolerance has induced Protestant ministers to refuse to use the twenty-third chapter of Matthew and related passages. Other modern leaders, in their exaltation of the qualities of meekness, moderation, and gentility, refuse to believe that their "pale Galilean" could ever have used such stinging curses. Recent historians, becoming aware of Jesus' religious kinship to the Pharisees, have rediscovered many noble qualities in first century Pharisaism and have concluded that the "woes" were not a categorical denunciation of all Pharisees as such.

But while Jesus' words may have been heightened by Christian apologists, and while He may have discriminated among His Pharisaic opponents,

the fact remains that He condemned scathingly many religious leaders of His day. He was impelled to do so by His awareness of God's will, their infidelity to that will, and the destruction that awaited them.

Do these "woes" have any value for us today? To be sure, they were originally intended by Jesus for specific individuals in His own day, and their spirit would be destroyed were we to interpret them as final legalistic rules for our own day. But if we consider prophetic religion of perennial and immediate importance, and if Jesus reveals to us the matchless incarnation of prophetic religion, we might well ask if His denunciations of the scribes may not be of recurring significance in the unending struggle between true and false religion.

One assumption, and only one, needs to be accepted to release the value of these sayings. What people today perform the same religious function as did the scribes and Pharisees? We do! Those of us who represent the official religious life of our day are the twentieth-century scribes and Pharisees. With this assumption, how pregnant with meaning Jesus' sayings become. His penetration into their sins is a penetration into ours as well, sins that are more dangerous in that we seldom see them in ourselves as sin. One would look long to find a better antidote to the poisons of our profession than these acid sayings of the Gospels. Applied in ruthless self-analysis, they revolutionize one's attitude toward himself and his profession.

"Alas for you . . . for you lock the doors of the Kingdom of Heaven in men's faces, for you will neither go in yourselves nor let those enter who are trying to do so."

"Alas for you . . . for you pay tithes on mint, dill and cummin, and you have let the weightier matters of the Law go—justice, mercy and integrity."

"You blind guides! Straining out the gnat and swallowing the camel!"

"Alas for you . . . for you love to have the front seats in the synagogues and to be saluted with respect in public places."

"Alas for you . . . for you load men with burdens they can hardly carry, and you will not touch them yourselves with a single finger."

To these might be added others—those painful metaphors of the whited sepulchres and the dishes that are clean on the outside but filthy within, that unforgettable caricature of the proud Pharisee at prayer. In all of these Jesus was offering a message of salvation to the leaders. Only by heeding His warnings, by being shaken out of their professional and traditional self-deceptions could they prepare themselves for the future. So, today, Jesus' peculiar contribution to church leaders is this inexorable challenge to repentance.

His message of repentance, however, was directed at other groups as well, and there is as great need today in other areas. Consider, for example, the economic and political impasse, the desperate need for change through democratic process, the seeming futility of reconstruction efforts, the necessity of gearing organized religion into the quest for social salvation, the difficulty of finding Christian techniques for that Herculean task. Wherein lies the distinctive message of prophetic religion? Is it not precisely this—the message of repentance? Without it can the employer rise above his class interest? Without it can a labor leader transcend blind reactions of hatred which generations of injustice have produced? Without it can a victorious revolutionary party escape the tendency to preserve itself by terrorism and dictatorship? Without it can the lowliest discussion group succeed in helping its members to rise above personal prejudices? Without the self-criticism implicit in true repentance, there is no freedom, no self-determination, no corrective by which subjective opinions may be more closely aligned to objective truth—only mechanical responses to the multiple conditioning forces of class, race, nation, and propaganda.

One must seek justice. But without humility it becomes merciless vengeance. One must seek mercy. But without humility it becomes unjust paternalism. Justice becomes man's justice, not God's. Mercy becomes man's mercy, not God's; unless both are permeated by that third essential in Micah's eternal trilogy.

The Oxford Conference insisted that the Church must seek social change by means of the message and experience of repentance, by creating an atmosphere in which individuals through self-knowledge will condemn themselves, an atmosphere in which the special illusions of each economic class will be punctured. To denounce social evils is neither new nor rare. To become aware of one's own social conditioning and to shift accordingly the center of life to another basis is both new and rare. Should Christians as Christians, should the Church as the Church, experience broadly and deeply the meaning of repentance in this area, one might have confidence that Christianity would be entering one of her most creative epochs. For repentance and "works meet for repentance" have characterized previous great epochs.

Consider, too, the relevance of the prophetic demand to the area of church doctrine and polity. An institution becomes distinctively Christian to the degree that it reincarnates the prophetic insights of its founder, and rigorously applies these insights not simply to its economic but to its doctrinal

and institutional prejudices as well. If, as many think, the Oxford Conference apprehended more fully the prophetic nature of Christianity than did the Edinburgh Conference, may it not be due to the greater willingness of churchmen to apply the demand for repentance to social than to institutional attitudes?

Repentance is not separable from religious consciousness as a whole. Sought by itself and for itself it ceases to be itself. Here, too, Jesus' faith is the highest example of the organic unity of propheticism. For Him, the center of life was God, the ultimate imperative was to love God, the ultimate standard was the will of God, the ultimate hope was the kingdom of God. It was the tension between man's sin, threatening imminent catastrophe, and God's merciful justice, offering to men the kingdom, which impelled Him into the very center of the stream of history proclaiming the immediate need for repentance before God. Sensitive to the sufferings of His fellows, tracing these sufferings to their rootage in sin, convinced that this sin was essentially due to disloyalty to the only true God, oppressed by the certainty of calamity and emboldened by the certainty of God's promised kingdom, He heralded the approaching doom and dawn by ringing threats and promises. Both the present and the future depended upon man's response. Would man see his present sins in the perspective of Ultimate Reality as that Reality had revealed Himself in the historical community as just and loving? Would he prepare himself for the judgment by repentance and for life in the kingdom by righteousness? Would he confront himself with the demands of God and reorient his whole life accordingly? These are the questions which prophetic religion asks of every generation.

Such repentance Jesus preached; such repentance Jesus experienced. To a Church interested in holding fast to the dogma of the sinlessness of Jesus, as formulated in the concepts of Hellenistic philosophy, His baptism has always caused difficulty. But to a Church to whom the prophetic religion of Jesus is significant in its own right, the baptism account will be cherished as a validation in experience of the message of repentance. According to priestly ideas of repentance, a penitent Jesus is blasphemy; according to prophetic ideas, a penitent Jesus is a true revelation of the will of God. For Jesus, it was a repentance so radical that it led to the Cross, but so true that not even the Cross could destroy its certainties. Today, as to the Israelites, God speaks:

"Open for me a gateway of repentance as big as a needle's eye, and I will open for you gates wide enough for chariots and horses."

# Why Should Souls Become Ill?

## A Program of Constructive Counseling in the Local Church

ROY A. BURKHART

**W**E are hearing a good deal about the cure of souls. There is a general recognition among some pastors that the methods of psychology and the resources of spiritual redemption should be summoned for the healing of souls. These efforts are important and they should be commended.

One may well wonder, however, whether there is not a danger that the minister may be satisfied with finding a cure for spiritual maladies. Important as this is, is it not even more necessary that a constructive emphasis be given to keeping souls healthy? Medical practice in the past made the same mistake. The majority of energy was given to the cure of disease. It is only of recent date that the medical profession has given a primary emphasis to prevention. It takes just as much skill to prevent disease as to deal with it after an onset. As much skill is needed to maintain spiritual, mental, and emotional health, as to find restoration for it.

The wise and alert minister must give attention to spiritual maladies. To overlook this responsibility would be to fail miserably. He should have an even greater concern in guiding the spiritual and emotional growth of his children and young people in such a way that souls maintain their health and keep in touch with the sources of their vital sustenance. It is the purpose of this article to suggest some things the pastor can do in seeking to direct the spiritual health and growth of his people.

### THE APPROACH WITH CHILDREN

There ought to be a close working relationship between the pastor and his church school, and between the pastor and the parents. It is possible, for example, for the leadership of the children's division of the church to be helped at the point of guiding the emotional development of children. In one church, many teachers' meetings are given to this idea. Teachers are helped to look for the symptoms of poor emotional development. They, for example, are asked to check all of the children with a view of getting an objective judgment of behavior, using the following points:

- Is there free social participation?
- Does the child submit? Or, is he over-dominant?
- Is there habitual tendency to exaggerate illness?
- Are there tendencies to blame others for difficulties?
- Are there extreme tendencies to day-dream?
- Are there evidences of any attitudes of fear?
- Is the child in any way over-suggestible?
- Does the child indicate any attitudes toward his parents which need attention?

Very frequently teachers make reports of children with these various symptoms, and an effort is made immediately to guide the child into a more wholesome group relationship. This is supplemented by conferences with the parents. In more difficult cases, the pastor is asked to help both in working with the child and in conferring with the parents. There is always caution lest the child be made problem-conscious. He must be helped to grow without realizing that there is anything wrong with him. In other words, he must not be given the thought that he is a problem child.

Further, the total curriculum for children in the church aims to help the child develop wholesome habits of thought and social interaction. The teachers are led to ask such questions as these of the curriculum: To what extent is the program helping the child—

- to learn to get attention by doing worthwhile things?
- to enjoy doing things well?
- to do things alone without fear?
- to be glad to try new things?
- to meet situations without shrinking or worrying?
- to act because of the value of the activity in itself?
- to decide courses of action in the light of the teachings of Jesus?
- to learn to admit his mistakes?
- to learn to place blame where it belongs?
- to accept criticism without undue emotion?
- to enjoy playing alone as well as with others?

Added to these tests are also the objectives of religious education which each department seeks to achieve. The leaders feel that if the child develops the right attitudes toward life, others, and himself, he will be able to deal normally with most of his problems as they come up.

It is possible, also, for the church to carry on both personal and group interviews with parents of young children. In one church the pastor has every winter a series of group interviews with mothers of preschool children. During the current year he has a group of seventy mothers. Most

of their children are just a year old. Mothers are personally invited into these group interviews. All those who have become mothers during the preceding year are especially invited. In these group interviews, the mothers are helped in coming to understand the nature of personality, how it grows, the part heredity plays, the organic, intellectual and spiritual factors, the place of play, the opportunity of the home in guiding the development of a habit system, the formulation of concepts, and so forth. The pastor makes an opening presentation within a given problem area and then the mothers are given a chance to ask questions and to contribute to the solution of each others' problems.

These group interviews are so meaningful that it helps to link the loyalty of the mother to the total program of the church. She not only receives help from the group interview, but she is put in touch with the best resources for child care and guidance. Furthermore, it opens the way for many personal conferences between individual mothers and the pastor.

Some special meetings are held for both mothers and fathers of pre-school children. This helps to get over to the father many things which are helpful to him in his role in the family.

The church has the opportunity, if its program is comprehensive and well planned, to provide a series of group experiences which contribute to the formation of right habits, good tastes, workable concepts, and right points of view. If its program the year round is sufficiently comprehensive and sufficiently sound and effective, a permanent foundation for mental and spiritual health can be laid.

#### WORKING WITH YOUNG PEOPLE

With this age, the pastor has a great opportunity for preventative work. One pastor, for example, has a personal interview with each young person. He does this even though he has five hundred young people between the ages of twelve and thirty in his church. A folder is started for each young person during the twelfth year, and the personal interview is arranged for as early as possible during the junior high-school period. Boys and girls not only want the interview, but they are encouraged to have it by their parents. In this first interview, the pastor talks over a number of things with the young people. He tries to discover how they are getting along in the home, with other people, in school, and in the church. He helps them to analyze their

program of personal living. He tries to discover what their specific interests are. This first interview is exploratory and is followed by subsequent interviews where necessary.

At the Youth Council of this church, where representatives from the five youth groups meet each month, in addition to making plans, time is given to discuss various individuals and their participation in the organized groups. Consideration is given to such questions as—

How to help the non-dater?

How to help those who are victims of introversion?

How to help the over-active?

These discussions are constructive. As projects are planned an effort is made to get those who are non-participants to take responsibility. The sponsors follow up these discussions with personal approaches.

Between the fourteenth and sixteenth year, each young person is urged to fill out a Bernreuter personality inventory which gives a picture of emotional development, of the attitude toward solitude and toward introversion and extroversion, of submission and dominance, of self-consciousness or confidence, and of sociableness and non-sociableness. The young people respond freely to this analysis. It is very helpful. The personality is charted and then in the interview a program of living is developed in light of the needs revealed by the inventory. The following specific program was built up after a number of interviews with a boy whose personality schedule immediately indicated fields where growth and control were needed. The case, as it happens, is rather extreme, the boy being introverted, submissive, self-conscious and non-social, his feelings, rather than his mind, tending to determine courses of action.

#### (1) *Control of Feelings*

- (a) Keep a careful record of each time you lose your temper; you have hurt feelings, you brood over your bad luck, you feel sorry for yourself. Try to decide what caused these emotional eruptions. Work out solutions.
- (b) Seek to do things with especially disagreeable persons.
- (c) Read Morgan's *Keeping a Sound Mind*.
- (d) Read weekly the story of Jesus' crucifixion.
- (e) Read one book in each of the following fields:

Poetry

Travel

Prayer

Biography

Philosophy

(2) *Finding Solutions to Problems*

- (a) Confer with several people whom you trust about the problem of when to ask advice.
- (b) Read Dewey's book, *How to Think*.
- (c) Confer with some teachers in seeking to decide on the steps one should take in solving a problem.

(3) *Social Activities*

- (a) Learn to swim.
- (b) Become proficient in two games of individual skill and two group games.
- (c) Choose and follow some hobby.
- (d) Seek to become active in one youth group, if only to be an attentive member.
- (e) Achieve skill in one type of leadership.
- (f) Keep a careful record of the times others determine your actions and when you choose your own actions.

(4) *Vocational Choice and Preparation*

- (a) Decide on your college.
- (b) Make a survey of all vocations.
- (c) Confer with leaders of those vocations that interest you.

Also, the young people are urged to ask for an interview at the time of engagement. At this time the pastor helps them to correlate their personalities and also works with them in building a program for the period of their engagement. This is needed in their experience and, aside from being helpful in itself, it gives a pastor the chance to work with them throughout their engagement.

The pastor works with them also prior to marriage and at the point of choosing vocations and getting a job. While it takes countless hours of his time, it undoubtedly is much more valuable than visiting or many other things he might do.

The youth program in the church is planned with the needs and interests of the young people in mind. A youth discussion can really be a group interview if it is experience-centered. The resource leader and all members of the group can work together pooling their experiences for the solution of a given problem. Here, for example, is the list of topics being discussed by four youth groups in one church. The reader will see how vital these topics are to the lives of young people.

## PLAN FOR YOUTH GROUPS

JUNIOR BROWNLEE (Junior Hi)	SENIOR BROWNLEE (Senior Hi)	AKITA FELLOWSHIP (College)	SUNDAY EVENING FORUM (Out of College)
<i>Signs of Immaturity</i>	<i>Doing the unexpected in our homes</i>	<i>Philosophy of Life</i>	<i>Series on Marriage</i> (Eight Nights)
<i>Ways of Showing Respect</i>		1. Phil. of man	<i>Social Problems</i>
<i>Teachings of Jesus</i>	<i>Series on the World</i>	2. Phil. of prayer	1. Gambling
1. How about forgiveness?	1. Russia	3. Phil. of God	2. Social Diseases
2. What about money?	2. Germany	4. Science and mystery	3. War
3. What is God like?	3. Japan	5. Science and Religion	4. Movie
4. Shall you serve or grab?	4. U. S. A. in the world picture	6. Why be religious	5. Race
5. What lies beyond?	<i>Common Folder Series</i>	<i>Modern Problems</i>	6. Liquor and Nicotine
<i>How about Gambling?</i>	1. Why the World War and its results?	1. Social diseases	7. Sources of Public Propaganda
<i>Why Tell the Truth?</i>	2. Do you want war?	2. Gambling	<i>Personal Beliefs Series</i> (Four Nights)
<i>Series on Alcohol</i>	3. Can we stop war?	3. Liquor and Its Control	<i>Meeting Some Leading Personalities</i>
1. Who is King?	<i>Problems Endangering Youth</i>	4. Commercial Amusements	<i>Series on Dramatic Art</i>
2. What will the King do to you?	1. Gambling	5. The movie	<i>Skills</i>
3. What is he doing to innocent victims?	2. Social diseases	6. Insanity and Its Causes	1. How to relax
4. Shall he bow?	3. Insanity	<i>Modern Youth Movements</i>	2. How to influence people
<i>Series on Prayer</i>	4. Laziness	1. Christian Youth Building a New World	3. How to speak in public
1. When does the ordinary person pray?	<i>Using Your Leisure As An Artist</i>	2. Fascism	4. How to interview
2. Why pray?	<i>Personal Power</i>	3. Communism	
3. What is the value?	1. How strong are you?	4. Other Youth Movements	
<i>Series on Manners</i>	2. Greatest Source of power	<i>Religious Arts</i>	
<i>Series on Hobbies</i>	3. Dynamo No. 2	1. Poetry	
	4. Dynamo No. 3	2. Pictures	
	5. Dynamo No. 4	3. Great Hymns	
		4. Architecture	
		5. Sculpture	
	<i>Personal Skills</i>		
	1. How to talk		
	2. Tips on manners		
	3. Secrets of leadership		
	4. Ways of entertaining		
	<i>What to Believe</i>		

Where personal problems can be handled in a group interview or group discussion, it is much better. The counselor must guard against helping people think they are problem cases. Furthermore, if they, working with other people, can find solutions for their problems, they may feel a more definite sense of possession in the solution itself.

The church service, itself, provides a great opportunity along this line. The writer has always felt that it is possible to have young people and adults together for a great fellowship of worship. Their experiences are often more alike than we think. The average young person of sixteen has a better terminology and a wider range of knowledge than the average adult of forty-five. It is possible to plan a service in such a way as to interest both young people and adults. In fact, if the service will interest young people it almost inevitably will interest adults. In a congregation of twelve or thirteen hundred, the writer has from four to six hundred young people. His own experience indicates the possibility of this fellowship of the two age groups. If the morning service can deal with real issues, it can make a great contribution to wholesome programs of living. It can help to discover ignored interests and to provide motivation for the Christian way of life.

Another method of guidance also, which is often overlooked, may come through various hobby and leadership training groups. If a church can provide a wide variety of art and craft groups, it gives young people a sense of creativity and makes a contribution to the solution of many of their moral and ethical questions. Very often young people do not need help in solving their problems nearly as much as they need fellowship. If they have fellowship, if they belong to the right kind of groups, if their leisure hours can be filled with creative experiences, many of their problems will be solved as a matter of course. Furthermore, the pastor and adult leader have great opportunity for indirect counseling as they work with young people in the processes of leadership and group management. Such fellowship helps to establish rapport and it may help the young person in the formulation of points of view and concepts which later on will contribute to the solution of his problems.

#### COUNSELING ADULTS

The writer often has whole families come into his interview rooms. They come usually for help in planning for the future, in dealing with many problems that face all or just one of the group. While the pastor's presence

in the home has real value, if the entire family will come to his interview rooms, he may have the freedom and the entree for a type of work which otherwise would not be provided.

Furthermore, the pastor can have such a close relationship with his people that they will come to him before the problems get beyond control. This is especially true in the field of marital difficulties, alcoholism, and vocational failure. It is at this point not so much a cure or solution as it is to help the individual at the time when the first symptoms occur.

What has been said regarding young people is also true with adults. Group interviews provide a real opportunity. Sunday evening informal suppers, when a group of twenty to thirty adults sit around the fireplace, provide the setting for real sharing. Group interviews with women and with men and with both, around problems, is another very valuable technique. One pastor has a series of religious life discussions in the afternoon with women. He is, for example, at the time of this writing, conducting a series of afternoon meetings with women on this topic:—*How to Develop An Objective View Toward Life*. On Wednesday nights, during the winter months, he has a series of counsels with the parents of young people. These counsels deal with crucial problems of young people and how the parent can help deal with them. The interesting thing is, however, that again and again these counsels turn into a discussion of problems that the parents themselves are facing.

The morning church service can be a great experience for adults. It can give them a sense of fellowship together, it can help them maintain their perspective, it can assist them in reclaiming interests, and it may lay the foundation for personal contacts between them and the pastor at the time of need.

These, then, are some of the things a pastor can do in the realm of prevention. If he can keep souls from becoming sick, he is rendering a far greater service than to help them find a cure after the onset has taken place. He should do everything in his power to keep souls from becoming ill.

# Disintegration and Dictatorship

EDGAR ERRETT WILSON

**T**HE Church of Christ is rightly alarmed over the prospect of totalitarianism. Whether Fascist or Communist, or in some other garb, we agree that it is the most menacing form of modern paganism. Its denial not only of democratic method but also of Christian objective reveals it to be secularism armed with a mailed fist.

Yet it is not enough to be afraid or to plan counter policies. The first task is to understand the forces which in all parts of the world are making for totalitarianism. These forces are not merely economic or political, nor can they be identified with any one ideology. They are rather the result of the blind demand for unity amidst confusion, in a time when no powerful ideology seems to offer the reference point for such unity. The growing faith in totalitarianism is the result of the desperation of man during a time of conflicts of economic and political groups producing an unendurable chaos and apprehension.

The prevailing ideologies which we have inherited appear helpless in the world-wide confusion of our period. They fail in their attempt to interpret the causes of our chaos; they seem unable to offer any workable solution. They are no longer widely heralded by the suffering masses as gripping hopes. With current ways of making life intelligible and hopeful losing their grip because of a rising tide of misery and apprehension, man turns to nationalism and nonrational force as his chief hope.

For this anarchy in our thought-world several great movements of thought and life are indirectly responsible. Among these, three seem to the writer to be of outstanding importance. First, naturalistic thought, with its popular and well known half-brother, secularism. Second, technical advances which have produced an interdependence that can only rest securely on large-scale reciprocity, but which is made to rest unsteadily, instead, on a divisive nationalism and a greed-centered economic order. Third, religious life which is divided, weakened, secularized, without a conscious social philosophy, and without the organs by which to be socially effective.

Ways of thinking and social movements are undoubtedly interdependent, but certain thought forms have a primary significance. So let us consider

naturalism-secularism, not academically in themselves, but in their effects, direct and indirect.

Regarding the grand transition made from the dominance of a religious culture to a secular culture John Dewey says in *A Common Faith*<sup>1</sup>: "The change that has taken place in conditions once universal (that is, a supernatural religious outlook) and now infrequent *is in my opinion the greatest change that has occurred in religion in all history*. . . . The new thing in history . . . is that the organization in question (the Church) is a *special institution within a secular Community*." He goes on, "The essential point is not just that secular organizations and actions are legally or externally severed from the control of the Church, but that the interests and values *unrelated* to the offices of any church now so largely sway the destinies and aims of even believers"<sup>2</sup> The writer believes this statement to be profoundly true. But what has been the root cause of this shift?

It cannot be denied that the divisions of thought produced or made possible by Protestant sectarianism weakened the grip of totalitarian Thomism, and made difficult any other inclusive thought. In addition, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism revealed many ridiculous and superstitious elements in the thought of organized religion. But the final blow came indirectly as a result of the progress of the physical sciences and the devotion they came to receive.

Humanity in general is impressed, not by the authority of scientific method, but by its practical accomplishments. For increasing millions of people science became the new Jehovah, and technology its messiah. From this exaltation sprang the preoccupation of man with material things, the realm recognized by the physical sciences.

For thoughtful men the prestige of physical science gave sanction to naturalistic thought, which is often dubbed "reductionism" because of its tendency to reduce all phenomena to physical levels, and to declare unreal all other human experience.

This process robbed human life of its drama and meaning. Life seemed to begin at no beginning and move to no end. As Will Durant so eloquently points out,<sup>3</sup> the earth became in men's thinking an unimportant planet rather than the scene of the drama of redemption. Life became a transient phe-

<sup>1</sup> Page 61 (italics and parentheses mine).

<sup>2</sup> Page 65.

<sup>3</sup> *On the Meaning of Life*, page 10.

nomenon at the mercy of the physical elements and other forms of life, rather than the revelation of divine power and purpose. Love and morality appear as mere physical or social expedients. Religious principles come to be regarded as curious results of a peculiar quirk of human impulse, the result of wish-thinking. God is represented as the creation of human imagination, the result of overdependence on parents, or a historical hang-over from pre-scientific times. Jesus and other religious prophets are psychoanalyzed and supposedly explained, or are ranked according to the development of the glands which are said to regulate or explain personality.

The realms of value and religious truth are granted no reality in themselves, and morality is made a sub-department of biology or sociology, both of which have weakened its sanctions by claiming to reveal all of its origins. The naturalistic fallacy of confusing origins and meanings has been repeated ten thousand times, but the common man has been too awe-struck by the practical achievements of physical science to question the conclusions of naturalistic writers. Indeed he was too preoccupied with the practical task of gutting the earth of its treasures to concern himself about it. The satisfactions of pleasure and comfort, as long as they lasted, were deemed adequate compensation for the loss of a firm conviction about God and the meaning of life.

Who can imagine a better preparation for disorder and confusion than such a process of reductionism? The result is what we call secularism, a disintegration of life which is the rule outside of religious groups.

Even in religious circles the profound weakness of conviction can be best explained by the same influence. The churchgoing, God-fearing Protestants of yesterday are succeeded today by descendants for many of whom religion means "a humanism six feet high (which) expresses its highest worship in an adoring look into the face of man."<sup>4</sup> These descendants may have a certain respect for the Church. They may send their children to church school or serve on an official board, but in their hearts and thoughts they are secularists. They believe, as Gaius Glenn Atkins says<sup>5</sup> that "it is now possible to explain the universe without the Creator-God of the creeds, morality without the Ten Commandments, personality without the soul, a sufficient life without supernatural help, and to die without the hope of immortality."

Into the "swept and garnished" empty throne rooms of occidentals have come demigods created by departments of life such as art, economics, or

<sup>4</sup> H. E. Luccock, *Christian Faith and Economic Change*, page 51.

<sup>5</sup> In *Living Philosophies*, B. Russell and others, page 19.

politico-social movements. These have virtually declared independence of all religion, and have set up self-sufficient criteria and objectives. To a degree this was desirable in the interests of a freedom to enlarge the realm of recognized value. But conflict between these semi-deities was inevitable. And the most victorious has been, not the most inclusive in terms of value, but the most powerful, the deity of the economic order. One after another, the arts, the sciences, and other departments have offered fealty. Only the radical politico-social movements have resisted, and by virtue of successfully doing so, become living competitors of the Christian religion. But they do not offer any lasting unity of life, no lasting security, and so must rank also as "demigods," "powers of darkness." And above these "powers of darkness" there is no God-over-all who can command.

With this decay of religious authority has come the confusion of our basic morality. And this confusion has been basic to chaos in other realms. Charles A. Beard feels this especially in relation to the economic breakdown. He says, "The source of our confusion is our contemptuous disregard of ethics. What ought to be, given our situation, what is just, right, fair, supremely gratifying and beautiful, is thrust aside. The grand conceptions which have inspired millions are swept into the discard by economists as futile, if not foolish, and by the Communists as bourgeois prejudices."<sup>6</sup>

The demand for specialized knowledge and skills by modern technology has added to the confusion. Man, through special sciences and technical skills, has thought and programmed life into segments, but in so doing has lost grip on central meanings. Experts, intent on "knowing more and more about less and less," are modern necessities and social dangers at the same time. They sell their knowledge and skill, oblivious or helpless as to its destructive or constructive uses. They are related to an industrial process which is organized for profit or else they are crippled for lack of support. There is little opportunity for them to be voluntary participants in a great program of human service, such as occasionally brings glory to some sector of the medical profession. Their objectives must be such specialized knowledge and skills as can be sold. Their deity bows before the deities of business or militaristic nationalism. To ask them to consider the meaning of life seems irrelevant or downright irritating.

What is true of the expert is true in a similar way of the factory workman with an infinitesimal part in a process he rarely grasps and whose purpose he

<sup>6</sup> As quoted by Luccock, *Christian Faith and Economic Change*, page 25.

cannot share. God has been far removed from the common life. The deity of the workman must be relevant to his need. And if it be any more than pleasure and comfort, that deity is apt to be collective justice, interpreted as more pay and shorter hours. He will be interested only in a God who promises hope to the achievement of that end. And this fact places modern religion under a great strain of temptation. It is tempted to subordinate God to, or identify God with, a program which is man-centered and only "six feet high."

But vital religion has always asserted that the deity man needs is a God he must worship and serve for Himself, not merely one who is socially useful. He must be the great End, not a means to some end which is less than His own.

The pressure of social conditions crying for solutions tends to make social utility of an immediate sort the measure of all things. This was inevitable in a time of social crisis. But it is producing another sort of "reductionism," making this-worldly values all-in-all, with the Church and even God as means to that end. Social idealism, interpreted through Marxian economics, is declaring its independence of Christian concepts except as the latter contribute to "the" revolution. They will use God, but they will not worship Him.

One suspects that the social radicalism of much modern Christianity roots more firmly in Marxism and secular sociology than in the Christian gospel, and thus contributes to the secularism it professes to abhor. The judgment it declares is largely secular and this-worldly. Reference to the Eternal is lacking. Such judgment does not spring from the will of God the righteous. The way of redemption is likewise secular. Human activity rather than divine grace is primary. Reliance is on tested methods of sociology. Reference to God is incidental and secondary. Yet it is the primacy of the Eternal that characterizes all true religion. As an appendage to sociology or modern psychology religion cannot integrate life, nor can it continue to be religion. On the other hand we may say that with the loss of ultimate reference the values of social-biological utility lose unity and ordering power. They impress disillusioned mortals as having adequate sanction only when some social-physical force is put behind them. And all of life then begins to appear as the stage of such conflicting forces. If the social idealism of Protestant religion contributes to this end, as seems to be the danger, it will defeat its own objectives. But if it can reveal and interpret a living and redemptive God, active in history and to which all other forces are finally subordinate,

it will contribute a unitive faith and a destiny worthy of men's efforts. Its task is to seek to interpret a reference point for faith, such as the living spirit of Christ, from which the conflicting forces of the time can be understood, measured, and brought under the sway of the Eternal purpose.

In a time when all things seem relative and temporal, when force seems ultimate, religion must witness to the reality of that Absolute which alone can save. Werner Sombart has summed up the present tragic state of affairs by saying that the greatest blow to mankind has been its loss of the idea of God. "The life of mankind has become meaningless. Cut off from directive ideals, man has recoiled into himself, has sought there the realization of his ideas, and found it not" . . .<sup>7</sup>

The net consequence of this has been, first, to break down the restraining and unifying power of the religious view of life, and, second, increasingly to make room for the demons or demigods of our capitalistic culture and economic order. These demigods or ruling principles are granted supremacy by the business world and by politics in large measure. They may be deified under "natural law," or as "laws of economics." Or they may be granted equal authority to Jehovah by being called "manifest destiny." But in any event, the only possible outcome is moral and physical disorder and conflict. Since God has been bowed out of the scene the only power deemed able to bring order and unity again is some adequate physical force. And the chief available organ of such physical force is the State.

With such a hasty survey of some effects of naturalistic thought let us turn to a consideration of technology. Technology has done two things. It has brought men close together in terms of time-space measurements, and it has extended organic relationships to ever larger groups. Both of these things have been done in a time when our economic machinery has been governed almost solely for private profit. In turn this deifying of profit has made the required mutuality of groups impossible. Thus we have poverty in plenty and enforced scarcity for reasons of business expediency. This paradox has come in spite of the tendencies of science and religion toward a world unity of life. Technical advance demands reciprocity but cannot produce it. By producing the modern machine age it has made solidarity and increased collectivism inevitable. But in the absence of that unity of life which it demanded technology has increased the strains of group against group. For it has put power into the hands of the privileged and has produced

<sup>7</sup> Quoted by William Hocking, *Evangelism*, page 8.

insecurity for the many. Yet the potential means of security are always in sight of the masses. The result is inevitable conflict. And in their struggle the ultimate reference and reliance is economic and political power or downright physical force.

Such conflicts are both symptoms and causes of chaos. But it must be remembered that they thrive in a time of secularism. When God goes the demigods must come, and if these strive among themselves the only substitute for the God of justice seems to be some trial by ordeal, some test of truth by relative power. And every movement able to do so seeks to make the State the incarnation and organ of its purposes. Such struggles to seize political power drive many in desperation to seek some sort of peace through a strong man, a leader, who gives unity through the totalitarian State, unity through a supreme devotion.

Of course, true technological unity or self-sufficiency is rarely if ever possible within the borders of a modern State. The greatest of nations, like the U. S. S. R., must import dozens of products from abroad which are essential to the manufacturing process. It is open to doubt whether any modern nation can even approach self-sufficiency. The strains of attempting to do so are commonly overcome by loud talk of impending attack by some other "bogey" nation, a strategy which helps to quiet internal dissension.

Technological progress, then, demands collectivism in some form. It produces plenty, or promises it, in the midst of poverty. It demands the co-operative life, yet its gifts of power have been so placed as to make conflict the inevitable rule. This conflict becomes intolerable to all who lose by it, or fear to lose. Order then becomes their chief objective. The worship of the State and the exaltation of a Leader promise order. The Leader, in turn, promises a security and equality to the heaving masses.

While such an analysis seems to apply only to fascistic totalitarianism, the first motive and final product of modern Communism are not so different. The necessity for collectivism in a machine age was the first motive, although the primary value was equality rather than order or security. And the final product is an exaltation of the State over all, embellished by a differently decorated philosophy. The chief difference is that modern communistic totalitarianism will hazard order for the sake of equality, while Fascism will sacrifice equality, when necessary, to the order which preserves the status quo.

Both deny God as supreme. Both ride roughshod over individual personality. Yet both seem to receive support by the trend of events in our

industrial order. Is it not because both, through the support of different classes, promise unity and security in a time of conflict and apprehension? They claim to offer a valid substitute for the reciprocity which modern interdependence demands but cannot secure.

The third chief factor that I mentioned in beginning this article was the weakened and divided Church of today, without a conscious, inclusive, social philosophy and without the organic relationships to society by which it might become socially effective. Whatever else they may have demonstrated, Weber and Tawney have shown that the divisiveness of Protestantism and its attitude of moral irresponsibility for the common life have helped to make room for the demigods mentioned above. Perhaps Protestantism is to be credited in part for what liberty we possess. It must be made quite as responsible for the self-sufficient attitude of science and business and art, none of which have found their "souls" in a divine purpose.

Protestantism in America boasts of begetting a free state-controlled educational system. But we must remember that it is an educational scheme without a God reference in its philosophy and is a chief source of the secularism we deplore. In its shift of attention from subject matter to the personality of the pupil it enters the area of the function of religion, and, unless it acknowledges the God of religious faith, becomes the chief secular competitor of the Church. In addition, it is the ready-made tool for every embryonic form of totalitarianism and is a potential instrument for its purpose.

Modern Protestantism regards with horror the union of Church and State. And rightly so, for such union often meant the subordination of the Church. But at least it involved the recognition of, and some attempt to practice, the authority of religion in matters of State, and thus in all social relationships. We are beginning to see that perhaps the evils of the connection of Church and State are only exceeded by the evils of the disconnection of religion and the common life.

The connection of Church and State in medieval times did not give the proper organic relations for fulfilling the function of religion in the common life. It relied on the mechanical more than on the organic, on the sanctions of fear rather than on the sanctions of honor and respect freely given by its devotees. Even at its best, when the Church was most influential and most pure in purpose it was hamstrung periodically by giving its blessing to a status quo which was a compromise or in time became a social misfit. Having so identified itself with a passing social order, the Church lost authority to make

a judgment upon it by reference to the Eternal. In fact there could logically be no reference to an Eternal. It had become localized and therefore was obscured. This is always the case where the Eternal is declared to be known except in a symbolic sense. "They are but broken lights of Thee, and Thou, O God, are more than they."

But certainly the poor mechanical connection of yesterday was no worse than the nonorganic relation that has prevailed in later years. The Protestant Church of the nineteenth century not only renounced any totalitarian purpose, it made room for all sorts of authoritative secularisms by identifying the essence of religion with the subjective and the other-worldly. The organized Christian religion in the Roman Catholic Church may have been a moral failure in its power over the medieval state. But in Protestantism no possible totalitarian vision or culture was left to challenge the growing claims of the State. Because of the realm to which Protestant religion withdrew it reacted strongly to the secularism of materialistic doctrines of evolution, but hardly at all to equally materialistic doctrines of nationalism or capitalism. It resented every attack on the doctrine of a future life, but it did not react against the cheap estimate of personality in our social system.

Now we are becoming more and more aware of our need of God, our need of a theology for the common life, our need of a universal morality of reciprocity. But religion has abdicated this throne, and now both secularism and the demigods of powerful interests deny it the right to return. Nor can it think of returning with authority and power except as it unites in the Word it has to say.

Such unity will come, however, not from conferences on faith and order but from those on life and work, where the Church finds itself "against the world" of entrenched secularism. Unity will come from practical necessity. Finding the very heart of its message and ethic threatened by the modern State, the Church will find an organization or mode of defense. Every movement that is vital will fight for existence. Having established the right to exist and having worked out a common defense against the modern State, the Church will then begin to philosophize about what has been accomplished. But, thanks to the lesson being taught in Germany, the real motive will be the struggle to preserve intact the Christian message and movement, not the philosophizing or theologizing which will inevitably follow.

The Christian movement is fighting for its life, yet at the very moment when the cross impends, the Church must bear witness on a world scale to

the totalitarian purposes of God in order to preserve its life. Its best defensive is a radical offensive, a new evangelism.

But at present the Church is in no position to interpret a Christian totalitarianism. Indeed, there are many in its own ranks ready to deny that it should attempt to do so. For some of these, religion is seen as only one approach to life among many that are possible. Others, on grounds of tolerance for other faiths, would deny Christianity any totalitarian purpose. Others believe it should "go into all the world" but should seek men "one by one", out of all reference to the life from which they come or in which they live. All of these play into the hands of the secular deities by their refusal to exalt God as the Eternal One, over all.

The issue which is basic to most of the serious difficulties is that of method. If we are to have a catholic outlook and a totalitarian purpose what means shall be used? How shall the Church be geared into the life of the community? One may grant that this is a serious issue without denying that God is concerned for the redemption of all of life in its most far-reaching relationships.

Message is primary to method. If we are sure that the Christian faith in God as revealed in Christ can be the center of a dynamic world unity of life, we will find our methods. On the other hand, both message and method will derive urgency from circumstances. Perhaps the old saying is true that God speaks mostly in circumstances!

But for a suggestion as to method, might we not offer as a cue the relation of the Christ-centered conscience to the human personality? As the spirit of Christ in the conscience is authority to the Christian, so the spirit of Christ in the Church universal is the authority to the collective life. The conscience can plead or command but it cannot enforce by any external coercion. Its power is in its clarity, coherence and unity, and in the respect its values command. This type of authority would be implemented, in democratic countries, by the power of Christian public opinion.

The problem of method is not insurmountable. When such methods are outlined we will have the main lines of the technique of a modern evangelism.

A moment's thought thus reveals how much must be accomplished by study and experimentation before the common man will begin to regard religion as his hope and salvation.

We assert that only the Christian faith is great enough in its meaning to

sit on the throne at the heart of human purpose. But we humbly admit that organized Protestantism must agonize on its knees before it can occupy such a position. Perhaps that is the disciplinary purpose of the Eternal in this hour.

Since world unity of life through religion seems but a dream, however imperative, the next logical center of organic unity, given our spiritual climate, is the individual nation. Here is a unity organizable around the worship of the demigods of nationalism. Here appears to be a possible devotion, a possible culture, a possible integration which, moreover, can be implemented by the coercive powers of government. It is also fortified by a ready-made popular national mythology (often taught as history), legends of national heroes, and prevailing delusions of self-righteousness and superiority.

In addition it has an appearance of reasonableness. People generally are not aware of mutual relations of importance beyond the nation, even though technical experts and religious leaders insist on them. While we really live in an internationalistic world, we have only a nationalistic awareness. No international totalitarianism can flourish without feeling-awareness and loyalty on its side. It has neither the inner coercion of powerful devotion nor the outer coercion of a legal system implemented by police forces and military establishments. Furthermore, the barons of the business demigods find nationalism a convenient defender of special privilege and the bulwark of imperialism abroad. This fact of nationalistic awareness and narrow loyalty is clearly shown in the reactions of peoples when war threatens. Even the internationalism native to Russian Communism has shrunk to nationalism under this pressure.

Now we need a unified world-social system. But who would exchange what can be, the totalitarian State, for what ought to be, a world totalitarianism? Especially so when the latter seems to require as its birthpangs intolerable confusion and suffering. Not many of us will hazard the present for the future on such a basis, especially when religious faith is decadent.

It is idle to point out, I think, that if this answer is made both democracy and Protestantism seem to be in danger of extermination. The average man will not quickly see great value in a liberty which seems to block the way to peace, security and equality, especially when that liberty is cherished by the powerful as a mode of keeping their power. For most people democracy is not so much a value in itself as it is a valuable method. And as a method it offers no gripping hope until it is merged with some social ideal which makes for security and equality. If both democracy and Protestantism are dropped

by the masses as false hopes in favor of a totalitarian State in some form, one must not blame empty stomachs and fearful lives for lack of perspective. One must blame the poverty of both democracy and Protestant Christianity as social hopes.

In the light of all this one must conclude that the great task of Protestantism and democracy is not opposition to the totalitarian State as such. It is rather an understanding of, and opposition to, those forces which seem to make such a state inevitable as the only hope which in this secular age can be grasped by the masses. Before democracy and Protestant Christianity themselves can become sources of hope they must do two things: first, they must reveal the false claims of modern secularism and its descendants, the demigods of nation, race, and class; second, they must demonstrate the power to produce the reciprocity, security, and equality, demanded by modern interdependence of life. There is little tendency to doubt that Christianity has the kernel of an adequate social objective in the family of God ideal based on love. But such a vision is not a hope, not even within the Church, until it has an interpretation for the times, and means of achievement are outlined. Unless the Eternal be revealed entering the temporal, its reality will never be generally accepted.

The means to the Christian ideal seem to be available today only in a democracy dedicated to equality as well as to liberty, both oriented by a Christ-centered, world-wide evangelistic purpose. Before Protestantism can overcome secularism it must beget social movements with which it is not identified, which strive for a Christ kingdom of God orientation, but which are so relevant to the common life that they can become a hope which will tower above and reveal the false claims of the modern totalitarian State. That modern Christianity prove itself socially capable is as important as to prove itself intellectually respectable.

We cannot avert the totalitarian State by opposing it. The destructiveness and weakness of its secularism will be made apparent only by revealing an adequate redemptive ideal and power. The God who promises redemption from tragedy is the god who will rule. Is it God or Caesar?

## Christianity, the Kingdom of God, and the Government

GEORGE A. BARTON

**I**T was my lot, one quiet Sunday last summer, to worship in a rural New England church by the sea. The rector—a man past middle age—preached from the text: "Fear not little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom" (Luke 12. 32). The burden of his thought was that men can do little or nothing to bring in the kingdom of God, that it must be done by God Himself, and that it will come when God chooses to give it to His children. His thought was emphasized by the collect which he employed as the final prayer before the benediction. It asked that we might "finally be gathered with the whole company of the redeemed into Thy everlasting kingdom." One came away with the impression that that pulpit voiced no social message as a part of the Christian gospel. Its occupant seemed to look for the kingdom of God only in the life beyond.

No matter how long one has believed in a social gospel, such archaic points of view, coupled with the present-day conditions of the world, lead one to re-examine the basis of his faith that the kingdom of God means something real for the world that is now and here. If our Lord's teaching is to be practiced in this world, it seems obvious that it must apply to the whole of life—that the Christlike spirit of love must, in those who are His real disciples, apply to all relations, domestic, economic, political, international. If that is true, men can do much toward bringing in the kingdom of God by being in conduct as well as in profession genuinely Christian. In this world God works, in the religious sphere, through men. If God is to establish His kingdom in this world, it must be done through the instrumentality of men. Christians—the Church—can, then, do something to hasten the coming of the kingdom—the rule of God in the hearts and lives of all people. In all reverence we may say that God cannot establish His kingdom in this world without the aid of men. Were He to establish it by miracle and cataclysmic upheaval as the apocalyptists expected, it would not be a kingdom of Christlike children of God. Either hate and revenge would still dwell in men's hearts, or they would be mere automatons instead of Christlike beings who served God of free choice, because drawn by the satisfying power of the love

and ethical perfection of His personality. The kingdom of God does not come because men do not yet really want it to come. The great mass of our race is still pagan. The majority of Americans are still pagans at heart. The mass of church members are only nominally Christian. One must conclude, in view of these facts, that the refined, gentlemanly rector, to whose sermon I referred, unintentionally, but nevertheless woefully, misrepresented the gospel.

## I

What would the kingdom of God mean to this world? It seems that by the "Kingdom of God" our Lord meant the direct rule of God in the hearts and lives of men. He Himself was the fullest revelation that has ever been made in humanity of what that rule means. His life was an extension of the moral and loving life of God into the life of man. He came to make men sons of God, each according to the measure of his finite capacity, as He was the perfect Son of God. Can we think of Jesus Christ needing external rules to live by? He lived by the direct knowledge of God's perfect will and by expressing in attitude of soul, in deed and act, the God-nature that was in Him. What would a kingdom be in which God was thus expressed in the mental attitude toward one another of all its citizens and by their conduct toward one another? No restraining laws would be needed. From the point of view of government it would be anarchy, but, as each would act unselfishly toward all the others—as each would do, without outward compelling law, but from Godlike love, the right, the just, the loving, the self-sacrificing thing—such a kingdom would achieve that perfect social organism for which the world groans and travails, but which no government, in the present half animal, half pagan condition of humanity, is able to attain.

## II

It will be objected by many that such an ideal Christian human race as this conception of the kingdom of God would require will never exist on this earth. It will be said that human nature is what we see it to be and that it cannot be changed. Such objections are at once too pessimistic and too short-sighted. It is, of course, true that none of us will live to see such an ideal race of men—to see all men Christlike, but that does not demonstrate that this desirable goal is in the long future unattainable. God spent perhaps a million years differentiating *pithecanthropus erectus* and the *homo Pekinensis*

from the other primates. Something like another million years seems to have been spent in bridging the gap between pithecanthropus and the present races of men. Thirty years ago a Harvard geologist declared that in all probability the earth would support human life for a hundred million years yet. More recently a president of the British Association has extended the time to a thousand millions of years. God is apparently not in such haste as we are. One day with Him is as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day. We are as yet, so far as the moral life of man is concerned, just in the morning of time. It is probably not more than ten thousand years since the human conscience was born, and it is not yet two thousand years since the Christ was born. If God spent two millions of years in creating man's body, in far less than a thousand millions of years he can complete man's inner life and bring in, even on this earth, the kingdom of God. How soon He may be able to do this, will depend on how readily men really heed the Christ, love Him, choose to be like Him, and co-operate with God in the completion of their own creation.

### III

How we may become co-workers with God in this great task, we may learn from our Master, the Christ. He recognized the sacredness of personality. He treated the outcast with sympathy and love. He aided the poor and helpless; He taught men the truth about God and life; He served with infinite tenderness. He recognized that God had made men free persons, and that, to become a child of God, one must of one's own free will choose God and His will. He attracted; he did not compel. Compulsion would have made automatons, not persons. That is the great secret of His power; it is why those who are really Christ's disciples possess a different quality of life from all other professedly religious people. It is why Christians have always loved freedom. Saint Paul declared: "For freedom did Christ set us free; stand fast therefore, and be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage" (Galatians 5. 1). It was because of this love of freedom and the recognition that it is a prerequisite to genuine Christianity, that the Pilgrim Fathers, William Penn and others sought these shores and established in the wilderness those colonies which have now grown into the American Republic. It is because of this that in Isaac Watts's hymn:

"Jesus shall reign where'er the sun  
Doth his successive journeys run"

we can truthfully sing

"Blessings abound where'er he reigns,  
The prisoner leaps to loose his chains."

To advance the kingdom of God, then, we must have genuine Christianity, genuinely lived and taught, exerting its attractive influence upon free persons. It goes without saying that the opportunity to be such a person presupposes a degree of material welfare to supply the needs of a modest life, the opportunity for healthy work, and full liberty of action in all ways that are not harmful to the personalities of others. In the abstract these principles seem thoroughly clear and would, I imagine, command wide assent. The difficulty arises when we come to apply them to actual conditions in this world.

#### IV

To fully appreciate the dilemma in which we find ourselves today, it is necessary to take another long-range view of the divinely chosen creative method. It pleased God to bring into being the different orders of animal life by the process of evolution. Why He chose this way, we can only guess. It is a method that compels the development of such qualities as swiftness, cunning, et cetera, but it seems a prodigally wasteful method, and in many respects cruel. To Tennyson nature seemed "red in tooth and claw." Undoubtedly it is, but God is its creator, and it must be as it is, because God so ordered it. A psalmist saw this long ago. He wrote:

"The young lions roar after their prey,  
And seek their food from God."

He saw that God designed the prey for them as much as he willed them to live. Men today live on the meat of beast and bird with practically no thought of the sacrifice of sentient life involved. In the life of man at present the old animal order is not dead, though the kingdom of God is struggling to be born. Up to the present, through interracial struggles and international wars, the process which Darwin called in the animal world "natural selection" has gone on. It has gone on in economic life just as through long ages it went on in the animal world. Changing conditions rendered the ichthyosaurus and the dodo extinct just as the discovery of metal tragically terminated the lives of men of the Stone Age. Professor Speiser has recently laid bare at Tepe Gawra the striking difference between the last Stone Age and the first

Metal Age civilization there and enabled us keenly to feel the poignancy of the condition of those over whom Lamech gloated:

"If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold,  
Truly Lamech seventy and sevenfold." (Genesis 4. 24).

The same process is not only going on, but during the last century it has in industry been greatly accelerated. Inventions are constantly creating new industries and supplanting old ones. Since the Great War the carton has almost superseded the wooden box as a container of goods, and a classmate of mine has been ruined by the change. Thirty years ago the coal barons and the coal miners thought they had a monopoly of a fuel necessary to civilization and they did their best to bleed the public to the limit in consequence. Not only so, but the operators and workers entered into internecine strife as to the division of the spoils. The result has been the development of the use of oil as a fuel and the employment of electricity generated by water-power for many uses for which coal was formerly necessary, and the coal industry is a dying industry. Those who have worked in the mines all their lives and are incapable of doing anything else are in pitiable case. Many of them have nothing on which to live. It is unnecessary to multiply examples. This process has been going on in industry for a hundred years with accelerating velocity. Many other instances, I am sure, will occur to every one. Ardent young Christians, who have gained some glimpse of that better world which Christ revealed to us, call this order of things godless. The thoughtful mind that takes a long view of the universe, if it believes in God at all, cannot concur in this view. This type of evolutionary order controlled by what seems to short human vision blind forces pushing from behind, was instituted by God. It fulfilled for long millenniums a useful—a divinely creative function. That it still controls so large an area of human life, is because that life still moves on the plane of animal desire and passion rather than upon the plane of Christian love.

## V

These facts constitute the acute problem of the present age. What is the process or the method by which we may bring the kingdom of God nearer? How can men today help the Christ-order of life to supersede the divinely constituted order for animal life without sacrificing the fundamental conditions of freedom without which the Christ-order of life is impossible?

I may say at once that I do not pretend to be wise enough to answer this question. It is clear to me, however, that our postwar experiences, and especially the experiences of the last five years, have demonstrated that there are some ways—ways that are now quite popular in a large part of the world—by which it cannot be done. It seems to me time that we put a sign, **NO PASSING: DEAD END**, at the entrance of those ways. I refer to all the ways that may be classed under the term “collectivism”, whether they be called Communist, Fascist, Socialist, or by some other title, such as State capitalism.

The so-called communistic experiment in Russia, established and maintained by the bloody extermination of whole classes of citizens, and maintained by bloody “purges” which out-do the bloodiest action of the czars, has not supplied its devotees with the common comforts of life. It is reliably reported that it takes the earnings of six weeks to purchase for the ordinary Russian worker a pair of shoes, and the earnings of more than a year to buy him a new suit of clothes. What the Soviet has done to religion, is a matter of common knowledge. In Nazi Germany conditions are not much better, and in many ways they are worse. Colonel Knox, in the *Chicago Daily News*, published an article some months ago, based on first hand investigation, showing that a skilled compositor in a German printing establishment—and compositors are skilled workmen—receives but little over a thousand dollars a year, and that unskilled laborers receive less than six hundred. From these sums families must be supported, fed, clothed, doctored, if ill, and all expenses incidental to living must be paid. As partial compensation, Hitler has made beer cheap. Men are compelled, moreover, to belong to a government-established labor union. From their wages the dues to this union are deducted. If one objects or refuses, he is expelled from the union, dismissed from his work, and turned out to starve. Naziism affords no material basis for a worthy personal life. As is well known, on the spiritual side it denies all the rights of personality. Freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience are all denied. Men must think what the Führer says they should think; they must act and vote as he directs them to vote; they must worship his pagan god or suffer persecution, if not martyrdom. In spiritual as in material things the nation that in freedom produced Goethe, Schiller, Schleiermacher, Beethoven, Mozart, Mendelssohn, Wagner, Harnack, Virchow, Einstein, and many others are individually reduced to the condition of serfs.

In Italy the case is no better. Little by little the individual is being made the serf of the State. Mussolini has robbed the individual Italian of all liberty as effectively as Hitler has done. An editorial in his official organ, evidently written by Il Duce himself, threatened recently to lay reforming hands on decadent Catholicism. He is apparently contemplating making the Roman hierarchy his tool.

President Roosevelt has suggested recently that European democratic governments broke down because that under them the people failed to obtain the material benefits which they demanded, but Dorothy Thompson (Mrs. Sinclair Lewis), who has made a firsthand study of the European situation, points out that no government, and especially no democratic government, can give the people all that they demand. People are selfish. They desire less work and more pay and, when the people are the source of authority, there is a point where the scheme breaks down. The German republic offered the working classes all that they are demanding. It "was the providential state par excellence. It had universal old age, sickness and unemployment benefits, and was for a number of years governed by the trades unions." The people would not work enough to produce the means for all these things unless spurred on by necessity or by a master. Hitler, assuming supreme power, has persuaded, hypnotized, or cudgeled the people into working more for less remuneration, and taking the differential in national glory. Miss Thompson points out that in Italy the dictatorship came about through a deadlock between capital and labor such as is being industriously fomented in this country. It was rapidly leading to chaos. Mussolini took advantage of the situation, offered his services to the employers, and promised to establish order. So the Italians, like the Germans, are working more and receiving less, and are taking the difference in national glory. Every one of the collectivist states, promising to do what democracy cannot do, robs the people of their liberty, actually gives them less in material benefits than democracy, but diverts their minds from their condition by holding before them national ideals, and, when these are not sufficient, the bludgeon and bloody purge are employed to compel obedience.

## VI

Our interest at the moment is not in political forms of government, but in the bearing of these on the kingdom of God, and one of the first requisites for that is the establishment of justice among men. This includes, of course,

the opportunity for each to obtain the necessities for a self-respecting life. The problem is twofold, economic and ethico-religious.

Does the so-called New Deal afford promise of an adequate material basis for the advancement of human personality? The answer to this must be an emphatic negative. Many have pointed out that its humanitarian objectives are admirable—they command the assent of ethically-minded persons—but in the great majority of cases, the means by which it is proposed to accomplish them lead directly away from these objectives. The whole basis of the New Deal is an economy of scarcity. Too much wheat and cotton are raised; the farmer cannot sell them at a profit. No matter how many people are hungry and unclad, restrict the output; keep up the price; feed the hungry by expropriating the property of those who have saved a little! For analogous reasons cattle and pigs are destroyed until beef and bacon are so high that only the well-to-do can afford them. Labor has often been exploited and underpaid. To correct this, wages must be so increased and working hours so reduced that more workers may be employed and all who work may have an adequate living. The result is, however, that this process makes many of the vital necessities cost so much that the many cannot afford them. For example, carpenters, masons, and plumbers now charge so much that houses cannot be built to sell or rent at a price that the working man can afford. Hence the great housing shortage. Similar conditions in other industries, aggravated by the uncertainties of constant governmental interference, produced the depression of 1937 before we had emerged from that of 1929. Profitable business is already paralyzed. It is impossible for it to function under the New Deal. The resources of provident citizens are being rapidly eaten up by taxation, dissipated in unsound economic experiments, or utterly lost by forcing large enterprises, in which the common people have invested their savings, such as railways and utilities, into bankruptcy. The time is approaching when, if this policy is pursued, the resources will be exhausted, and then the alternative will be barbarism or some form of regimented fascist state.

America's experience during the past four years has demonstrated that the philosophy of scarcity, enforced by bureaucratic regimentation, is not the way to establish an economic basis for the kingdom of God.

## VII

In its ethico-religious aspects the New Deal is equally wanting. The

effect of dictatorial regimentation upon personality has already been discussed. All that was said is pertinent at this point, but need not be repeated here. There are other considerations which, to many minds, may appear more compelling. It has long been recognized by some of the sanest economic and social authorities that no advance in social organization can be achieved unless it is preceded by and based upon an advance in ethical standards. Economic and social justice are based on a prevailing sensitive ethical consciousness. Enmity, hatred, the desire for revenge—these do not heal social wounds, they aggravate them. One of the greatest faults of our present economic organization is and has been the unscrupulousness of many of its most powerful members. High-powered salesmanship has used all arts of misrepresentation and the use of half-truths to defraud the ignorant and obtain their money. Alluring promises, unctuously uttered, and taken at face value by the dupes, have been ignored or denied. Solemn contracts, when it could be done with impunity, have been regarded as scraps of paper. Powerful corporations have employed their great resources to sell goods at less than cost over long periods to crush weaker competitors and put them out of business. They have by money at times corrupted legislatures and even individual judges to secure unfair legislation and judicial decisions in their own interest. The ills of society will never be cured until such practices are eliminated, but they can only be eliminated by the introduction of a keener ethical consciousness. They will never be eradicated by imitation.

The effect on the national standards of truthfulness is appalling. In my judgment, the United States has violated one of its most solemn contracts with its citizens. In its hour of need the government appealed to the masses of people to loan her money with which to prosecute the Great War. Every class of citizen responded. Many a poor man sacrificed in order to loan the Nation fifty dollars. The government which he trusted promised in solemn covenant to repay that loan in gold dollars—the kind of dollars which the government had received. Those solemn covenants with the people have been repudiated. It was an act such as no private corporation would have been allowed to perform. It will ever remain a stain on the Nation's honor. In my opinion the people are subjected to another injustice. Workers and employers are compelled by law to pay to the government premiums for future pensions. Instead of establishing with these premiums a permanent fund to accumulate and meet the obligations, when they mature, as any private company would be compelled by law to do, the premiums are being used to defray current

government expenses, leaving it to the option of some future administration to provide funds by future taxation with which to pay the pensions. This is done in face of the fact that the government has already repudiated one solemn obligation to its people! In the realm of ethics there is not one ethic for the individual and another for the government. Honesty is honesty everywhere, and fraud is everywhere fraud. In the TVA and similar projects the government is employing the vast resources of taxation to crush private competitors. It is the same type of unfair competition that, when practiced by would-be monopolistic corporations, is so justly condemned. Parallel examples could be cited in many other departments of activity.

The sole reason for mentioning these things here is to call attention to the fact that the government is engaging in the unethical practices of big business and is doing it on a larger and more reprehensible scale than was ever attempted before in this country. In the case of corporations there was always some hope of correction through appeal to the government, but there is no such hope from the government.

### VIII

A clergyman of my acquaintance, who has recently twice visited Russia, points out that one of the most ominous effects of the Communist regime there is the loss of any high ethical standard. There is no absolute standard of right. The standard tends to become simply that which will profit the group. It is with profound sorrow that one observes a similar deterioration in ethical standards here. One can appreciate and admire the kindness of heart that burns with sympathy and indignation for those who are being crushed by the injustices of society as at present organized, but we betray the Christ when we abandon the high, pure, even-handed morals of the gospel for the morals of the pack, herd, or mob.

With all my heart I believe that the gospel has a social message. People never reach the full measure of the Christian life alone. We are social beings. A society composed of Christlike individuals would be a Christlike society. In my opinion the pulpit should voice the social implications of the gospel. The Church should not be the ally of the rich, but the friend and helper of all, poor and rich alike. The "poor man with vile clothing" who comes into our congregations should receive even more consideration than the man with "a gold ring and goodly apparel." The minister should be actively interested in all efforts to help the less privileged; in all labor troubles he should be

sympathetic with the aspirations of the workers, aiding them in so far as their aims and methods are just and right, but he should never make the mistake of substituting economics or sociology for the gospel. The kingdom of God will not be established on the earth by the abolition of capitalism any more than it was brought to America by the adoption of the eighteenth amendment, which made the liquor traffic illegal.

## IX

It is ours to present to men the Christ—to preach Him so persuasively, so attractively, to reveal, in our living, His way of life so powerfully that men are brought to Him and learn how to live. It is thus that we shall do more to bring in His kingdom than any economist, sociologist, or statesman can do. There are times when it is the minister's duty to publicly take the side of the oppressed, to help clean up a slum, and to raise his voice against every attempt to destroy the freedom of a hundred and thirty millions of people, but we must never forget that it is our main business to make men living disciples of Jesus Christ. By doing that and helping them to live by His fundamental principles of life we shall do more for human happiness and more for social welfare than can be done in any other way. Christians have their differences of Protestant and Catholic, High Church and Low Church, but we all have the same mission, and can all unite in bringing men to God. The varieties of our approach to the gospel help in reality the adaptation of the message to different minds, different temperaments, and to men of different points of view. In these critical years of the world's history, such differences should not be magnified. We should unite in holding before men Jesus Christ, humanity's one great Helper.

During the thousand millions of years yet to be, I have no doubt that the kingdom of God will be established on this earth. A formal Church may be crushed in Russia, a vigorous Christianity may be purified by fire in Germany, the loss of freedom may bring our people into similar tribulations, but in the end God will accomplish His purpose and make a Christlike race of men. The great question for us and for our generation is whether or not we shall so live and act that it will be possible for God to "hasten the coming of His kingdom."

## Theology's Ever-Expanding Frontier

R. BIRCH HOYLE

**S**TATESMEN are not the only people bothered about frontiers, boundary lines, fencing off areas from one another. Philosophers, scientific students, and theologians have always been busy at rail splitting. S. T. Coleridge in his *Table Talk*, said, "every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist." An Aristotelian could never be born again and become a Platonist. The two types are as distinct as the sheep and the goats in the parable. Thus, in old Greece the "either-or" existed twenty-five centuries prior to Kierkegaard's discovery of the "infinite qualitative difference between God and man, Time and Eternity." Every science delimits its sphere of study. Like King Canute, it says, "Thus far shalt thou come and no further." The logician eschews metaphysics; the rationalist cannot bear the intuitionist. Bergson and Otto depreciate reason in order to exalt instinct. Specialism is rampant and issues in increasing knowledge about more and more of less and less. In current theology the boundary line is horizontal. Protestant theologians limit the sources to Bible and Church dogmas. Romanists would annex tradition as a source ground. Aquinas would make the boundaries in ascending scales, "planes," they are called, each shading off imperceptibly into one another, as in the modern philosophy of the organism. Others would make the line of demarcation by using temporal instead of spatial figures of speech. Some look back, Romanists to Aquinas and Aristotle. Others, following another aspect of Aristotle's thought look forward, to the end or "purpose" being realized. Thus, the *status quo ante*, is limited off from the dynamic urge, the "nisis" of Lloyd Morgan's thought. The psychologist's fence is in depth, seeking in the Freud, the "*id*." Yet again, others, like the Jesuit, Przywara, and the Protestant, Karl Heim, use the figure of polarity drawn from electricity. Theology has to deal with all these aspects. Kraemer in *The Christian Message* says, "Theology, history, psychology, anthropology must be exploited" now. Books before us reveal how the fences are falling.

Stanley A. Cook, who retires from the Hebrew chair at Cambridge (England) this year, in *The "Truth" of the Bible* (S. P. C. K. London) has the "forward look." As an archaeologist, student of the history of religions,

as well as expert in Hebrews, he is well equipped with lore from the past, but his gaze is turned forward to trace the direction humanity may be taking through our cloudy present era. The word "Truth" he puts in quotes. He asks, "What is the Truth we expect or desire to gain from the Bible? What true things important for us today, emerge from the modern critical study of the Bible? What is the process by which we reach a position where we are able to say that 'so and so' is true? And, finally, what is there, just because it is true, that must be made real and that must be manifested in life and thought?"

Professor Cook insists that we are passing through an age which is the prelude to some epoch-making reconstruction of religion which has but two great parallels in the past: the age of exilic religion in Israel, sixth century B. C., when six great religions arose, and the first century A. D. He seeks to draw from the Bible the future line of advance. Under those questions about what "Truth" means, all our modern methods of research, historical, comparative, psychological, scientific are brought into play. Man and his entire environment he seeks to bring within the scope of God's activity: from the Hebrews we gain ethical monotheism and so the Bible will keep its place as the great aid to faith, but it is to be read with eyes and hearts open to the ever-increasing data with which theology is concerned.

Another wide survey is given in Edwyn Bevan's Gifford Lectures on *Symbolism and Belief* (Allen & Unwin, London). By "symbolism," Doctor Bevan means the terms used to express the things of the unseen world. Such words, of necessity, are taken from the language of the children of men on earth: how far do they adumbrate metaphysical reality? as against Feuerbach, the earlier Freud, who contends that such words are the product of "wish-projection," like man's shadow enlarged to gigantic proportions, as in the Brocken specter. Doctor Bevan argues that they do, to some extent, express ultimate reality. He examines and illustrates with abundant references, the symbols or terms, Height, Time, Light, Spirit, Wrath (of God), to show how ethical, teleological nuances are inwoven within spatial, temporal, human emotional terms—"fancies that break through language and escape," as Browning said: "words, like Nature, half reveal and half conceal the soul within," as Tennyson put it—and have reality on the "other side" to which they partially correspond.

Within the limits of the terms of the "Giffords," Doctor Bevan is debarred from appealing to revelation and Church dogmas: he is confined,

as in Deism, to the range of human reason. The closing lectures discuss Pragmatism and Analogy, Rationalism and Mysticism and their limitations and finally The Justification of Belief. From Hellenistic sources, where Doctor Bevan is an expert, from the Bible and comparative religions, an immense mass of illustrative material is drawn, and set forth in a style of pellucid clarity. And since symbolism is now a central theme of discussion, this scholarly yet popular treatment is *ad rem* and the book bids fair to become a classic. As Doctor Bevan deals with the above symbols, we see how words gain ever deepening content, containing fold upon fold, and we can see theology entering further into human experience.

Doctor Moffatt's own Commentary on 1 Corinthians in the series that bears his name (Hodder & Stoughton) is of unusual interest. Here we see how Christianity entered into a Gentile, Hellenistic, pagan environment and how Paul applied his "theology" to new situations and problems. As Doctor Moffatt says, "there are sustained pieces . . . written in the great style which comes naturally now and then to one of the great minds in the history of religion, as he (Paul) is endeavoring to transmit what is to him not one of the varied interests of a varied life, but the supreme vision of reality which alone illuminates and inspires the soul of man." He refers to "four supreme passages . . . what the story of the Cross or of Divine Wisdom means (1. 18-2. 12); the narrative of The Lord's Supper (11. 23ff.); the rhapsody on love (13); . . . and the majestic description of The End (15. 42-58)." These and other passages illustrate Doctor Bevan admirably: such things are not human fables but must have a suprahuman background that evoked them. We see, too, that instead of "Corinth," any modern city could be named as the scene of struggles which Doctor Moffatt so admirably elucidates: problems of sex-ethics, the relation of Christians to State law, the racial problem of Semitism and Gentilism, the grades of "orders" or functions in the Church, and the advance beyond food taboos.

Though Christianity was cradled in Judaism, it soon burst its swaddling bands. How it outgrew the limits of Palestine, and the mentality of Rabbinism, and advanced through the Roman Empire, imbibing much Gnostic, Neo-platonic material, until it could claim to be "universal" is well displayed by Hans Lietzmann in *The Founding of the Church Universal*, which Nicholson and Watson issue, in The International Library of Christian Knowledge, of which Dr. William Adams Brown is one of the editors. What the Roman world was like, and the Church; with what the Church was equipped in

literature, theology, worship; how she faced and overcame the "world"; and absorbed, alas! much imperialistic and materialistic virus; how the Church outthought and outlived opposition, and the various countries she penetrated; the influence of Greek ideas on theology and the reaction thereto, until Origen's time: these things are described with brilliance, as befits Harnack's successor and to whose volumes on *The Expansion of Christianity* this is an indispensable supplement. We see here new frontiers crossed as the Church went forth "conquering and to conquer."

Canon Oliver Quick, now of Durham and Professor of Divinity in Durham University, moves in narrower limits in his *Doctrines of the Creed* (Nisbet, London). He studies the basis of the great doctrines of God, the Incarnation, Salvation, and the Holy Spirit and the Church—the four articles of the Creed—as laid in the Bible and modified by modern thinking. He rejects Aquinas' distinction between "natural" and "revealed" theology, as also the Barthian-Brunner view that only those who believe in Christianity are competent to criticize it. Not "either-or" but "both-and" expresses Canon Quick's attitude: man is active, not simply passive, in revelation. He has acute insight into the incompatibility of the Greek static and the Hebrew dynamic views of reality as inharmoniously fused in much theology, such as Aquinas'. His discussions of the Virgin Birth, Atonement, The Last Things, and especially the Doctrine of the Spirit, take account of the burning problems of today, and indicate lines of advance in accord with our fuller knowledge of human nature and history. He is all on the side of freedom in his fine discussion of Freedom and Authority in Faith. This is a devout, thoughtful book of great value.

For some years past every summer Roman Catholic scholars hold a "School" at Cambridge (England). The lectures delivered in 1937 have been collected: the theme was *The New Testament* (Burns Oates, London). It is interesting to study how far, if at all, Roman scholars indicate advance. In some respects they do, when, for example, discussing Textual Criticism and the Formation of the Canon of Scripture. But the decrees of the Council of Trent and the Vatican act like a clog on the wheels of progress. Thus, it is taken for granted that John, son of Zebedee, wrote the Gospel, Epistles and Revelation; that 2 Peter is from the Apostle; that Matthew is more trustworthy than Mark, in the Synoptics; that the theory of a Proto-Luke, as advocated by Streeter and V. Taylor, are untenable; that tradition is of equal worth with Scripture; that Paul wrote "Hebrews." Still, some, though

little, advance, is perceptible. In 1897, the Holy Office declared the verse 1 John 5. 7 to be authentic; in 1927 this view was abandoned. The Biblical Commission still holds to the unity of the book of Isaiah and that Paul wrote the letters to Timothy and Titus. There is much chafing against Aquinas' theology, but little of it gets an outlet into print.

One reason for this chafing is the strong current of thought on the "I and Thou" philosophy made popular by Karl Heim. Emil Brunner has espoused that trend in a striking book of six lectures, delivered in Sweden last autumn, on *Wahrheit als Begegnung* (*Truth as Encounter*; Furche, Berlin). In this book Brunner goes back to the Biblical view of what "truth" means. It is no rational concept but a "meeting," an "encounter" (without hostility) between the Personal God and man as a person. This Biblical view is beyond both Orthodoxy, with its dogmas and Pietism; beyond the antithesis of "subjective" and "objective" which has, in his view, influenced and damaged the history of theology and the Church. Brunner shows how this pair of terms has operated in history and needs to be subjected to the Biblical view of truth as "personal intercourse" between God, the Initiator, and man, the recipient. He shows how the object-subject relationship is removed in faith, love; and applies his doctrine of "personal correspondence" to the doctrines of The Trinity, Election, Man as in God's "Image," Sin; the Person and Work of Christ; the practice of Infant Baptism (scathingly criticized!) the New Life; the Church, its nature, officers, pastoral work. Here there is advance by leaps and bounds; new life bursting the old sheaths of dogma. When Brunner comes to Princeton some people will get an electric shock—if he teaches these things!

Two more books must be briefly mentioned. An Indian, Doctor Rasvihary Das, has issued a useful help to those who would understand A. N. Whitehead—*The Philosophy of Whitehead* is the title (Jas. Clarke, London). It is not easy reading, but it does explain the strange terms that savant uses, and has acute criticisms also. Professor C. E. Raven is an ardent Pacifist, and in *War and the Christian* (S. C. M.) he puts both sides of the question and pleads for Christians who differ to "get together" to frame a common policy. Thus, as against Jewish narrowness, Gnostic fogginess, Imperialistic patronage, slavery, feudalism, cramped dogmatism, theology has waged conflict and won advanced positions in the past, and now Mars and Mammon call for an attack from a Christendom that gropes its way to a union of forces.

## Charity or Love?

Suggested by Reading *Saint Paul from the Trenches*<sup>1</sup>

F. J. FOAKES JACKSON

THIS is a very remarkable book and the oftener one reads or refers to it the more apt one is to change his opinion of its scope and object. If one's first impression that it is an attempt to interpret the Apostle in the language of today and to question the language as misrepresenting the simplicity of the Authorized Version, one has to read it once more to see that this idea is alike superficial and erroneous, and that this little book is not retranslation or paraphrase but really a work of genius.

As a preliminary it is desirable not only to consider the circumstances under which he wrote but to endeavor to introduce the writer. The manuscript is an old mud-stained copybook written in the trenches by a young officer who was killed in action on September 16, 1916, while leading his troops. That he should have occupied his leisure amid the horrors of war in the trenches by studying Saint Paul's two epistles to the Corinthians and to the Ephesians is truly remarkable; and no one but a real scholar could have produced so profound a work without the aid of reference books, and in an atmosphere of learning. It is as though he had put himself into the age and circumstances of Saint Paul and interpreted the three letters to us as the Apostle might have done. In one respect he was, like Saint Paul, "a citizen of no mean city." His father was Vice Provost of Eton College, and not only a great classical scholar, but a most distinguished man of letters. When a Master in the school, he was my tutor and his portrait hangs over my desk as I am writing. Gerald Warre Cornish's mother was a very exceptional woman and a writer of some repute, and I have every reason for my opinion that she was related to the novelist William Thackeray. Gerald Warre Cornish himself was an Eton Scholar of Kings College, Cambridge where he distinguished himself by taking a high degree, and was a lecturer in Greek at Manchester University.

Nowhere else does Saint Paul reveal himself to us as in 1 Corinthians: Romans is an invaluable theological treatise addressed to a church he had not

<sup>1</sup> *Saint Paul from the Trenches*. By Gerald Warre Cornish. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. \$1.35.

yet visited. The personal note appears in 2 Corinthians and Galatians. He is Christological in Ephesians and Colossians; but in 1 Corinthians we see the man at his best. He knew his converts thoroughly and understood their faults and their merits. He had a letter from Corinth before him, stating their difficulties, some real and others frivolous; but whatsoever they were, Saint Paul displays his rare gifts of insight, sympathy, and common sense. In the famous chapters 13 and 15, Saint Paul rises to even his highest level. This is how Cornish has treated the noble utterance in praise of charity:

"And the way I will show you is the way of perfection. I may have knowledge, but it is still fragmentary, I read as it were on a mirror the reflections which I cannot yet quite make out. I prophesy partially, not fully and perfectly, and so is it with other gifts of the kind, tongues and healing and so on. These are, as it were, but the infancy of the Spirit, its first faint babblings and lisps, but love is full, complete, perfect. Here and now it is the all-inclusive, towards which all these other gifts point, and when love is fully come, there will be an end of these partial utterances of the Spirit. Therefore love is above all things necessary. What are all these other gifts without it? What is the speaking with tongues, the utterances of men or angels, without it? Merely a repetition of the old religions with the clashing of cymbals and beating of gongs. And what does it avail to prophesy, to have an intellect which can grapple with all mysteries and knowledge, and to have so powerful a faith as to be able to work miracles with it, if love is not the crown, the aim, the end of it all? It is worthless. And to give away all your possessions without love, and to embrace martyrdom and the stake without love—how empty, how vain and worthless! For love includes all that is good—all patience, kindness, tolerance, forbearance, faith and hope; and love is antidote to all evil, all jealousy, and boasting, all ugliness, selfishness, ill-temper, evil thinking. Love can never take any pleasure in these things, the joy of love comes from truth. And so it shall come to pass that all other things will change, pass, and be no more, but love will remain. All that is partial, imperfect, incomplete must have an end, but love will never fail. In that perfect day of love we shall see face to face, we shall know then as now we are known, and though now we see faith, hope and love, these three, abiding with us, the greatest of them is love."

It would be easy to criticize the rendering of the great chapter, and to contrast it with the incomparable translation of the King James version, the rhythm of which makes the English even superior to the original Greek.

One might be tempted to call it presumption to attempt even to explain what is expressed with such exquisite simplicity by the translators of the seventeenth century. But all carping must cease when the circumstances under which the manuscript came into being are realized. It is evident that it was not intended in its present form for the public and it is probable that the object of the young officer was to beguile the dreary spare time he was spending in the trenches by trying to put into writing what these epistles meant to him, in his own highly cultured style and vocabulary. There could be no room for affectation, the whole work bears every mark of being sincere and spontaneous. The writer had no books to refer to; but had to trust to memory of his previous studies. I like to think that when he put down his view of what Saint Paul meant, in his chapter on what *agape* really was, he was trying to express what he thought his own character ought to be, but I cannot help thinking that all modern translators have chosen the wrong word when they express *agape* by *love*. One has only to read the chapter aloud with love, as here, substituted for charity to see how the whole lacks the exquisite poetry and dignity of the Authorized Version. In truth, charity is a noble word and fits every definition in this chapter better than love. "Charity suffereth long and is kind, charity vaunteth not itself," and so forth. This word by modern usage has become almost objectionable. It has been made to connote a grudging condescension of those who bestow it, and a certain humiliation on the receivers. Hence the familiar phrase, "Cold as charity," and the cry of the unemployed, "Curse your charity: we want work." But by its derivation it implies a *grace*. What even today we should mean if we were to call anyone a "charitable man" is not a person who subscribes largely to good causes, but one who takes a broad liberal view of others, kind to all and free from those petty faults, arrogance, jealousy, censoriousness, harsh judgments and the like, which may seem trifling but make people intolerable to live with.

If Saint Paul in this great chapter unconsciously drew his own character, the great Apostle could better be described as charitable than loving, for a loving man would suggest that he was sentimental rather than practical, inclined to be feminine, rather than masculine, an enthusiast rather than a self-disciplined man of action. Paul made so many friends and admirers because of his breadth of mind and his unfailing courtesy that *charitable* is the word best suited to him.

## Book Reviews

**God in Us: We in God.** By ALBERT EDWARD DAY. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.75.

LONG ago the reviewer heard a sainted scholar of another generation speak on the sweet reasonableness of religion. His discussion was presented in theological and philosophical terms beyond the grasp of the youth in his audience. Doctor Day in his recent book has set forth the sweet reasonableness of Christian faith in terms that any youth can comprehend. He handles the most profound truths of life in simple nontechnical terms, yet his presentation is such as to command the respect of erudite scholars. His illustrations strike one with great force—and are likely to be remembered a long time. A fine example is: "We waste our heavy artillery on mosquitoes and employ peashooters against Gibraltar."

His treatment of the subject is truly experience-centered, and thus meets the demands of the most exacting modern education. But Doctor Day does not allow his reader to remain on the low levels of life in which materials alone matter; he lifts him into that realm where the spirit of man has communion with God. This is the true test of great preaching and teaching.

Nor is one allowed to remain in a realm of detachment. He is sent into a workaday world of reality, where men and women struggle and sometimes fail, where honest effort sometimes produces nothing, where virtue and valor are often defeated. Into that world, however, the reader is sent with hope and assurance that the religion of Jesus Christ is the only force capable of effecting integration of

personality, competent to establish the proper perspective, and worthy of total dedication. He is led to feel that the greatest challenge in life is to make the religion of Jesus operative in his own life and to lead others to understand the real Jesus and accept His way of life. Doctor Day admirably summarizes the case in these words: "That is why the Christian religious experience is so socially significant; for the unification of life about a Christlike God, as the object to which surrender is made, is an integration about One who cares greatly for the needs of the body, whose passion is for personality, whose quest is for brotherhood, whose way is the way of the Cross."

JOHN W. ELLIOTT.

Secretary Christian Education,  
The American Baptist Publication Society.

**Revelation.** Edited by JOHN BAILLIE and HUGH MARTIN. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.50.

THE world-wide exchange of Christian opinion which prepared the way for the Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences in the summer of 1937 and was in no small measure responsible for their quite unexpected and unprecedented unity of viewpoint, disclosed that the most fundamental *theological* divergence lay in the conception of Revelation. It was wisely felt that progress toward a common faith must be preceded by at least clarification and mutual understanding of contrasted views on so vital an issue. To that end, the present symposium was arranged as preparatory material for both conferences. Six recognized spokesmen of as many

schools of Christian theology were invited to set forth their interpretations of this prolegomena to all theology. Here is Karl Barth's latest (and most intransigent) word on the Word of God. The Archbishop of York follows with a masterly and balanced exposition which furnishes the most vivid contrast to Barth's polemic, not less in temper than in matter. Father D'Arcy, of the Society of Jesus, states the Roman Catholic position with a tempered persuasiveness which will bring illumination to many Protestants. Sergius Bulgakoff of the Russian Seminary in Paris and Bishop Aulen of Sweden present the Orthodox and Lutheran views. American thought is ably represented in an essay by Professor Walter M. Horton of Oberlin, which labors conscientiously and with marked success to establish contact with prevailingly European modes of thought without sacrifice of our more pragmatic and empirical insights. T. S. Eliot furnishes an introductory essay.

Space forbids detailed appraisal of the several contributions. The book as a whole has a double importance. The collection of papers offers much the most useful primer to the "varieties of Christian conviction" now available; no one who would understand the difficulties—and the promise—of a united faith for Christendom can afford to lay it aside without careful study. There is one striking and regrettable omission; the thought of the Orient and of the "younger churches" is unrepresented. Still ecumenical discussion is carried forward as though the Christian mind were wholly Western. But the wider significance of this volume lies in its forecast of one of the most important methods of forging the Christian theology of the future. We may regard it as the first in a series of similar symposia on the central themes of Christian faith. Ecumenical thinking will press forward by a

dual movement—by seeking agreement in mutually satisfactory statements, and by laying side-by-side the divergences of Christian interpretation in unrelieved contrast.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN.

Union Theological Seminary.

**The Validity of Religious Experience.** By F. E. ENGLAND. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$2.00.

HAVING myself recently written a book with the above title I was naturally interested in reading this volume, which was published half a year or so later than mine. The author "has for several years given courses of University Extension Lectures in England on the psychology and the philosophy of religion." He is well acquainted with the literature in these fields and makes good use of it. The book is well written and with the exception of the last chapter is easy and interesting reading.

Most of the book has to do with problems that relate more or less directly to the nature of religious experience. The point especially emphasized by the author is that all articulate experience is interpreted experience. There can, therefore, be no such thing as absolute immediacy in religious experience. The religious object is not and cannot be given with an absolutely indubitable certainty. Probability is all that we can attain through the empirical method.

The pragmatic method is viewed as still less adequate and is rather curtly dismissed. Considerable attention is devoted to the aprioristic method, particularly to its formulation by Rudolf Otto. The author's contention here is that "there is no royal road to the apprehension of God through the *apriori* category of the numinous." In other words, the religious *apriori* is not necessarily valid because it is *apriori*. This,

of course, is true and would have been admitted by Otto himself. The real nerve of the aprioristic argument lies in its pointing out that all knowledge rests ultimately on faith and that religious faith is logically as valid as are the other fundamental forms of faith: the theoretical, the moral and the aesthetic. If religion is a unique and basal form of human experience, there is no reason why we should not trust its implications as fully as we trust our intellectual, moral and aesthetic natures. This positive form of the aprioristic argument is not developed as fully by Doctor England as it might have been.

His metaphysics will also hardly commend itself to strict theists. He attaches himself apparently to Whitehead's philosophy and seeks to modify it in a theistic direction. But his conclusions are not as clear cut as might be desired. In general he writes as a Christian personalist, yet he speaks of deity as a "quality of reality as a whole." The result is that at times a rather blurred impression is left with the reader.

One could wish that the author had put his own positive argument for the validity of religious experience into a somewhat more clearly defined and systematic form. But the book is nevertheless on the whole an informing and helpful treatment of the subject with which it deals. Its main contentions are especially valuable as corrective of the rather loose type of empirical apologetic current in religious circles.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON.

Boston University,  
School of Theology.

**Right and Wrong. In an Age of Confusion.** By WILLIAM P. KING. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

THE thesis of the book is that the great need of the present day is "some final

moral principle, some absolute standard." Without this our generation must drift into an ever-deepening confusion in thought and practice which will in the not very long run mean ruin. This standard, however, is not to be found in any external authority, but through an examination of human life and experience which will reveal "the immutable laws of life."

The treatment of this theme falls into two parts. First of all, there is a vigorous frontal attack on the modern tendencies to ethical and religious skepticism. Second, there is an attempt to build up a positive ethic on the basis of a reassertion of the theory of a moral sense as inherent in humanity. This moral sense is defined as the intuitive recognition of the distinction between good and bad, an intuition which in its full significance "carries us beyond the natural order and indicates a spiritual reality." It gets its positive content from experience as interpreted by the exercise of the human power of imagination, and from the guidance of great moral personalities of whom Jesus is supreme.

The book is fresh and stimulating. The author has a fine sense of balance, a knowledge of the difficulties he is facing, and a rich fund of common sense. The passages on guarding against wishful thinking and on the use of the imagination in dealing with specific moral problems are of great practical value. In dealing with modern youth there is no indiscriminate condemnation, neither is there any of that silly attribution to young people of all the virtues by which some of the older generation try to avoid their own responsibilities for leadership. On the other hand, the reader sometimes feels a lack of clear connection between the chapters—the author does not always keep close to the thread of his argument.

There is also a tendency to repetition which gives the impression that points are sometimes unduly labored. The treatment of the sense of sin is not to this reviewer entirely satisfactory. And he thinks also that not enough attention is paid to modern psychology.

But the author is on the firmest possible ground in his assertion that the moral standard must be found through the investigation of the facts of human nature, that the moral law is in fact written on the heart, and that hence the moral imperative is inescapable since only by the discovery of its meaning can there be any possibility of an integrated personality. He is equally impressive in his treatment of the relation of this moral element in human nature to the cosmic order. It is harder than ever after reading this book to see how so superficial an idea as humanism can retain any standing among thinking people. Doctor King's book is addressed to youth—it is to be hoped that it will find many readers among young people. But young and old alike will find it good reading in every sense of the word.

W. G. CHANTER.

Wesleyan University.

**Crime Control by the National Government.** By A. C. MILLSPAUGH. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. \$2.00.

CERTAIN facts confront us every time we analyze a modern social problem. The big city, accumulated wealth, rapid transportation facilities, corrupt politics and decentralized law administration have had their influence on crime. Present-day crime is gang activity, holds life cheap, plays for large stakes, is well-equipped with instruments of attack and defense, strikes and gets away quickly and operates

in such wide areas—interstate, national and even international—that local agencies cannot cope with it completely and effectively.

These facts bring the federal government into the situation and create the problem with which the book is concerned. In our country at the present time criminal law enforcement is divided between the federal government and the states. Within the latter it is infinitely subdivided among local agencies. When the federal government seeks to co-ordinate and to supplement state and local efforts it does so at the risk of overlapping, duplication and even jealousy and conflict. As a consequence, Doctor Millsbaugh emphasizes that any sound reorganization program must work toward three ends: reorganization within the federal government, reorganization within the state and reorganization of the federal-state relation. By analyzing nine federal agencies, all dealing with law enforcement and all involving overlapping, duplication and lost motion, the author clearly reveals how complicated is America's crime problem.

When it comes to proposing solutions the author proceeds cautiously, recognizing a need for more reliable statistics and further research. "At present we are unable to tell whether crime is increasing or decreasing, except in a few categories and then only roughly. The fact seems to be that we do not know with any exactness how much crime we are suffering from. . . . If we are to make any progress toward sound reorganization of social resources to the solution of the problem we must have statistics that go nearer to the roots of the problem."

So far as next steps are concerned several suggestions are made. Better co-ordination can be effected among the various federal agencies by transferring the

functions of some to the others which are better equipped for the task of law-enforcement. The author warns us, however, that there are limits beyond which this cannot be done.

In discussing improvements in the federal-state relations, Doctor Millspaugh makes three significant criticisms of the trend toward centralization. First, "it skips the logical next step in administrative development" which is improvement by and within each state. Second, there is the danger that a national police force might not always be democratically controlled and used only for the purposes of democracy. Third, it fails to take into consideration the important role prevention must play in combating crime. Prevention is for the most part a local problem, a problem in which the federal agency can assist and promote but cannot direct and control.

Prevention as well as enforcement is essential to crime control. We are to avoid brutality on the one hand, and sentimentalism on the other. We have given too little attention to prevention as over against deterrence and protection. Public opinion is far from accepting the principle that criminals require diagnosis and treatment by experts. Your reviewer finished reading the book curious about the author's opinion regarding the part religion might play in crime control. He mentions the contribution education, medicine, law and social work can make. No direct reference to religion is included, although in dealing with environmental factors he adds "economics tinged with social ethics," to stabilized employment and the elevation and equalization of standards of living as essentials to ultimate crime prevention.

EUGENE WILFORD SHRIGLEY.  
First Methodist Episcopal Church,  
Baldwin, N. Y.

**The Philosophy of Religion.** By  
EMIL BRUNNER. New York:  
Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.25.

THE Barthian position receives a further and fairly lucid interpretation of its principal thesis in this exposition by Emil Brunner. Its meaning is sometimes hard to grasp due to the difficulties of translation and to the frequent use of paradoxical statement.

The book is divided into two sections, the first dealing with the problem confronting a philosophy of religion and the second setting forth the meaning of revelation.

Both philosophy and religion seek to interpret ultimate reality. But, whereas reason is the basis of the former, revelation is the ground of the latter. An irreconcilable tension ensues at the point of the primacy of reason as over against the primacy of revelation, which is God's self-disclosure.

The Reformation faith had in it a clear recognition of the objective nature of revelation. But the ensuing Protestant movement lost the emphasis on revelation as an "act of God." Protestant theology suffered a collapse in the development of orthodoxy which reverences the letter of the Scriptures rather than its revelation; in rationalism in which "the ground of all intellectual life is God himself and revelation is the gradually increasing consciousness of this ground that is accomplished in history"; in pietism which in stressing subjective religious experience minimizes the Word; and in historicism which loses sight of the uniqueness of the revelation of Jesus Christ.

In short, the book sets forth the Barthian emphasis on the supremacy of revelation as the ground of religious knowledge and experience. The path

to God is not through science, philosophy, or culture. In themselves they have a justifiable place in the human scheme, but their limitations are such that man cannot realize union with God through their findings. Rather, "man's pride in his rationality, science, philosophy and culture" makes for religious futility and unreality. The Christian Church will experience creative power only as it recognizes the objective nature of the revelation of Jesus Christ which is contained in the Scriptures.

LLOYD ELLIS FOSTER.

Calvary Church,  
East Orange, N. J.

**Ends and Means.** By ALDOUS HUXLEY. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$3.50.

THOUGH only in his forty-third year, Aldous Huxley has long been recognized as one of the consummate of contemporary literary artists. In his writing he is individualistic, witty, cynical, sophisticated, though essentially honest. Personally he is shy and thoughtful and kindly.

His novel, *Eyeless in Gaza*, avowed the breakaway of a captive from the grinding mill of a life without meaning or value. His *Ends and Means* discloses that he has grown increasingly dissatisfied and disgusted with skepticism and Bohemianism. Now he perceives that the reckless libertinism which he had countenanced is occasioned by the passions, leads to the destruction of personality, and has something to do with the darkening clouds of poverty, hatred and war which overhang the world.

The question he poses in this book is, how can existing society be transformed into the ideal society of man's hopes? He breaks this down into three questions: What do we want to become, what are we now, how do we propose to pass from our present condition to the condition we

desire to reach? It is generally agreed that liberty, peace, justice and brotherly love characterize the golden age toward which men look. We must crusade against the dangerously encroaching ills that can destroy the world. Ignorance is a deadly sin and a right means of earning a livelihood is among the virtues necessary to salvation. Hatred, unawareness, stupidity thwart and may extinguish a species. Love and understanding are valuable even on the biological level. We must find the best way to combine workers' self-government with technical efficiency, to vary an individual's labors so as to eliminate boredom and multiply educative contacts, to dispose of the wealth created by machine production, to invest superfluous wealth and determine how much should go into the production of capital goods, to use the gifts of varying workers, to find the best form of community life and of education, to discover leaders and deliver them from the lust for power.

Indicative statements enliven many pages:

"The patience of common humanity in tolerating the intolerable is almost the most surprising fact in history."

"Technological progress has merely provided us with more efficient means for going backward. Collective ownership of the means of production does not have as its necessary and unconditioned result the liberation of those who have hitherto been bondsmen."

"The most gratifying form of praise, the most unbearable form of blame, are the praise and the blame of fellow professionals."

"The massacre of a few thousands of engineers, administrators and doctors would be sufficient to reduce any of the great metropolitan centers to a state of plague-stricken, starving chaos."

"Children can be taught to rely on their

own internal resources and not to depend on incessant outside stimulation, which is the stuff with which propagandists bait their hooks, the jam in which dictators conceal their ideological pills."

"If Behaviorism is correct, there is no reason for attaching the slightest importance to the opinions of Behaviorists; if Behaviorism is correct, it is probable that Behaviorism is 'incorrect.'"

"The cultural condition of a society rises in exact proportion as it imposes pre-nuptial and postnuptial restraints upon sexual opportunity."

"However good the end aimed at may be, its goodness is powerless to counteract the effects of the bad means we use to reach it."

The opening sentence of the book reads like the beginning of a sermon, and the popular literary critics have hailed it as marking a conversion. The moralist has superseded the artist, but the book is another demonstration that competence in literature, science and art does not guarantee spiritual discernment. Huxley does not sufficiently distinguish between personality in God and God as a person. A person, he believes, must have passions and caprices and he notes that the Old Testament God is wrathful, jealous and vindictive. He adopts Buddha rather than the Christ. The deficiencies in Jesus, he argues, have influenced earnest Christians to despise artistic creation and philosophic thought, to disparage the inquiring intelligence, to evade long-range, large-scale problems of politics and economics, and to believe themselves justified in displaying anger.

Yet Mr. Huxley does perceive that ultimate reality is "the peace of God which passeth all understanding" and that goodness is the way it is to be approached. Our beliefs are the finally determining factors in all our actions, but virtue is the essen-

tial preliminary to the mystical experience of a direct intuition of spiritual reality, and virtue is based on respect for personality. "If I want as full a knowledge of God as it is possible for human being to have, I must be as good as it is possible for human being to be."

This is a book to be pondered by those who would know their day.

JOHN W. LANGDALE.

Book Editor of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

**Creative Controversies in Christianity.** By GEORGE W. RICHARDS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.50.

THIS discriminating teacher of church history proceeds upon the thesis that it is by controversy that great issues are clarified and accurate thinking is stimulated. He puts the conflicting points of view, one over against the other, on the major issues with which Christianity has had to deal. These issues in general have had to do with the meaning of life and in particular with man's hope of salvation.

In the pre-Christian era he finds Socrates, philosopher of the Greeks, and Amos, prophet of the Hebrews, inspired with a common sense of mission and with a common quest of God and the good life. Socrates discovered the soul in man and urged the attainment of its perfection as his chief concern. He was related to the god in whom he believed by his physical nature, a god who had no eternal purpose for his people and who died with them. In contrast, Amos worshiped a God whose loving purpose was constant, whose presence was inescapable and whose life survived all nations.

Whether Jesus was what His first followers thought Him to be or not can never be determined by the scientist nor the philosopher, but by humble disciples who

by the way of Christian pragmatism accept the revelation of Himself that He makes to them. It was love that made Him more than man and brought Him into controversy with the world. This controversy is seen specifically in His temptation experiences and His conflict with the Pharisees. It was the love of God which man cannot discover but which Christ revealed. It was this spirit that produced the early Christian fellowship of persons who rejected the totalitarian claims of a pagan state and lived in faith and hope and love.

The religious career of Paul might be described as a series of controversies: First, before his Damascus road vision, with a sect of the Nazarenes who taught that the Jesus whom Israel had crucified God had raised from the dead; then, after his Christian experience, with the Jews to whom he insisted that Christ had brought an end to the law and that he had been sent to the Gentiles; later, with the Jewish Christians to whom he declared that salvation comes as the gift of God and not as a reward for merit; and finally, with the Gentile Christians to whom he preached a God who is ever seeking man. Although most modern philosophers reject the idea of the Holy Spirit as set forth in the Scriptures we must remember there is a difference between a spirit that pervades the cosmos and the Holy Spirit revealed to the prophets, the Christ and the Church. It is by the help of the Holy Spirit with this latter meaning that we may understand the mind of Christ. It is a possession that we cannot gain for ourselves but with which we are filled when we prepare ourselves for it.

The quest for a Christian metaphysic leads to a consideration of Christology. "Whom say ye that I am?" The answer has led to endless controversies, conspicuous among which was the famous

Arius-Athanasius debate. Although Professor Harnack asserted that Paul, Athanasius, Augustine and Luther saved Christianity from being merely a cosmology, the mere statement of creeds has not finally answered all the questions. In the Middle Ages we find catholicity and uniformity coming to the front as the expression of Christian idealism, to be met later by the ever-challenging idea of individualism and naturalism. In a later period we discover a recurrence of the age-old conflict interpreted on the one hand by Erasmus, the humanist, who considered Christianity primarily an ethical system, and, on the other hand, by Luther, to whom religion became an experience of personal salvation through the believer's faith in Christ. In more recent times we have the controversy expressed by Schleiermacher, whose basis for religion was the feeling of absolute dependence, and by Barth, who finds the basis in the revealed Word of God.

It ought to be noted that as one reads this book which, of necessity, takes him over much territory familiar to one who knows the Scriptures and some Christian history, his interest is sustained by the striking style with which the writer conveys his thoughts. For example, he says, "The Greeks professed to have man-made gods and the Hebrews to have god-made men." He says of Jesus that "He delivered men from religion that they might live in the freedom of the spirit of God." And he says of Erasmus that "in the end he is responsible for the first four chapters of 'Re-Thinking Missions.'"

Professor Richards has compressed into a surprisingly small volume an excellent analysis of the great events of Christian history. Anyone who desires to find in a book of scarcely more than two hundred pages a scholarly but semi-popular treatment of the main issues that Christianity

has met, will do well to read *Creative Controversies in Christianity*.

MARSHALL RUSSELL REED.

Nardin Park Church,  
Detroit, Michigan.

**A Self Worth Having.** By W. G.

CHANTER.. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.25.

THE title of this little volume from the pen of Dr. W. G. Chanter, of the faculty of Wesleyan University, aptly defines the author's purpose, to set forth the achievement of personality as the main business of life. Nothing is more tragic for Doctor Chanter than the ease with which modern man has fallen prey to mistaken judgments upon the meaning of his own existence, and has come to interpret the purpose of life in terms of satisfactions offered by "the world," especially material comfort and security. Much of the moral civil war and intellectual confusion in the soul of modern man are simply the penalty that must be paid for trying to define successful living in terms of material possessions, and neglecting the "one all-important thing," the winning of a free, cultivated personality, a self of integrity and dignity whom man can respect and with whom he can live in peace—in short, "a self worth having."

To give content to the ideal of "a self worth having," Doctor Chanter turns to Jesus of Nazareth, not with any intention of foisting Him or His teaching upon the reader, but to point us to one who after all must be acknowledged the "greatest Master of the art of achieving personality" (p. 19). No matter what we may think of Jesus theologically, we yet have to reckon with Him as the most winsome and heroic, the most dramatic and creative personality that history records.

Doctor Chanter then does a very interesting thing. He seizes on the story of Jesus' temptation in the wilderness as "the story of a supreme success in the choice of the one perfect way of life" (p. 100), and expounds it as a dramatic parable of alternative philosophies of living that in one way or another are presented to every man. From this experience and the way Jesus dealt with it there emerge certain broad truths, Doctor Chanter feels, that can guide us in the attainment of the truly good life. One is the necessity of a denial of the world, for selves "... organized on the principles of the world are not free ..." nor "... secure, since they depend on things which constantly change and perish" (p. 25); another, paradoxically, is a sharing of oneself in the life and work of the world, being in the world but not of it, for "there is no self worth having to be found in isolation from the struggle of mankind for a true humanity ..." (p. 28); others are a vigorous intellectuality, moral courage in holding fast to what is good, faith to affirm invisible ideals of the spirit as alone authoritative in human life; and above all, a radical, positive unselfishness, a dedication of oneself to interests that appeal beyond the individual and unite one to all other human beings.

The author is the first to admit that there is nothing new in these principles. Their interest lies, indeed, in the fact that they are not new, that they are timeless. And few people I know have set them forth with more effect than has Doctor Chanter. Fewer still have brought to their task a mind so well seasoned with a knowledge of human nature, so keenly aware of the social forces making modern man what he is, and at the same time so sure in its grasp of the truths of the Christian faith that can

save man from himself and his time. On occasion, Doctor Chanter can write with something of the psychological insight of Jung, let us say; at others with something of the incisiveness of Krutch or Lippmann; at others with something of the theological acumen of John Oman. It is in the combination of these elements that the distinctive value of *A Self Worth Having* is to be found. For this volume, while first of all a manual of truths pointing us to the good life, is also a penetrating, constructive judgment upon the illusions and sins of modern man, delivered with the earnestness of a prophet but tempered with the wisdom of a scholar and with the humor and sympathy of a Christian gentleman.

PAUL WAITMAN HOON.

Summerfield Church,  
Bridgeport, Conn.

**The Unity of Philosophical Experience.** By ETIENNE GILSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.75.

FROM Etienne Gilson, distinguished professor of medieval philosophy at the celebrated Collège de France and director of medieval studies at the University of Toronto, we have come to expect writings of profound erudition and charm. Readers of *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* will not have to be told that this eminent historian of philosophy has the rare gift of making old things new and vital. This book before us, representing the William James Lectures given at Harvard University in 1936-7, embodies, with the exceptions to be noted, once more these excellent qualities. The thesis here proposed and defended by Professor Gilson is that the history of philosophy is not a collection of scattered and random thoughts but rather develops a dramatic story possessing unity and coherence, and from which im-

portant lessons, both of imitation and avoidance, may be learned. "The history of philosophy," he rightly maintains, "is to the philosopher what his laboratory is to the scientist."

Three important movements of philosophy are singled out for such experimental scrutiny: The Medieval, the Cartesian, and the Modern Experiment, respectively. The Medieval Experiment takes us from Abelard to the disintegration of scholasticism by Ockham in the fourteenth century; the Cartesian Experiment extends from Descartes himself to Hume; the Modern Experiment begins with Kant, whom Hume woke from his dogmatic slumber, and ends with the present day. There is a kind of cyclical symmetry in each experiment, which begins, on the whole, with a rejection of skepticism only to have skepticism, through "historical blunders," once more restored as the final outcome. This parallelism in cycles is somewhat marred by the fact that for Gilson in no subsequent cycle is there a man to be found like Saint Thomas of Aquinas, who alone in the Christian era "clearly defined the exact place of philosophical speculation."

The outcome of all these experiments, Gilson admits, is somewhat disheartening since from his viewpoint, apart from Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Thomas, all philosophers studied, including even Descartes and Kant, were at best but magnificent failures. "Metaphysics is a science which has as yet been tried by but a few." Skepticism has been the inevitable outcome of Abelard's logicism, Duns Scotus' theologicism, Ockham's pious empiricism, Descartes' mathematicism, Kant's physicism, and of the psychologism of the more contemporaneous thought. The modern period especially comes under Gilson's strong condemnation. Its disappearance, he explicitly declares, would be good riddance,

"for what is now called philosophy is either collective mental slavery or skepticism." While he hates both, it is significant that he hates skepticism vastly more. Even Marxism, because of its craving at least for dogmatic truth, is to be preferred to what he calls the decadent skepticism of modern philosophy. The one thing needful is to restore our lost confidence in reason and upon the immutable principles declared by Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Thomas build for our day a metaphysics which will be a genuine science of ultimate being. Only in this way can science and liberty, in short, Western culture, with its feeling for the dignity of man, be conserved.

With much of Professor Gilson's thesis one may be in hearty accord. Skepticism cannot give nourishment to the soul. But while we have not the confidence in reason of early scholasticism, it can hardly be maintained that modern philosophy in non-dictatorial countries is lost in the slough of skepticism. One wonders also how, if his analysis is true, Western culture was able to maintain itself at all in the midst of such widespread metaphysical failure.

As the book progresses it becomes increasingly less convincing. The treatment of Kant, for example, is in places superficial, and sometimes even falls to sheer absurdity, as when Gilson taunts Kant with suspecting he himself might be God simply because Kant once wrote: "God can be sought only in us," or when he remarks that "what Kant knew about metaphysics was mere hearsay." His lack of sympathy for the post-Kantian idealists (who were certainly anything but skeptics) is striking: Fichte is dispatched in two pages, Schelling in a paragraph, and Hegel in a few pages which for their misinterpretation and distortion had better not have been written at all. The final

chapter, which purports to give his own philosophical viewpoint, lacks Gilson's usual clarity and precision. After finding reason lauded throughout the entire book up to this point, it is rather disconcerting suddenly to find that it is intuition to which primary importance is given in metaphysics. What is then left for reason to accomplish is not unambiguously stated.

These latter deficiencies do not however detract from the high excellence of the earlier and greater part of the book where Gilson is the incontestable master. Here the student of philosophy can learn much, and the general reader will be delighted with the verve and pungency of a robust writer.

CORNELIUS KRUSE.

Wesleyan University.

**Art and Character.** By ALBERT E. BAILEY. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$3.75.

THERE has been an increasing need for books that make available to educators the wealth of material to be found in the world of art for the enrichment of life. *Art and Character*, by Dr. Albert E. Bailey, is therefore an especially valuable and timely contribution. His analyses of pictures are sound from the standpoint of the artist, and beautifully interpreted in the language of a gifted writer, while the treatment of the subject matter reveals thoughtful understanding of the subject of education, and of the problems of getting its message across for the betterment of human beings. Doctor Bailey seeks to convince us that the vast treasures of art, from the days of the pyramid-builders to the painters of the modern mural, contain a store of unused power, not only for our enjoyment but for our spiritual help.

The excellent plan of the book makes the material easily accessible. Arresting titles at the top of each page illuminate the

text below, and serve to fix the high points in the mind. Helpful sets of "Readings" at the close of chapters show how much farther one can travel without much labor on bibliographies. The "Classification of Pictures for Their Spiritual Value," about fifty pages in all, and the "Index of Artists and Works of Art," nearly 1,700 items, covering the great in art since time began—these pages alone are worth the price of the volume, and make it invaluable to ministers, teachers, and students of social problems. They will save such persons hours of research.

To make a better world is the problem of all creators of beauty. All the sources of all the arts are needed to accomplish this task. In the past the work of the genius spoke only to the artist with any degree of understanding. It was not so intended. His message was for humanity. The greater the work, the more universal should be its inspiration for good. This is the function of art.

People who know very little about art, who seek to understand its meanings, will find the first chapter, the "Language of Art," very helpful. All the laws and methods of the composer of any art are presented in simple terms, most essential to a layman's grasp of the way the artist thinks. The second chapter, "The Nature and Function of Art," treats in a vivid way the philosophy of art, and the author's use of architecture and painting to prove his theories, convinces us of the splendid preparation he brings to a serious study like this.

In a way outstandingly clear and simple he describes and illustrates the fundamental laws of all art form. Creative art is based on lines—verticals, horizontals, diagonals, curves. We are inspired by verticals, rested by horizontals, energized by diagonals, swayed by curves. Ample illustrations are convincing. Masses,

colors, spaces, symbols, dark and light, are the words of the artist. With these he composes his painting, builds his tower, plans his tapestry.

But these laws are not arbitrary. They follow human psychology. The many examples prove how few and fundamental, and how very flexible the laws of all great art are. They were to reach human personality, to inspire it, to improve it. So art, the author claims, is not created for an emotional pleasure alone. He says: "The doctrine of 'Art for Art's Sake' is not wrong. . . . It is inadequate. The artist who finds aesthetic joy in nothing but abstract pattern, merely passes judgment on his own spiritual poverty." Besides, "psychology is against him. We demand subject matter, meanings, to satisfy the craving for experience. It is because we are human that we respond to art with a meaning." And history supports us, for the great works of art were produced for a purpose: To build a tomb for a king, an arch for a conqueror, a painting for a church. Each was created around a personality, or embodied a social significance. Full of meaning when created, they now speak a timeless human message today. "We spare so little time to comprehend them. But the loss is ours. We miss an opportunity to enrich our spiritual lives by emotion vividly experienced and intellectually disciplined. The genius of the artist needs to be supplemented by the intelligence of his public."

In chapter three the nature of personality is analyzed. Man, the complex being, is capable of high spiritual attainment. Love, joy, sacrifice are the fruits of this transformation. Greed, war, hate are the opposites, also found in man. How to build the desirable traits? Great monuments emulate self-sacrifice. Great paintings have pictured the horrors of greed and war. They stir our emotions for or

against great causes, and they speak with power when painted by a master hand. Even the myriads of symbols created and preserved by art—the cross, the staff, the crown—have a profound hold on our lives through their association.

Chapter seven, a most valuable one, deals with the practical problems of teaching little children. Teachers of young groups will find help in the materials listed, and in the attractive and understanding way the author has presented them. "The child lacks images to understand the abstractions in religious teaching. Pictures supply imagery to acquaint him with the world of religion."

And for adults, the last part of the book opens up that "Great Treasure House of Art," which is to be had for the asking. Here is an art survey from ancient time to modern days. Open this part of the book, at any chapter, and read the fascin-

ating story of the march of time—of Egypt, of Greece, Italy, Flanders—any land; read of personalities like Giotto, Durer, Rembrandt; read about tapestry, great Gothic churches, stained glass, religious painting—all have been interestingly written about, not a dry paragraph. Each has been discussed with the vital thought of its relation to the enrichment of human character. "Art justifies itself as the Handmaid of Religion."

Read any analysis or interpretation in this book. See if you can stop in the middle of it. Doctor Bailey makes it vivid and real in setting and characters. It is a drama enacted before you. We wish there had been more reproductions of works described in the text.

CAROLYN S. ASHBROOK.

Department of Fine Arts,  
Pratt Institute,  
Brooklyn, N. Y.

## Bookish Brevities

In part the article by President McAfee of Wellesley College was an address delivered at the interdenominational luncheon of church women in New York.

A portion of the article by Doctor Bennett was given as an address at a seminar of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church which met in Philadelphia last May.

"Poetry alone imagines, and imagining creates the world that men can wish to live in and make true," writes Alexander MacLeish.

"The mental pabulum of our day is too largely the detective story and effervescent novel, with a sexual spice. Mental self-support has largely 'gone with the wind.'" So writes Ralph Tyler Flewelling in *The Personalist*.

Charles W. Ferguson, the editor of *The Readers' Digest*, has a different idea. In *The Saturday Review of Literature*, he undertakes to distinguish between an article and an essay. An article differs from an essay as a sermon from a conversation. An article marches, an essay walks. Articles are written in the daytime, essays at night. Articles are done to present facts or sell convictions, essays to distill the substance of reflection.

The gait of our time calls for something swifter, more purposive, and direct, than the essay. We are in a bull market

for information and comment. The masses hanker for enlightenment. Reading interests have changed so unexpectedly and profoundly during the past twenty years that no one can any longer say with certainty what is likely and what is not likely to interest the public. People would rather be informed than entertained and it has become smart to be opinionated.

Henry James said to a young man whose desire was to do the best he could with his pen: "There is one thing that, if you really intend to follow letters, I cannot too emphatically insist upon; there is one word which you must inscribe upon your banner, and that word is Loneliness."

*Quiet Thoughts*, by Patience Strong, published by E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., gives sixty-four one-page meditations on such diverse themes as "Fog," "Tea Cosy," "Slippers," "Carol Singers," "Forgive Yourself." The dedication is in tune with the content of the book:

"I dedicate this little book  
To all who love a firelit nook,  
A silent room, a homely hearth,  
A window and a garden path,  
To all who love a leafy lane,  
The warmth of sun, the kiss of rain,  
God's gifts of bird and tree and flower,  
The quiet thought, the quiet hour."

A review of Doctor Lowrie's book in

the *Literary Supplement* of the *London Times* has high things to say of Kierkegaard. It claims that the world has never known a greater psychologist, Dostoevsky alone being his peer. He ranks with Augustine and Luther in the effort to apprehend Christianity in its earliest guise, but his understanding of the soul was deeper than Augustine's and he went beyond Luther in seeking an ultimate philosophical clarification of man's religious need and the Christian response thereto. Among all the theological works produced in the last century, it is solely some of his that will prove imperishable.

Dr. George Avery Neeld of St. Johnsbury, Vermont, in a noble study entitled "From Rome to Geneva," points out that in a country founded so largely on religious impulse as was ours, one of the first problems to receive serious attention was that of settling the relation between religious organizations and the new state. That relationship had occasioned continuous conflict in Europe for centuries. The settlement is set forth in the first amendment to the Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof." Doctor Neeld regards this separation of Church and State as probably the only real contribution made by the United States to constitutional government.

Harper and Brothers have published *Recent Literature and Religion*. John Rothwell Slater, the author, is the Chairman of the Department of English at the University of Rochester. He con-

finer his survey to American and English literature since 1900 and adopts Micah's statement as his idea of religion—"to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God."

Admitting the reading public is not so much afraid of faith or so proud of doubt as it was a quarter of a century ago, he rates the period as still skeptical. He takes the virtues of the abler contemporary writers to be, courage to banish fear, honesty to combat hypocrisy and slander, sympathy to understand weakness and forgive. They incline to reject mysticism as a subjective delusion and to disbelieve in immortality. They take Jesus to be an innocent martyr, whose fortitude and benevolence are to be admired, but whose life and death afford us merely a remote ideal example. Having dismissed what they call their illusions, they are not sure that there is a soul though they talk much of a self or psyche; they know little of conscience or repentance but much of remorseful memory and unconquerable fear.

With complacency abandoned, they are searching for better ways of living. "In these writers we have seen our generation as it is; struggling in vain to find a new way for better living without better men to make it; to find happiness without sacrifice, peace without goodwill, prosperity without integrity. But we have also seen forces that make light from waterfalls, courage from crises, beauty from dust. It appears that reason is not enough. Science and social progress are not enough. Something divine awaits and invites us."

This is the most hopeful word Doctor Slater can report of the best present literature.

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